ORDER

JOHN Z. BOYLE, Magistrate Judge.

Pending before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Compel Arbitration of Individual Claims. (Doc. 11.) For the reasons below, the Court will grant Defendant's Motion to Compel and order Plaintiff Leonardo Lopez and Defendant to proceed to arbitration as provided in the parties' Arbitration Agreement. The Court will deny without prejudice Defendant's request to dismiss the Complaint and order the parties to provide briefing regarding whether the Court should stay or dismiss this action while Plaintiff and Defendant proceed to arbitration, and the impact of the opt-in Plaintiffs on this case moving forward.1

I. Background

Plaintiff began working for Defendant as an Account Executive in Defendant's Arizona Office on January 5, 2015. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 15, 28; Doc. 11-1 ¶¶ 8-9.) On February 26, 2016, Defendant informed Plaintiff it would be terminating his employment, effective February 29, 2016. (Doc. 11-1 ¶ 11.) Defendant provided Plaintiff with a Severance Agreement for his consideration on February 26, 2016. (Id. ¶ 12.) Plaintiff signed the Agreement on March 4, 2016, and thereafter accepted the consideration detailed in the Agreement. (Id. ¶ 14.)

The Agreement provides that Defendant would pay Plaintiff a lump sum severance payment, reimbursement for COBRA premiums for six months, and a separate payment made in lieu of any claim to unpaid accrued vacation. (Doc. 11-1 at 5.) The Agreement further states that Plaintiff "acknowledge[s] that [Defendant] has paid all wages, bonuses, earned commissions, and accrued vacation or PTO (as applicable) and any and all other compensation and benefits owed to you as of your Termination Date . . ." (Id.) In consideration for the payment, Plaintiff agreed to a Release of Claims, which stated Plaintiff "agree[s] not to sue or otherwise institute or cause to be instituted any legal or administrative proceedings concerning, any claim, duty, obligation or cause of action relating to any matters of any kind . . . including, without limitation:. . . any and all claims for violation of . . . the Fair Labor Standards Act." (Id. at 6-7.) The Agreement also contains the following provisions:

(Id. at 8-9.)

On November 17, 2016, Plaintiff filed a "Collective Action Complaint" pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), individually and on the behalf of other similarly situated employees, alleging Defendant failed to pay overtime wages. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 3-6.)

On February 6, 2017, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss and Compel Arbitration of Individual Claims. (Doc. 11.) Defendant asserts that the parties entered a valid and enforceable Arbitration Agreement, which requires Plaintiff to bring his claims individually in arbitration, and that any claims regarding arbitrability must be submitted to the arbitrator in the first instance. In response, Plaintiff does not dispute that the Agreement contains a mutual Arbitration Agreement, Plaintiff signed the written Agreement, and Defendant paid Plaintiff the payments provided for by the Agreement. (Doc. 25.) Rather, Plaintiff asserts that the entire Severance Agreement, including the Arbitration Agreement, is void because private settlements of FLSA claims are unenforceable without court or Department of Labor (DOL) approval, and, therefore, the Severance Agreement fails for lack of consideration, the Arbitration Agreement is unconscionable, a collective action affords potential claimants the best opportunity to exercise their rights under the FLSA, and Defendant has waived enforcement of the Arbitration Agreement by attempting to settle with Plaintiff and other similarly situated former employees outside of arbitration. (Doc. 25.)

II. Discussion

a. Delegation of Arbitrability to the Arbitrator

Defendant first argues that, under both federal and California law, the parties agreed to delegate issues regarding arbitrability, including sufficiency of the consideration and unconscionability, to the arbitrator for a decision. (Doc. 11 at 7-8.)

Brennan v. Opus Bank, 796 F.3d 1125, 1130 (9th Cir. 2015).

"[F]ederal law governs the arbitrability question by default because the Agreement is covered by the FAA, Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985), and the parties have not clearly and unmistakably designated that nonfederal arbitrability law applies, see Cape Flattery Ltd. v. Titan Maritime, 647 F.3d 914, 921 (9th Cir. 2011)." Brennan, 796 F.3d at 1129. More specifically, the parties' choice-of-law provision provides that construction and interpretation of the Agreement will be in accordance with California law and the FAA, but, in the event of a conflict, the "FAA will control."2 (Doc. 11-1 at 9.)

In Brennan, the Ninth Circuit Court affirmed the district court's finding that the "parties' incorporation of the AAA rules constituted `clear and unmistakable' evidence of their intent to submit the arbitrability dispute to arbitration." Id. at 1131; see also Oracle America, Inc. v. Myriad Group A.G., 724 F.3d 1069, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that the parties' incorporation of the UNCITRAL Rules, which include an "almost identical" jurisdictional provision as the AAA Rules, constituted "clear and unmistakable evidence that the parties agreed the arbitrator would decide arbitrability").3 If the Court finds that the parties clearly and unmistakably agreed to delegate "arbitrability questions to the arbitrator," the Court must then examine whether the delegation clause is itself unconscionable. Brennan, 796 F.3d at 1132. Some courts have inquired into whether the assertion of arbitrability is "wholly groundless." Khraibut v. Chahal, No. C15-04463-CRB, 2016 WL 1070662, *4 (N.D. Cal. March 18, 2016) (citing Qualcomm Inc. v. Nokia Corp., 466 F.3d 1366, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).

Here, Defendant argues that by agreeing to incorporate the JAMS Rules, the parties "clearly and unmistakably" agreed that the arbitrator must decide issues regarding arbitrability. (Doc. 11 at 7-8.) Like AAA Arbitration Rules, JAMS Employment Arbitration Rules provide that "disputes over the formation, existence, validity, interpretation or scope of the agreement under which Arbitration is sought, and who are proper Parties to the Arbitration, shall be submitted to and ruled on by the Arbitrator." Plaintiff does not respond to Defendant's argument that the parties clearly and unmistakably agreed to delegate arbitrability to the arbitrator by agreeing to arbitrate in accordance with JAMS Arbitration Rules. Therefore, based on applicable law, the Court finds that the parties' clearly and unmistakably agreed to delegate arbitrability to the arbitrator. The Court addresses Plaintiff's arguments regarding unconscionability below.

i. Unconscionability of the Delegation Clause

Plaintiff argues that the Severance Agreement as a whole is unconscionable because it includes a waiver of FLSA claims, and the arbitration provision is unconscionable under California law because Plaintiff was "facing unemployment and uncertainty," "Defendant[was] in a greater position of leverage to delegate the terms of the Agreement," and the Agreement requires that the arbitration take place in San Francisco, California. (Doc. 25 at 4-5.) However, the Court must confine its analysis to the specific challenged Agreement in question. Therefore, Plaintiff's argument regarding enforceability and unconscionability of the Severance Agreement as a whole is outside the scope of this Court's review and should be decided by the arbitrator. See Sena v. Uber Technologies Inc., No. CV-15-2418, 2016 WL 1376445, at *4 (D. Ariz. April 7, 2016) ("When assessing whether a delegation clause is unconscionable, a court must sever it from the arbitration provision in which it is embedded. `It is not sufficient to prove that the arbitration provision as a whole, or other parts of the contract, are unenforceable.'") (quoting Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 71-74 (2010)); Khraibut, 2016 WL 1070662, at *3 ("where a court finds that the parties have empowered an arbitrator to decide arbitrability, the court's role is narrowed from deciding whether there is an applicable arbitration agreement to only deciding whether there is a valid delegation clause. Id. at 2779. In that circumstance, the traditional questions of contract formation, validity, revocation, and unconscionability should fall to the arbitrator.").

Even construing Plaintiff's other arguments regarding unconscionability of the Arbitration Agreement as a challenge to the delegation clause, for the reasons below, the Court finds that Plaintiff's arguments lack merit.

Poublon v. C.H. Robinson Co., 846 F.3d 1251, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 2017) (analyzing unconscionability of an arbitration agreement under California law). As detailed below, the Court does not find the Arbitration Agreement, including the delegation clause, to be procedurally or substantively unconscionable.

1. Procedural Unconscionability

Plaintiff argues that because Plaintiff was facing "unemployment and uncertainty," "Defendant[was] in a greater position of leverage to dictate the terms of the Agreement," and "Plaintiffs were not in a position to negotiate that any dispute arising from their employment should be arbitrated in Arizona," the Arbitration Agreement is unenforceable. (Doc. 25 at 4-5.) However, Plaintiff's general claim that he could not negotiate the terms of the Arbitration Agreement, even if true, "would give rise to a low degree of procedural unconscionability at most." Poublon, 846 F.3d at 1261-62 (noting that under California law, adhesion contracts, without more, give rise to a low degree of procedural unconscionability, at most) (citing to Baltazar v. Forever 21. Inc., 62 Cal.4th 1237, 1245 (2016)). And, Plaintiff fails to provide any support for his claim that he could not negotiate the terms of the Arbitration Agreement. Further, executing the Agreement was not a condition of Plaintiff's employment with Defendant (Plaintiff was presented with the Agreement after being informed that Defendant was terminating his employment), the Severance Agreement includes a separate provision wherein Plaintiff acknowledged that he reviewed the Agreement and was advised to consult with his own attorney prior to executing the Agreement, and Defendant gave Plaintiff 14 days to consider the Agreement before signing. (Doc. 11-1 at 1-3, 9.) Further, the Arbitration Agreement, which contains the delegation clause, was not hidden within the Severance Agreement. Based on these facts, the Court finds that the Arbitration Agreement, including the delegation clause, is not procedurally unconscionable.

2. Substantive Unconscionability

Plaintiff further argues that the Agreement is substantively unconscionable because it requires that the arbitration take place in San Francisco, California and, therefore, would require Plaintiff "to travel, at [his] own expense, to San Francisco, California if [he] ha[s] a dispute which arose from [his] employment with Defendant." (Doc. 39 at 5.) The California Supreme Court has held "that forum selection clauses are valid and may be given effect, in the court's discretion and in the absence of a showing that enforcement of such a clause would be unreasonable." Smith, Valentino & Smith, Inc. v. Superior Court, 551 P.2d 1206, 1209 (Cal. 1976). "California appellate courts considering forum selection clauses in adhesion contracts have held that `[n]either inconvenience nor additional expense in litigating in the selected forum is part of the test of unreasonability.'" Tompkins v. 23andMe, Inc., 840 F.3d 1016, 1028 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Cal-State Business Products & Services, Inc. v. Ricoh, 12 Cal.App.4th 1666, 1679 (1993)) (citing Am. Online, Inc. v. Superior Court, 90 Cal.App.4th 1, 19 (2001) ("[T]he additional cost or inconvenience necessitated by litigation in the selected forum is not part of the calculus when considering whether a forum selection clause should be enforced.")). See also Poublon, 846 F.3d at 1264-65 (finding that under California law, the forum selection clause, requiring that the arbitration take place in Minnesota, a thousand miles from the plaintiff's home, was not substantively unconscionable because Minnesota was not "unavailable or unable to accomplish substantial justice."). Here, Plaintiff makes no allegation that San Francisco, California as a venue is unreasonable other than arguing that Plaintiff will need to travel there from Arizona. Therefore, the Court does not find that the venue provision in the Arbitration Agreement is substantively unconscionable.

ii. The Motion to Compel is not "wholly groundless."

As Defendant notes, and as noted above, some courts have also conducted a "second, more limited inquiry to determine whether the assertion of arbitrability is `wholly groundless.'" Qualcomm Inc., 466 F.3d at 1371 (citing See Dream Theater, Inc. v. Dream Theater, 124 Cal.App.4th 547 (2004)). However, even applying this standard, Plaintiff fails to provide any basis for finding that the Motion is groundless. Further, the Arbitration Agreement covers "[a]ny dispute or claims arising from or related to this Agreement, [Plaintiff's] employment relationship with [Defendant], or the termination of that relationship (including but not limited to statutory, contractual, constitutional, or common law claims)," and requires Plaintiff to pursue his claims on an individual basis. (Doc. 11-1 at 8.) Here, Plaintiff alleges claims against Defendant for failure to pay him overtime during his employment in violation of the FLSA. Therefore, Plaintiff's claims are sufficiently connected to the Arbitration Agreement and Defendant's Motion to Compel is not "wholly groundless."4

For the reasons detailed above, under applicable law, the parties clearly and unmistakably agreed to delegate the gateway issue of arbitrability to the arbitrator. Plaintiff fails to provide any basis for finding that the agreement to delegate arbitrability is unenforceable. Therefore, the Court finds the delegation clause is enforceable.

b. Plaintiff's Arguments Regarding Collective Actions

Plaintiff also argues that "a collective action under the FLSA affords the best opportunity for potential claimants to exercise their rights under the FLSA," and that the Supreme Court in Hoffman-La Roche v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165 (1989), "held that in order to obtain the benefits of a collective action sought by Congress, a district court has `a managerial responsibility' to oversee the FLSA opt-in process `to assure that the task is accomplished in an efficient and proper way.'" (Doc. 25 at 5-6.)

Plaintiff's argument regarding the benefits of proceeding as a collective action is not a sufficient basis for the Court to deny Defendant's Motion to Compel. First, the Court in Hoffman-La Roche did not address enforcement of arbitration provisions. Rather, it addressed "the narrow question whether, in an ADEA action, district courts may play any role in prescribing the terms and conditions of communication from the named plaintiffs to the potential members of the class on whose behalf the collective action has been brought." Hoffman-La Roche, 493 U.S. at 169. Second, Plaintiff fails to cite to any legal authority that FLSA claims cannot be referred to arbitration on an individual basis. Therefore, Plaintiff's argument with regard to the benefits of collective actions is irrelevant to the issues currently before the Court.5

III. Plaintiff's Request to Amend

Finally, Plaintiff requests that if the Court compels arbitration as to Plaintiff, the Court grant Plaintiff's counsel leave to amend the Complaint "to substitute Plaintiff representatives who did not sign the Agreement." (Doc. 25 at 7.) The Court will deny Plaintiff's request at this time. Plaintiff does not identify any authority to support his request. And, although Plaintiff's counsel has filed a Notice of Filing Consent to Be a Party Plaintiff and Opt-in to Lawsuit on behalf of several individuals (Docs. 5, 10), and attached unsigned settlement agreements to his Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Compel Arbitration, Plaintiff does not attach a proposed amended pleading as required by Rule 15.1 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure, or even identify who would be named in an amended Complaint, or whether any of the opt-ins signed an arbitration agreement. (See Doc. 25 at 7 ("Other opt-in plaintiffs may not have signed this Agreement . . .) (emphasis added)).

Plaintiff further fails to address whether Plaintiff, or the opt-in Plaintiffs, would have standing to proceed in this action if Plaintiff's claims are sent to arbitration. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (holding that standing requires that "the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision" (quotation omitted)); Douglas v. U.S. Dist. Court for Cent. Dist. Of Calif., 495 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2007) ("If Douglas's individual claim is rendered moot because it is fully satisfied as a result of the arbitration, he would lose his status as class representative because he would no longer have a concrete stake in the controversy."); Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 133 S.Ct. 1523, 1529 (2013) ("In the absence of any claimant[]s opting in, respondent's suit became moot when her individual claim became moot, because she lacked any personal interest in representing others in this action . . . the mere presence of collective action allegations in the complaint cannot save the suit from mootness once the individual claim is satisfied."); Smith v. T-Mobile USA Inc., 570 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 2009) ("structural distinctions between a FLSA collective action and a Rule 23 class action foreclose appellants' claims of a continuing personal stake. Accordingly, we join our sister circuits in holding that a FLSA plaintiff who voluntarily settles his individual claims prior to being joined by opt-in plaintiffs and after the district court's certification denial does not retain a personal stake in the appeal so as to preserve our jurisdiction."). Therefore, the Court will deny Plaintiff's request for leave to amend.

IV. Conclusion

The Court must compel Plaintiff to submit to arbitration because the parties entered into a valid and enforceable agreement to arbitrate questions of arbitrability. Defendant requests the Court dismiss the Complaint in its entirety. "Pursuant to [§ 3 of the FAA], the Court is required to stay proceedings pending arbitration if the Court determines that the issues involved are referable to arbitration under a written arbitration agreement." Meritage Homes Corp. v. Hancock, 522 F.Supp.2d 1203, 1211 (D. Ariz. 2007). However, the Court may also, in its discretion, dismiss the case. See id.

Here, the Court will deny Defendant's request to dismiss the Complaint without prejudice. As detailed above, the Court will require Plaintiff to submit to arbitration. However, neither party addresses in any meaningful manner the status of the opt-in Plaintiffs, or their impact on whether, and to what extent, the Court may dismiss this matter. Therefore, the Court will require the parties, within 21 days, to file briefing regarding: (1) whether the Court should stay or dismiss this matter while Plaintiff and Defendant proceed to arbitration; and (2) how the Court should handle the collective action allegations in the Complaint and the opt-in Plaintiffs moving forward. Each party's briefing must contain a thorough analysis of relevant legal authority.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Compel Arbitration of Plaintiff's individual claims (Doc. 11) is granted in part and denied in part.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Compel arbitration of Plaintiff's individual claims is granted.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is denied without prejudice.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that on or before August 10, 2017, Plaintiff and Defendant shall each file briefing that addresses the issues listed above.