Elawyers Elawyers
Washington| Change

Krassow v. Ryan, CV 16-00054-TUC-JGZ(JR). (2017)

Court: District Court, D. Arizona Number: infdco20170426910 Visitors: 8
Filed: Mar. 30, 2017
Latest Update: Mar. 30, 2017
Summary: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION JACQUELINE M. RATEAU , Magistrate Judge . Pending before the Court is Jeffrey A. Krassow's ("Krassow") Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 12) filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2254. In their Limited Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Respondents affirmatively argue that Krassow's Petition is untimely and that he is not entitled to statutory or equitable tolling. Doc. 17. As explained below, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the Petition be dismissed
More

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Pending before the Court is Jeffrey A. Krassow's ("Krassow") Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 12) filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In their Limited Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Respondents affirmatively argue that Krassow's Petition is untimely and that he is not entitled to statutory or equitable tolling. Doc. 17. As explained below, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the Petition be dismissed with prejudice.

I. Background1

On August 23, 2012, following a jury trial, Krassow was found guilty of aggravated driving under the influence while his license was suspended, revoked or restricted and aggravated driving with an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more while his license was suspended, revoked or in violation of a restriction. Ex. A.2 After finding that Krassow had three historical felony convictions, the trial court sentenced him to concurrent, slightly mitigated nine-year prison terms. Ex. B. On August 30, 2012, Krassow appealed to the Arizona Court of Appeals and on March 28, 2013, the court affirmed his convictions and sentences. Exs. B, D.

On April 30, 2013, Krassow filed a notice and petition for post-conviction relief and on January 9, 2014, the state court dismissed the petition. Exs. F, G, I. Krassow did not appeal that decision to the Arizona Court of Appeals.

Over two years later, on February 3, 2016, Krassow filed a second state petition for post-conviction relief and on May 31, 2016, the state court dismissed the petition. Exs. J, L.

On January 25, 2016, Krassow filed his first federal Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) and on February 4, 2016, the court dismissed the Petition with leave to amend (Doc. 3). On March 28, 2016, Krassow filed an Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 7) and on April 22, 2016, the court again dismissed the Petition with leave to amend (Doc. 10). On May 16, 2016, Krassow filed another Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 11) and on May 20, 2016, he filed a Second Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 12). The court construed the Petition as Krassow's Third Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. Doc. 13. Krassow raises four grounds:

Ground One: Violation of the Fourth Amendment by deterring police misconduct. Which the deterrent purpose was served sufficiently to make it worthwhile to forgo the conviction who wrongfully demonstrated my guilt;

Ground Two: Once again on this ground my Fourth Amendment was violated and also "Unreasonable Application" the clause;

Ground Three: this ground surely shows Prejudice. Also will prove how the jurors were instructed on my blood count for alcohol and sobriety tests that were performed which clearly mislead the jurors if in fact I was driving while intoxicated, which they were not told that I was not in a vehicle or even in control of a vehicle only that a sobriety test was done. (Procedural Default); and

Ground Four: this ground is also listed as Procedural Default and violation the 4th Amendment under Probable innocence for having blood tests drawn and a sobriety test which the sheriff dept had reason reason to conduct either of these because there were no actual basis for them to do so, just by a false report by a corrupt Chief of Police.

II. Timeliness

A. Krassow's Petition is Untimely.

The Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") provides for a one year statute of limitations to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Petitions filed beyond the one-year limitations period must be dismissed. Id. The statute provides in pertinent part that:

(1) A 1—year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of— (A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

Here, on January 9, 2014, the state trial court dismissed Krassow's petition for post-conviction relief. He did not appeal that decision to the Arizona Court of Appeals. Thus, the relevant triggering event for purposes of AEDPA's statute of limitations is when Krassow's time for seeking review expired. Krassow had thirty days from January 9, 2014 to petition the appropriate appellate court for review of the actions of the trial court. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.9(c). After adding five additional days pursuant to Ariz. R. Crim. P. 1.3(a), Krassow's deadline to appeal was February 13, 2014. AEDPA's statute of limitations began to run on February 13, 2014 and expired on February 13, 2015. Krassow did not file his first federal habeas petition until January 25, 2016, 11 months after the expiration of the statute of limitations.3

B. Krassow is not entitled to equitable tolling.

"Equitable tolling of the one-year limitations period in 28 U.S.C. § 2244 is available in our circuit, but only when `extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner's control make it impossible to file a petition on time' and `the extraordinary circumstances were the cause of his untimeliness.'" Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 922 (9th Cir. 2003). A petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling of the limitations period "only if he shows (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing." Lakey v. Hickman, 633 F.3d 782, 786 (9th Cir. 2011). "The high threshold of extraordinary circumstances is necessary lest the exceptions swallow the rule." Id.

Krassow does not argue equitable tolling. As such, his untimely petition is clearly barred by AEDPA's statute of limitations.

III. RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that the District Court, after its independent review, deny Krassow's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 12).

This Recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District Court's judgment.

However, the parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the District Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rules 72(b), 6(a) and 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days within which to file a response to the objections. Replies shall not be filed without first obtaining leave to do so from the District Court. If any objections are filed, this action should be designated case number: CV 16-00054-TUC-JGZ. Failure to timely file objections to any factual or legal determination of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a party's right to de novo consideration of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir.2003) (en banc).

FootNotes


1. The factual summary of the state court is accorded a presumption of correctness. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 746 n. 1 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132, 1135 n. 1 (9th Cir. 2002)).
2. Unless otherwise indicated, all exhibit references are to the exhibits attached to the Respondents' Limited Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. Doc. 17.
3. Respondent correctly notes that the filing of Krassow's second state petition for post-conviction relief on February 3, 2016 did not toll or restart the limitation period which had already expired. Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 922 (9th Cir. 2003); Fergusun v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir.2003). Thus, by the time Krassow filed this petition on February 3, 2016, the statute of limitations had already expired (February 13, 2015).
Source:  Leagle

Can't find what you're looking for?

Post a free question on our public forum.
Ask a Question
Search for lawyers by practice areas.
Find a Lawyer