JAMES A. TEILBORG, District Judge.
Pending before the Court is Defendant Willard John's two Motions to Dismiss the Indictment (Docs. 149, 151) and one Motion to Suppress various Statements made by Defendant (Doc. 150). The Government filed Responses (Docs. 158-60), but Defendant has not replied. The Court held oral arguments and a two-day evidentiary hearing on these three motions over June 18 and 19, 2014. For the reasons stated below, Defendant's three motions are denied.
On the morning of March 19, 2013, Larson Williams ("Williams") discovered Willard John ("Defendant") and NJH ("Victim") lying on the bed in their bedroom in a pool of blood. First responders arrived and found Victim deceased from multiple stab and slash wounds. Defendant was found alive, but suffering from a still bleeding neck wound. Defendant was transported to hospital, underwent surgery, and survived. Later that morning, FBI Special Agent Stephen Hale ("SA Hale") arrived at the scene, interviewed various people present, and collected evidence, including two samples of the bloody mattress Defendant and Victim were found lying upon. Later that day, SA Hale allowed Defendant's family to remove and destroy the bloody mattress.
Also on March 19, 2014, BIA Special Agent Auggie Belvado ("SA Belvado") travelled to the hospital, collected evidence from Defendant, and photographed Defendant's injuries. On March 21 and 32, 2012, SA Hale travelled to the hospital and interviewed Defendant. Defendant was later arrested on suspicion of murder and, on April 11, 2012, indicted on a single count of first degree murder. In preparation for trial, Defendant has moved to dismiss the indictment on two grounds and moved to suppress both of Defendant's statements to SA Hale.
Defendant's first Motion to Dismiss the Indictment (Doc. 149) alleges that the Government investigators destroyed material exculpatory evidence from the crime scene—a bloody mattress—by "giving the bed away to be burned" without first recovering trace evidence from it for future DNA testing (id. at 1-3). Defendant further asserts (id. at 7-15) that this failure to preserve potential DNA evidence constitutes a due process violation and merits either dismissal of the indictment or, alternatively, a lesser sanction. In its Response, the Government argues (Doc. 159 at 8-14) that a due process violation has not occurred because the destruction of the bloody mattress does not prejudice Defendant.
In United States v. Sivilla, 714 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2013), the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit articulated the applicable legal standard:
Sivilla, 714 F.3d at 1172. Generally, evidence is material and exculpatory if it is clearly favorable to the accused, and considered in the context of the entire record, may affect the outcome of the case. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 113-14 (1976). In contrast, "[p]otentially useful evidence" is evidence "of which no more can be said than that it could have been subjected to tests, the results of which might have exonerated the defendant," such as Breathalyzer samples or seized cocaine. Illinois v. Fisher, 540 U.S. 544, 547-48 (2004); Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 57.
In this case, the Court held a hearing in order to fully establish and examine the relevant facts:
• SA Hale interviewed the first responders at the scene and was told, among other things, that upon arrival at the scene, a first responder witnessed a neighbor exit the residence.
Based on these facts, the Court must determine "whether any exculpatory value in the [bloody mattress] was apparent to the government agents." Sivilla, 714 F.3d at 1172. Defendant argues that the identity of the perpetrator is at issue here. (Doc. 149 at 9-11). Consequently, Defendant argues that the bloody mattress was materially exculpatory because further examination of the bloody mattress—including vacuuming for hairs, fibers, and other trace evidence—may have identified the true attacker and eliminated Defendant as a suspect. (Id.). For analogy, Defendant cites to State v. Escalante, a 1986 Arizona state case about the preservation of DNA evidence when identity is an issue.
Defendant's analogy to Escalante, however, is inapposite. In Escalante, the semen, had it been tested, would have conclusively determined whether or not the defendant was the attacker. 734 P.2d at 603-04. Here, by contrast, gathering additional trace evidence from the mattress could not conclusively exonerate Defendant because Defendant (and his DNA) was undisputedly present on the mattress at the scene. At best, if testable trace evidence could have been gathered,
Here, the facts demonstrate that SA Hale did not consider the mattress, as a whole, to hold any exculpatory value. Moreover, SA Hale specifically preserved both a sample of the blood coating the top of the bloody mattress and the bloody fingerprints found on its underside. Thus, the facts demonstrate that to the extent the bloody mattress held any apparent materially exculpatory value, SA Hale preserved that evidence. The Court finds that there was no obviously materially exculpatory value in the unpreserved portion of the bloody mattress. Thus, even if the Government was negligent in not preserving the remainder of the bloody mattress, Defendant must demonstrate that the government's actions rise to the level of bad faith required by Youngblood. 488 U.S. at 56.
Here, Defendant scantly argues bad faith by arguing that "the FBI did not simply mishandle the evidence as was the circumstance in Escalante, in which the State simply failed to freeze the evidence. The FBI deliberately gave the evidence away, knowing it would be destroyed." (Doc. 149 at 11). Although true that SA Hale allowed Defendant's family, at their not-unusual request, to remove the mattress and destroy it, the Court finds that this does not rise to the level of bad faith. SA Hale specifically collected a blood sample from the top of the mattress and cut-out the bloody fingerprints on the underside, thereby preserving the most relevant portions of the mattress prior to its destruction. Additionally, SA Hale credibly testified that he did not believe that the remainder of the mattress constituted potentially exculpatory evidence, in part because of the lack of evidence of an intruder and the fact that the mattress undeniably had been saturated with Defendant and Victim's blood. Defendant cites to no other fact as evidence of bad faith.
In sum, the Court finds that the facts do not support a claim that the exculpatory value of the bloody mattress at the time of its destruction was apparent to government agents or that the conduct of the government agents demonstrated bad faith. Thus, the Court concludes that the destruction of the mattress did not violate Defendant's due process rights. See Sivilla, 714 F.3d at 1172; see also, Del Toro-Barboza, 673 F.3d at 1150 ("[W]here evidence is routinely destroyed or lost by the government with no knowledge that the evidence is likely exculpatory, and the evidence is later sought for testing, the destruction or loss of such evidence is not fundamentally unfair to a defendant and will not offend traditional notions of due process."). Accordingly, the Court denies Defendant's first Motion to Dismiss the Indictment (Doc. 149).
In the alternative, Defendant asks the Court to "suppress the additional evidence recovered in the bedroom, to include [Victim's] body, photographs of the scene, the scissors the Government claims to be the murder weapon, and all other items from the room that the Government may seek to introduce at trial." (Doc. 149 at 12). Additionally, Defendant asks that the Court provide an adverse jury instruction regarding the destruction of the bloody mattress. (Id. at 13-15).
In determining whether to give a remedial jury instruction, the "Court must balance `the quality of the Government's conduct' against `the degree of prejudice to the accused,' where the government bears the burden of justifying its conduct and the accused of demonstrating prejudice." Sivilla, 714 F.3d at 1173 (quoting United States v. Loud Hawk, 628 F.2d 1139, 1152 (9th Cir. 1979) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
Sivilla, 714 F.3d at 1173-74 (quoting Loud Hawk, 628 F.2d at 1152).
First, with regard to the "secondary"
Second, with regard to an adverse jury instruction, SA Hale gave permission for Defendant's family to destroy the bloody mattress. This indicates that although the mattress was located within and removed from Victim's bedroom, the government had sufficient control over the crime scene at the time of removal to prevent removal and the destruction of the mattress. However, the facts do not indicate that the government acted with disregard for the rights of the accused. Rather, SA Hale specifically preserved two sections from the mattress, a sample of the bloody top and the bloody fingerprints on the underside. Although SA Hale may not have strictly followed FBI protocol, the facts indicate that SA Hale acted in good faith and with reasonable justification in acquiescing to Defendant's family's request to destroy a health and safety hazard. Thus, the Court finds the quality of the government's conduct to be, if less than ideal, still rather high.
With regard to Defendant's burden of demonstrating prejudice, Defendant merely reiterates (Doc. 149 at 14-15) his illogical and wishful speculation that perhaps some useful trace evidence could have been recovered from the unpreserved portions of the bloody mattress. When balanced against the government's conduct, the Court does not find that the destruction of the bloody mattress warrants an adverse jury instruction. Accordingly, the Court denies Defendant's request for an adverse jury instruction.
Defendant's second Motion to Dismiss the Indictment (Doc. 151) alleges that the Government investigators destroyed material exculpatory evidence of Defendant's physical injuries by failing to preserve evidence of the injuries through photographs (id. at 2-4). Defendant further asserts (id. at 4-11) that this failure to preserve evidence constitutes a due process violation and merits either dismissal of the indictment or, alternatively, a lesser sanction. In its Response, the Government explains (Doc. 158 at 1-3) that, in fact, photographs of the Defendant's injuries were taken and have now been disclosed to Defendant. At the evidentiary hearing, Defendant's Counsel confirmed this disclosure. Because the Government, in fact, preserved the evidence at issue, the Court finds Defendant's motion moot.
From his hospital bed, Defendant provided two statements
Defendant alleges that because SA Hale twice entered Defendant's hospital room to obtain statements from Defendant without a search warrant, the government violated Defendant's reasonable expectations of privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. (Doc. 150 at 5-6). Apparently characterizing the two government interviews as "searches," Defendant generally cites (id.) to Katz v. United States for the long-standing proposition that an unreasonable search occurs when the intrusion violates both the subject's subjective and society's objective expectations of privacy. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Next, Defendant explains that Defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy
Defendant's reliance on a general concept of privacy, however, is misplaced. First, what occurred were interrogations, not Fourth Amendment searches, and Defendant offers no legal support otherwise. To the extent that SA Hale's entrance into John's hospital room can be considered a search, however, the Court finds that Defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy. In a not dissimilar case, United States v. George, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that a patient admitted to the hospital did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his hospital room. 987 F.2d 1428 (9th Cir. 1993). In George, a suspect was involuntarily admitted to the hospital while suffering a drug overdose. Id. at 1429. Suspecting that the suspect had swallowed balloons of heroin, the police searched the suspects bed pan and seized the results. Id. The court held that the suspect did not have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy because he was admitted to the hospital involuntarily and under police supervision. Id. at 1432. Therefore, the officers did not commit an unreasonable search and seizure when they entered the suspect's room, searched his bedpan, and seized the results. Id. Although the suspect in George was already under arrest when the "intrusion" occurred, unlike Defendant here, the distinction is not material because Defendant was under similarly heightened supervision.
Furthermore, even if Defendant someone had both a subjective and objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in his commercial, albeit "private," hospital room,
Defendant alleges that the circumstances surrounding Defendant's statements indicate that Defendant was not competent to waive either his right to counsel or his right to remain silent. (Doc. 150 at 7-8). Notably, Defendant does not appear to dispute that he was properly Mirandized before both interviews, acknowledged that he understood his rights, did not request an attorney,
At the suppression hearing, Dr. Morenz testified that Defendant did not have the capacity to knowingly and intelligently consent to being interviewed by SA Hale. Dr. Morenz based his post hac diagnosis "on the totality of the circumstances," including the possible effects of medications (morphine and Ativan), Defendant's emotional state, and Defendant's overall development and capacity. Dr. Morenz, however, admitted that his interviews with Defendant occurred many months after the two March interviews and that Dr. Morenz's knowledge of the March interviews came primarily from Defendant's statements to Dr. Morenz and secondarily from a review of various police and medical records. Additionally, Dr. Morenz admitted that although Defendant had been prescribed morphine and Ativan, Dr. Morenz had no knowledge of what dosage, if any, Defendant had consumed at the time of either interview. Thus, Dr. Morenz admitted that he could not say with medical certainty to what extent medications may have affected Defendant's competency. Although the Court finds Dr. Morenz eminently qualified, here Dr. Morenz's opinion lacks meaningful foundation and was formed too remotely to be probative. Consequently, the Court ascribes limited credibility to Dr. Morenz's opinion of Defendant's competency at the March 21 and 23, 2012 interviews.
At the suppression hearing, Dr. Menchola expressed a similar post hac diagnosis of Defendant's lack of competency. Dr. Menchola, a neuropsychologist, based her opinion on tests she administered that revealed Defendant's significant difficulty using language to express ideas and for abstract or concrete reasoning. Dr. Menchola, however, indicated that because the tests she administered to Defendant had not been normalized
In determining the voluntariness of Defendant's statements, the Court must determine "whether, under all of the circumstances—including [Defendant's] age, intellectual disability, and lack of sophistication, and the interrogation techniques used—there was coercive police action which overbore [Defendant's] will and rendered his confession involuntary." United States v. Preston, ___ F.3d ___, ___, 2014 WL 1876269, at *9 (9th Cir. May 12, 2014) (en banc). In evaluating the voluntariness of Defendant's confession, it is not necessary to first conclude that the government's conduct was coercive before examining Defendant's individual characteristics. Id. at ___, 2014 WL 1876269, *8-9 (overruling Derrick v. Peterson, 924 F.2d 813 (9th Cir. 1991), Amaya-Ruiz v. Stewart, 121 F.3d 486 (9th Cir. 1997), United States v. Chischilly, 30 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 1994)).
Preston, ___ F.3d at ___, 2014 WL 1876269, at *9.
Here, Defendant adduces no evidence suggesting that SA Hale used coercive interrogation tactics such that Defendant's statements were anything but voluntary. Rather, Defendant relies solely on his two expert's opinions that Defendant's individual characteristics demonstrating a reduced mental capacity simply precluded any voluntary waiver of Defendant's right to remain silent. In Preston, however, the Ninth Circuit very recently made it abundantly clear that courts consider a defendant's reduced mental capacity "because it [may] render[] him more susceptible to subtle forms of coercion." ___ F.3d at ___, 2014 WL 1876269, at *10 (citing N. Mariana Islands v. Mendiola, 976 F.2d 475, 485 (9th Cir. 1993), overruled on other grounds by George v. Camacho, 119 F.3d 1393 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc)).
With regard to the March 21 and 23 interviews, the Court finds that SA Hale's testimony (which the Court finds fully credible) and the tape and transcript of the March 23 interview do not indicate that SA Hale used any inherently coercive interrogation techniques when interviewing Defendant. SA Hale spent approximately 45 minutes conversing with Defendant prior to the March 21 interview in order to establish Defendant's ability to understand and answer questions. SA Hale stated that Defendant appeared to have greater competency and understanding than many of the tribal members he has interviewed in the past. During the interviews, SA Hale asked simple and often open-ended questions. SA Hale used simple language, went slowly, explained questions and concepts, and kept the interviews relatively short. SA Hale did not volunteer incriminating details of the crime, press for answers when Defendant expressed a lack of knowledge, or persistently rephrase questions when Defendant provided a non-inculpatory answer. SA Hale repeatedly informed Defendant that he did not have to answer questions. At the March 21 interview, SA Hale did not demand that Defendant sign a written waiver after Defendant inquired whether Defendant could sign the written waiver later. In sum, nothing in the record suggests that SA Hale sought to take advantage of Defendant's weakened condition.
Turning to Defendant, SA Hale testified that during both interviews, Defendant was coherent, generally unemotional, and responsive to the agents' questions, answered without hesitation, and did not appear impaired by medications. Defendant had previously had numerous visitors to his hospital room and had a pile of written notes stacked next to his bedside, indicating that Defendant had been communicating with others. Defendant communicated with both head nods and shaking, written notes, and, at the March 23 interview, whispers. Defendant did not ask to end the interviews despite being advised by SA Hale that he could. Defendant expressed understanding of his rights and, furthermore, the record establishes that Defendant was no stranger to law enforcement and had been read Miranda rights on many previous occasions. During the March 21 interview, Defendant specifically asked SA Hale to return once Defendant was physically able to express himself verbally. Additionally, Defendant expressed his will to sign the March 21 written waiver at a later date, but nonetheless chose to continue speaking with SA Hale. Defendant also volunteered material details—such as the fact that the murder weapon was scissors—without prompting or suggestion from SA Hale. Additionally, at the end of the March 21 interview, Defendant even specifically asked SA Hale for the whereabouts of Defendant's cellphone. To facilitate the return of his cellphone, Defendant drew a detailed sketch of his phone from memory, including a unique identifying mark. Displaying recollection of the previous interview, on March 23 Defendant again inquired about his cellphone.
Although Defendant was in the hospital, medicated (to an unknown extent), and recovering from trauma and pain, the Ninth Circuit has held that a defendant can voluntarily waive his Miranda rights even when he is "in the hospital, on medication, and in pain." George, 987 F.2d at 1430. Moreover, Courts have consistently found a defendant's statements voluntary in circumstances more questionable than these. See, e.g., California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1124-25 (1982) (statements upheld where defendant was interviewed while intoxicated and emotionally distraught); United States v. Miller, 84 F.2d 1028, 1032 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding that "mere emotionalism and confusion" do not render waiver involuntary); United States v. Martin, 781 F.2d 671, 673-74 (9th Cir. 1985) (upholding statements where the defendant was in pain and under the influence of Demerol and pain killers when interviewed); United States v. Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 393 F.3d 849, 55 (9th Cir. 2005) (statements voluntary where defendant was suffering from mild to moderate heroin withdrawal); United States v. Lewis, 833 F.2d 1380, 1382-83 (9th Cir. 1987) (upholding interview of the defendant in the prison hospital one day after the defendant underwent surgery).
Considered all together, the various factors here (including Defendant's weakened mental and emotional state) do not suggest that SA Hale overbore Defendant's will during either the March 21 or March 23 interviews. The Court finds that Defendant had the necessary competency to, and did, in fact, knowingly and voluntarily waive his Miranda rights. Accordingly, the Court denies Defendant's Motion to Suppress with respect to a Fifth and Sixth Amendment Miranda violation.
Accordingly,
