H. RUSSEL HOLLAND, District Judge.
Defendant City of Hildale ("Hildale") moves for an order requiring non-party United Effort Plan Trust ("the Trust") to respond to a subpoena issued by this court. The motion is opposed. Oral argument has been requested but is not deemed necessary.
One of plaintiff's claims in this case is interference with fair housing by Hildale. Hildale asserts (and the court believes based on earlier information in this case) that the Trust owns much of the property in Colorado City and Hildale. Alleged victims' houses may be on property owned by the Trust. By a subpoena issued on July 29, 2014, Hildale sought production from the Trust of six categories of documents.
Hildale asserts that the instant motion is brought pursuant to Rule 37, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and Local Rule 37.1. However, it is Rule 45 that governs the enforcement of third-party subpoenas. Rule 45(d)(2)(B) addresses the subject of objections to subpoenas such as that made by the Trust. Here, the trust timely objected to Hildale's subpoena. Pertinent to what is before the court, Rule 45(d)(2)(B) provides:
If an objection is made, the following rules apply:
In this instance, the "commanded person" is the Trust; the "serving party" is Hildale; and the "district where compliance is required" is Utah.
As Rule 45(d)(2)(B)(ii) recognizes, the purpose of 2013 revisions to Rule 45 are aimed at protecting persons such as the Trust who are neither parties nor affiliated with a party from incurring significant expense in complying with a subpoena. The above-quoted portions of Rule 45(d) make it clear that a motion to compel production pursuant to a third-party subpoena is to be filed in "the district where compliance is required." As set out above, compliance in this instance was to be at the offices of Hildale's counsel in Salt Lake City, Utah. Rule 45(d)(2)(B)(i) authorizes the type of motion before the court; but the motion has been filed in the wrong court.
Hildale points out that Rule 45(f) makes provision for transferring of a subpoena-related motion from the court where compliance is specified to the issuing court. This provision, first and foremost, does not alter the rule which requires that a motion to enforce a subpoena be first filed in the district where compliance is required. That district (in this instance, Utah) may transfer subpoena enforcement proceedings to the issuing court "if the person subject to the subpoena consents or if the [Utah] court finds exceptional circumstances."
The motion to compel the United Effort Plan Trust to produce documents in response to Hildale's subpoena is denied.