JAMES A. TEILBORG, Senior District Judge.
Pending before the Court is Defendant Quiel's Motion to Supplement the Record (Doc. 394), Defendant Kerr's Notice of Joinder to Defendant Quiel's Motion to Supplement the Record (Doc. 395), Defendant Quiel's Motion to Supplement the Record (Doc. 396), and Defendant Kerr's Notice of Joinder to Defendant Quiel's Second Motion to Supplement the Record (Doc. 397). The Court now rules on the motions.
The Court has previously recounted the facts of this case:
(Doc. 346 at 1-2). On September 24, 2013, Quiel and Kerr ("Defendants") appealed their convictions to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ("Court of Appeals") (Doc. 372; Doc. 375). Quiel filed his first motion to supplement the record on October 18, 2013, and his second motion on October 22, 2013. (Doc. 394; Doc. 396). Kerr has joined in both motions. (Doc. 395; Doc. 397).
Quiel and Kerr ask this Court to supplement the record with documents that they allege tend to show that the third defendant in the case, Christopher Rusch, entered into secret agreements with the government by which Rusch could continue to provide international tax advice. (Doc. 394 at 2-4; Doc. 396 at 1-5). The legal basis for their request is the Court's inherent authority to supplement a record, or alternatively Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure ("FRAP") 10(e). (Doc. 394 at 4; Doc. 396 at 5).
Contrary to Defendants' contention, the Court has no inherent authority to supplement the record after the filing of a notice of appeal. "As a general rule, the filing of a notice of appeal divests a district court of jurisdiction over those aspects of the case involved in the appeal." Stein v. Wood, 127 F.3d 1187, 1189 (9th Cir. 1997). There are a limited number of exceptions to this general rule, namely to correct clerical errors or clarify a judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60, supervising the status quo during the pendency of an appeal, or when specified by statute. Id. No such exception applies in this case. Defendants' filings of notices of appeal on September 24, 2013 divested the Court of jurisdiction with respect to "those aspects of the case involved in the appeal." See Stein, 127 F.3d at 1189. Courts' inherent powers "are those which `are necessary to the exercise of all others.'" Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764 (1980) (quoting United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812)). Because the Court has no jurisdiction over this case, it has no inherent powers to supplement the record.
Defendants' alternative reliance upon FRAP 10(e) is unpersuasive. The rule provides two narrow methods by which a district court may correct the record transmitted to the Court of Appeals:
Fed. R. App. P. 10(e). "All other questions as to the form and content of the record must be presented to the court of appeals." Id. 10(e)(3).
"It is a basic tenet of appellate jurisprudence . . . that parties may not unilaterally supplement the record on appeal with evidence not reviewed by the court below." Lowry v. Barnhart, 329 F.3d 1019, 1024-25 (9th Cir. 2003). As FRAP 10(e) clearly states, only the Court of Appeals has the authority to consider a request to supplement the record with evidence not presented to the district court. See Nat'l Ass'n for Advancement of Multijurisdiction Practice v. Ariz. Supreme Court, 2013 WL 5718962, at *2 (D. Ariz. 2013) (holding that a request to supplement the record with materials not reviewed by the court "should be directed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals"). Defendants have not shown that their proposed evidence was "omitted from or misstated in the record by error or accident." See Fed. R. App. P. 10(e)(2). Indeed, Defendants' stated purpose in seeking to add this evidence to the record is precisely because it was not before the Court at the time of trial or sentencing. See (Doc. 394 at 3). This request is appropriately directed to the Court of Appeals, and this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider it.
For the foregoing reasons,