JAMES A. TEILBORG, Senior District Judge.
At Doc. 18, Defendant Jakel filed a "crossclaim" against Universal Metal Industries Incorporated ("Universal Metal"). Universal Metal moved to dismiss in part on procedural grounds arguing that the only "complaint" that can be filed against Universal Metal in this case is a third-party complaint and not a "crossclaim." (Doc. 22). Specifically, Universal Metal argues that Defendant Jakel cannot meet the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13.
Defendant Jakel responds and presents no colorable argument that what Defendant Jakel called a "crossclaim" does not need be filed as a Third-Party complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14. (Doc. 25 at 7). However, Jakel says that it can cure this technical defect by amendment.
Universal Metal replies and argues that any amendment to correct the caption to a third-party complaint rather than a crossclaim would be futile because, Universal Metal contends, Jakel cannot state a claim against Universal Metal. (Doc. 26 at 3).
The Court will grant leave to amend to allow Jakel to file a Third-Party complaint. In filing the Third-Party complaint, Jakel is free to amend as much as it deems necessary to state a claim.
This Order is without prejudice to Universal Metal again moving to dismiss if it can show Jakel (as a third party plaintiff) fails to state a claim. In so moving, Universal Metal is reminded that the Court must accept all well pleaded factual allegations as true;
Additionally, Universal Metal is reminded that ripeness is not reviewed under the Twombly standard. Thus, to the extent what Universal Metal is actually arguing is that any claims against it are not currently ripe in this case, based on expert opinions in other cases, Universal Metal should apply the correct legal test.
Finally, Universal Metal argues that: "The purpose of [Fed. R. Civ. P] 12(b)(6) is to enable defendants to challenge the legal sufficiency of complaints without subjecting themselves to discovery." Rutman Wine Co. v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 829 F.2d 729, 738 (9th Cir. 1987). This argument is rejected. As this Court noted in its Order of March 1, 2017, Universal Metal was bound by all deadlines in this Court's Rule 16 scheduling order unless Universal Metal sought a supplemental Rule 16 conference within 30 days of service. Universal Metal did not make any such request, and therefore, discovery should already by ongoing in this case.
Based on the foregoing,