JAMES A. TEILBORG, District Judge.
Pending before the Court is Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint. (Doc. 75). The Court now rules on the motion.
The background of this case was recited by the Court in its July 14, 2015 order dismissing Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint ("FAC"):
(Doc. 73 at 1-2).
On July 14, 2015, the Court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss the FAC. (Doc. 73). On July 21, 2015, Plaintiffs filed a motion to amend their Complaint and lodged a proposed Second Amended Complaint ("SAC"), which Defendants oppose. (Docs. 75, 76, 79). Plaintiffs' motion to amend is fully briefed.
The Court should freely give leave to amend "when justice so requires." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). "In exercising its discretion[,] . . . `a court must be guided by the underlying purpose of Rule 15—to facilitate decision on the merits rather than on the pleadings or technicalities. . . . Thus, `Rule 15's policy of favoring amendments to pleadings should be applied with extreme liberality.'" Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1135 (9th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted); accord Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Rose, 893 F.2d 1074, 1079 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating that leave to amend is generally allowed with "extraordinary liberality"). "This liberality . . . is not dependent on whether the amendment will add causes of action or parties." DCD Programs, LTD. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 186 (9th Cir. 1987).
The extremely liberal policy in favor of amendments, however, is subject to some limitations. Motions to amend need not be granted when the district court determines that there has been a showing of (2) bad faith, (3) prejudice to the opposing party, (4) futility of amendment, or (5) repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). Thus, the Court need not allow a proposed amended complaint that suffers from the same defects that caused the original complaint to be dismissed. See Canatella v. Jamison, 9 F.3d 1550 (9th Cir. 1993) ("Indeed, the second amended complaint proposed by Canatella included the same vague, general and conclusory allegations of concerted state action as did the first amended complaint. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend." (emphasis in original)); McGlinchy v. Shell Chem. Co., 845 F.2d 802, 818 (9th Cir. 1988) ("The deficiencies in the AFA complaint are not cured by new facts or allegations presented by appellants in the proposed Second Amended Complaint. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend by means of the Second Amended Complaint."). A litigant's right to amend their complaint under Rule 15(a) survives even the dismissal of the complaint. Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing Bonanno v. Thomas, 309 F.2d 320, 322 (9th Cir. 1962)).
Plaintiffs' proposed SAC contains claims under three statutes: (1) 42 U.S.C. § 1983, (2) the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc, et seq., and (3) the Arizona Free Exercise of Religion Act ("FERA"), 41 A.R.S § 41-1493, et seq. The Court addresses the proposed SAC's claims under each of these statutes separately.
The proposed SAC describes additional details not found in the FAC regarding the conflict that gave rise to this litigation. For example, the SAC describes the complaints made by neighbors about Plaintiffs' bible study groups, (Doc. 76 at ¶¶ 38-40, 56), the meetings Plaintiffs had with their city councilman and Defendants, (id. at ¶ 41-43), the correspondence that took place between Plaintiffs and Defendants, (id. at ¶¶ 44-45, 49, 52-53), and an instance in which the Phoenix Fire Department was dispatched "to disperse a bible study of about 15 people at the resident of the plaintiffs," (id. at ¶ 48). Additionally, the proposed SAC deletes all mention of Mr. Salman's convictions, which heretofore have been at the center this controversy.
In its July 14, 2015 order, Court dismissed the § 1983 claims because they are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994) and because Judge Martone's decision collaterally estops Plaintiffs from re-litigating those claims. (Doc. 73 at 6). While the added historical details in the proposed SAC give context to the parties' dispute, they ultimately do nothing to alter the Court's analysis; Judge Martone's decision still commands preclusive effect and Plaintiffs' claims still necessarily imply the invalidity of Mr. Salman's conviction.
The omission of Mr. Salman's convictions from the proposed SAC poses a slightly different question. If the Court looks only at the four corners of the proposed SAC, then it cannot consider Mr. Salman's conviction and must conclude that the Heck bar does not apply. But because Mr. Salman's convictions are a "matters of public record" that are not "subject to reasonable dispute," the Court need not ignore them when determining whether Plaintiffs have stated a claim under § 1983. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting MGIC Indem. Corp. v. Weisman, 803 F.2d 500, 504 (9th Cir. 1986)). Therefore, the Court's conclusion that Plaintiffs' § 1983 claims are barred by Heck also applies to Plaintiffs' proposed SAC and allowing Plaintiffs' amendments to their § 1983 claims would be futile.
In its July 14, 2015 order, the Court explained that not every ordinance is subject to RLUIPA's requirements; rather, the act applies only to "land use regulations," which are defined as "zoning or landmarking law[s] . . . that limit[] or restrict[] a claimant's use or development of land." (Id. at 10-11) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(5)). The Court concluded that the FAC did not state a claim under RLUIPA because it did not specify which substantive sections of the Code were being enforced against Plaintiffs. It was therefore impossible to tell whether RLUIPA applies or whether the Code imposes substantial burdens on Plaintiffs' free exercise. (Doc. 73 at 11-12). The Court further noted that "the few portions of the Amended Complaint that give some small clue as to the nature of the ordinances at issue indicate that they are building and safety codes, not zoning or landmarking laws." (Doc. 73 at 12).
Plaintiffs' proposed SAC does not remedy these flaws. Indeed, like the FAC, the SAC cites only § 303, which categorizes building occupancy and use but imposes no substantive duties. (Doc. 76 at ¶¶ 70-101). Also like the FAC, the few allegations in the SAC that hint at the substantive provisions in the Code largely indicate that those provisions are not zoning or landmarking laws. For example, one allegation calls the Code a "commercial or assembly construction code[]." (Doc. 76 at ¶ 65). Another allegation states that Plaintiffs were required to "develop a half street in front of their home . . . which would include adding an expanded roadway, pavement, asphalt, curb, gutter, and sidewalk among other things." (Id. at ¶ 58). From these descriptions, it appears that the Code sections enforced against Plaintiffs (and which Plaintiffs seek to enjoin Defendant from enforcing in the future), regulate construction, safety, and traffic, and do not resemble zoning or landmarking laws.
In short, the proposed SAC does not specify which Code sections Plaintiffs challenge, and the few allegations that give some information about the Code sections at issue indicate that they are not "land use regulations" governed by RLUIPA. These are precisely the same deficiencies identified by the Court in its order dismissing the FAC. Accordingly, the proposed SAC fails to state a claim under RLUIPA and allowing the proposed amendments to Plaintiffs' RLUIPA claims would be futile.
In its July 14, 2015 order, the Court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's FERA claim, finding that because "this case has not yet entered the discovery phase and [because] Plaintiffs have had ample opportunity in several other venues to litigate their grievances, . . . declining to exercise jurisdiction over quintessential state law issues such as interpretation of . . . FERA `serves the objectives of economy, convenience and fairness to the parties, and comity.'" (Doc. 73 at 13) (quoting Trustees of Constr. Indus. & Laborers Health & Welfare Trust v. Desert Valley Landscape & Maint., Inc., 333 F.3d 923, 925 (9th Cir. 2003)). The Court further elaborated that "Plaintiffs' FERA claims are likely also barred by collateral estoppel, given that the Maricopa Superior Court decision upholding Mr. Salman's conviction specifically addressed that issue." (Id. at 13 n.6) (citing (Doc. 22-1, Ex. 1 at 5)).
This reasoning also applies to Plaintiffs' FERA claims in the proposed SAC. Because, as explained above, Plaintiffs have failed to cure the deficiencies in their federal claims, those claims remain dismissed. Thus, even if the Court allowed Plaintiffs' amendments to their FERA claims, the Court would decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over those claims for the same reasons the Court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the FAC. The Court therefore concludes that allowing Plaintiffs' proposed amendments
Although the Court concludes that allowing the proposed SAC would be futile, the Court cannot conclude that no possible amendments could cure the FAC's defects. Accordingly, the Court will not enter judgment at this time. If, however, Plaintiffs fail to file a motion to amend by September 11, 2015, the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment in favor of Defendants.
Accordingly,
