DAVID G. CAMPBELL, District Judge.
On February 29, 2016, Petitioner Armand Andreozzi filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Doc. 1. The Court referred the petition to Magistrate Judge Bridget S. Bade. Doc. 4 at 3. On July 8, 2016, Judge Bade issued a report and a recommendation that the Court deny the petition ("R&R"). Doc. 16. Petitioner filed pro se objections to the R&R (Doc. 19), and Respondent Kathryn Tracy filed a response (Doc. 22). For the reasons set forth below, the Court will accept Judge Bade's recommendation that the Petition be denied, but on a different basis.
Judge Bade provided the following summary of Petitioner's convictions and habeas corpus petition:
Doc. 16 at 2-4 (footnotes and citations omitted).
Petitioner again argues that he has been confined with foreign nationals in violation of 10 U.S.C. § 812, which prohibits the confinement of members of the armed services in close association with enemy prisoners or other foreign nationals. Doc. 1 at 1. As a remedy, he seeks five days' credit to his sentence for every day his custody has violated § 812. Id. at 9. He also argues that the Army Court of Criminal Appeals ("ACCA") arbitrarily denied his petition for habeas corpus relief. Id. at 5.
Judge Bade found that the "full and fair consideration" standard applies to the Court's collateral review of the ACCA's denial of Petitioner's habeas corpus petition. Id. She concluded that federal courts should defer to military courts when reviewing the merits of court-martial proceedings and any ancillary matters that have been considered and decided by military courts. Id. at 6. She also determined that the ACCA's denial of Petitioner's habeas petition constituted full and fair consideration because Petitioner fully briefed and argued his claim before the ACCA. Judge Bade found that if an issue is fully briefed before a military court, even a summary denial by that court constitutes full and fair consideration. Id. at 5.
Judge Bade also found that Petitioner has provided no factual support for the alleged violation of § 812. As a result, she found that Petitioner's claim should be denied even if considered de novo. Id. at 9. Further, Judge Bade denied Petitioner's motion to strike documents relating to his court-marital proceedings, finding that they provided important context for this case. Id. at 2.
Petitioner first objects to the denial of his Rule 12(f) motion to strike "all matters pertaining to Pet[itioners court martial proceedings], appeal, discharge, and confinement". Doc. 14 at 2. According to Petitioner, those matters are "outside the scope of the issues raised in this action." Doc. 19 at 1. Next, Petitioner argues that the full and fair consideration standard does not apply to collateral review of his claim because he does not challenge the merits of his court-martial proceedings or a matter ancillary to those proceedings. Id. at 2-5. He asserts, in the alternative, that even if the standard applies, it was not met in his case. Id. at 5-7. Finally, Petitioner objects to Judge Bade's finding on the merits of his claim, again asserting that he is being confined with foreign nationals in violation of § 812. The Court will review Petitioner's specific objections de novo. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003).
Under Rule 12(f), the court may "strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). Motions to strike are generally disfavored and "should not be granted unless it is clear that the matter to be stricken could have no possible bearing on the subject matter of the litigation." Johnson v. Cal. Medical Facility Health Servs., 2015 WL 4508734, at *6 (E.D. Cal. July 24, 2015).
Petitioner argues that Respondent's pleadings, which contain records of Petitioner's charges, sentencing, appeal, discharge, and confinement, are "immaterial, impertinent, and are an insufficient defense to the issues raised in the petition and fall squarely within the parameters of Rule 12(f) to be stricken." Doc. 19 at 1. Judge Bade found that the records provide context for Petitioner's claim. Doc. 16 at 2. The Court agrees. Petitioner's claims concern his status within the military, the adequacy of the consideration his claims received in military court, and the nature of his current claim under § 812. The records are relevant to Petitioner's claims.
Petitioner filed a petition for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The government did not assert that this was an improper form of relief, and Judge Bade dealt with his claim as a habeas petition. The Court concludes, however, that Petitioner seeks relief that cannot be obtained through a habeas petition.
There are "well-recognized boundaries between habeas corpus and civil rights claims." Glaus v. Anderson, 408 F.3d 382, 385 (7th Cir. 2005). As the Supreme Court has made clear, habeas claims are proper only when an individual is challenging the validity or duration of his confinement. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973), 498-99. The Ninth Circuit has echoed this distinction:
Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 856 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal citations omitted). In a recent en banc decision, the Ninth Circuit confirmed that cases challenging conditions of confinement, rather than the fact or duration of confinement, cannot be brought as habeas claims. Nettles v. Grounds, ___ F.3d ___, No. 12-16935, 2016 WL 4072465, at *9 (9th Cir. July 26, 2016) ("Because success on Nettles's claims would not necessarily lead to his immediate or earlier release from confinement, Nettles's claim does not fall within `the core of habeas corpus,' and he must instead bring his claim under § 1983.") (citation omitted).
In Glaus, a federal prisoner filed a habeas petition alleging a violation of his Eighth Amendment rights based on prison officials' indifference to his need for medical treatment, and requested transfer to a prison medical facility or release from custody to obtain treatment. 408 F.3d at 384. The Seventh Circuit upheld the district court's dismissal of the petition, noting that it "was really a classic `conditions of confinement' claim" which should be brought as a civil rights action. Id. at 386; see also Wiley v. Holt, 42 F. App'x 399, 400 (10th Cir. 2002) ("A habeas corpus proceeding attacks the fact or duration of a prisoner's confinement and seeks the remedy of immediate release or a shortened period of confinement. In contrast, a civil rights action attacks the conditions of the prisoner's confinement.") (internal citation omitted).
Here, Petitioner does not challenge the validity or duration of his confinement. He challenges a condition of his confinement — being housed with foreign nationals. Doc. 19. The fact that petitioner asks for a remedy that would shorten his sentence does not change the underlying nature of his claim. Doc. 1. The petitioner in Glaus also sought early release, but the court held that habeas corpus was not the proper avenue for his claim. 408 F.3d at 384. Glaus noted that release was not an available remedy for an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim. Similarly, Petitioner has presented no authority to suggest that a reduced sentence is an appropriate remedy for violation of § 812.
A court may recharacterize an improperly labeled habeas petition as a civil rights claim, and deal with it as recharacterized. See Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 647 (2004); Glaus, 408 F.3d at 388; Weaver v. Sanders, No. CV 13-3269-FMO JPR, 2013 WL 2147806, at *2 (C.D. Cal. May 16, 2013). But the court in Glaus recognized several factors that recommend caution before recharacterizing a habeas petition. 408 F.3d at 388. These include discrepancies in the identification of the defendant, the nature of the relief sought, relevant exhaustion requirements for filing, and the amount of the filing fee. Id. Here, as in Glaus, the warden has been named as the respondent and may not be the correct or exclusive defendant in a civil rights action. It does not appear that the decision to house Petitioner in the Bureau of Prisons was the Warden's. Petitioner may need to seek relief against the Department of the Army or the Bureau of Prisons. See Moore v. Pemberton, 110 F.3d 22, 23-24 (7th Cir. 1997) ("The right respondent in a § 2254 action is the warden of the prison; the right defendants in a § 1983 suit are the persons whose wrongful acts harmed the plaintiff (and the warden is rarely a proper defendant, because he is not vicariously liable for subordinates' acts).").
In addition, because Petitioner is complaining about where he has been housed by federal officials, his civil rights claim may need to be brought under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), if it can be maintained under the Bivens doctrine. As the Seventh Circuit noted in Glaus, however, "federal prisoners suing under Bivens may sue relevant officials in their individual capacity only. In this instance, Glaus's suit against the warden appears to be an action against the warden in his official capacity." 408 F.3d at 389. The same is true of Petitioner's claim.
Considering the nature of Petitioner's allegations, the Court declines to recharacterize Petitioner's complaint as a civil rights suit. The Court instead will deny the petition without prejudice so Petitioner can consider pursuing his claim as a civil rights action. This comports with the recognition in Glaus that recharacterization should occur only "in a narrow set of circumstances." Id. at 388; see also Nettles, 2016 WL 4072465, at *9-10 (discussing Glaus favorably).
The Court expresses no view on whether Petitioner can plead or prevail on a civil rights claim.
