ORDER

MICHELLE H. BURNS, Magistrate Judge.

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Myra Butler's appeal from the Social Security Administration's final decision to deny her claim for disability insurance benefits. After reviewing the administrative record and the arguments of the parties, the Court now issues the following ruling.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On September 4, 2014, Plaintiff filed an application for disability insurance benefits alleging disability beginning June 14, 2014. Her application was denied initially and on reconsideration. Thereafter, Plaintiff requested a hearing before an administrative law judge. A hearing was held on January 10, 2017, and the ALJ issued a decision on March 13, 2017, finding that Plaintiff was not disabled. The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review, making the ALJ's decision the final decision of the Commissioner. Plaintiff then sought judicial review of the ALJ's decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The ALJ's decision to deny benefits will be overturned "only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error." Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1989) (quotation marks omitted). "Substantial evidence" means more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. See Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 1998).

"The inquiry here is whether the record . . . yields such evidence as would allow a reasonable mind to accept the conclusions reached by the ALJ." Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1453 (9th Cir. 1984) (citation omitted). In determining whether there is substantial evidence to support a decision, the Court considers the record as a whole, weighing both the evidence that supports the ALJ's conclusions and the evidence that detracts from the ALJ's conclusions. See Reddick, 157 F.3d at 720. "Where evidence is susceptible of more than one rational interpretation, it is the ALJ's conclusion which must be upheld; and in reaching his findings, the ALJ is entitled to draw inferences logically flowing from the evidence." Gallant, 753 F.2d at 1453 (citations omitted); see Batson v. Comm'r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 2004). This is because "[t]he trier of fact and not the reviewing court must resolve conflicts in the evidence, and if the evidence can support either outcome, the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ." Matney v. Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 1992); see Young v. Sullivan, 911 F.2d 180, 184 (9th Cir. 1990).

The ALJ is responsible for resolving conflicts in medical testimony, determining credibility, and resolving ambiguities. See Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995). Thus, if on the whole record before the Court, substantial evidence supports the Commissioner's decision, the Court must affirm it. See Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989). On the other hand, the Court "may not affirm simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence." Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007) (quotation marks omitted).

Notably, the Court is not charged with reviewing the evidence and making its own judgment as to whether a plaintiff is or is not disabled. Rather, the Court's inquiry is constrained to the reasons asserted by the ALJ and the evidence relied upon in support of those reasons. See Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 2003).

III. THE ALJ'S FINDINGS

In order to be eligible for disability or social security benefits, a claimant must demonstrate an "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). An ALJ determines a claimant's eligibility for benefits by following a five-step sequential evaluation:

See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-42 (1987) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920). At the fifth stage, the burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner to show that the claimant can perform other substantial gainful work. See Penny v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir. 1993).

At step one, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since June 14, 2014 — her alleged onset date. (Tr. at 19.) At step two, he found that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: degenerative changes of the lumbar spine and obesity. (Tr. at 19-20.) At step three, the ALJ stated that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 of the Commissioner's regulations. (Tr. at 20.) After consideration of the entire record, the ALJ found that Plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity "to perform sedentary work (lifting and carrying ten pounds occasionally and less than ten pounds frequently) as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(a) except the claimant is limited to standing and/or walking up to two hours and sitting at least six hours in an eight-hour day. The claimant is limited to occasionally climbing ramps and stairs, but never ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. The claimant is limited to occasionally stooping, but never crawling or crouching. The claimant should avoid concentrated exposure to extreme cold, wetness, humidity, vibration, unprotected heights, and moving and dangerous machinery."1 (Tr. at 20-24.) The ALJ found that Plaintiff is capable of performing past relevant work as a placement coordinator, finding that this work does not require the performance of work-related activities precluded by the residual functional capacity. (Tr. at 24-25.) Thus, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff has not been under a disability from June 14, 2014, through the date of his decision. (Tr. at 25.)

IV. DISCUSSION

In her brief, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by: (1) failing to properly weigh the medical source opinion evidence; and (2) failing to properly consider her subjective complaints. Plaintiff requests that the Court remand for a determination of benefits.

A. Medical Opinion Evidence

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by improperly weighing the medical opinion evidence. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in rejecting the assessment of Plaintiff's treating pain management specialist Wladislaw Fedoriw, M.D., and "ignoring" the assessment of occupational therapist Mary Hymen.

The Commissioner is responsible for determining whether a claimant meets the statutory definition of disability, and need not credit a physician's conclusion that the claimant is "disabled" or "unable to work." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1). But, the Commissioner generally must defer to a physician's medical opinion, such as statements concerning the nature or severity of the claimant's impairments, what the claimant can do, and the claimant's physical or mental restrictions. § 404.1527(a)(2), (c).

In determining how much deference to give a physician's medical opinion, the Ninth Circuit distinguishes between the opinions of treating physicians, examining physicians, and non-examining physicians. See Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). Generally, an ALJ should give the greatest weight to a treating physician's opinion and more weight to the opinion of an examining physician than a non-examining physician. See Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1040-41; see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)-(6) (listing factors to be considered when evaluating opinion evidence, including length of examining or treating relationship, frequency of examination, consistency with the record, and support from objective evidence).

If a treating or examining physician's medical opinion is not contradicted by another doctor, the opinion can be rejected only for clear and convincing reasons. See Lester, 81 F.3d at 830 (citation omitted). Under this standard, the ALJ may reject a treating or examining physician's opinion if it is "conclusory, brief, and unsupported by the record as a whole[] or by objective medical findings," Batson v. Commissioner, 359 F.3d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 2004), or if there are significant discrepancies between the physician's opinion and her clinical records, see Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005).

When a treating or examining physician's opinion is contradicted by another doctor, it can be rejected "for specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence in the record." Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31 (citation omitted). To satisfy this requirement, the ALJ must set out "a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stating his interpretation thereof, and making findings." Cotton v. Bowen, 799 F.2d 1403, 1408 (9th Cir. 1986). Under either standard, "[t]he ALJ must do more than offer his conclusions. He must set forth his own interpretations and explain why they, `rather than the doctors', are correct." Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 421-22 (9th Cir. 1988).

Physician's assistants, nurse practitioners, chiropractors, and similar providers are medical professionals, but they are not considered "acceptable medical sources," under the Social Security regulations (the regulations were later amended — the amendments are not applicable here). 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(d)(1). Rather, these medical professionals are considered "other sources." Id. The distinction between "other sources" and "acceptable medical sources" is significant because only "an acceptable medical source" may be considered a "treating source." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1502. Thus, these "other sources" are not entitled to the same deference as "acceptable medical sources." Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012). The ALJ may discount testimony from "other sources" simply by giving "reasons germane to each witness for doing so." Id. (citations and internal quotations omitted).

1. Wladislaw Fedoriw, M.D.

The opinion of Dr. Fedoriw was contradicted by other physicians, as well as, other objective medical evidence of record. As such, the specific and legitimate standard applies.

Dr. Fedoriw began treating Plaintiff in December 2015. Dr. Fedoriw prescribed Tramadol, MS Contin, and Oxycodone, and monitored Plaintiff's pain and medication effectiveness. (Tr. at 493-94 (December 2015), 490-92 (January 2016), 487-89 (February 2016), 484-86 (March 2016), 482-83 (April 2016), 480-81 (May 2016), 478-79 (June 2016), 476-77 (July 2016).) In August 2016, Dr. Fedoriw noted that Plaintiff followed his recommendation to obtain an inversion table for pain relief, but it made her pain worse. (Tr. at 474.) Dr. Fedoriw prescribed a lumbar traction unit. (Tr. at 474.) Symptoms and medications were unchanged throughout 2016. (Tr. at 472-73 (September 2016), 470-71 (October 2016), 468-69 (November 2016).)

In December 2016, Dr. Fedoriw completed a medical assessment of ability to do work-related physical activities. (Tr. at 496-97.) Dr. Fedoriw opined that Plaintiff could sit more than three but less than four hours in an eight-hour workday, and could stand or walk for less than two hours in an eight-hour workday. (Tr. at 496.) Plaintiff had to alternate between sitting, standing, or walking, and needed a rest period of 10-15 minutes with position changes. (Tr. at 496.) Dr. Fedoriw rated moderately severe pain and fatigue, defined as a limitation causing a person to be "off task 16-20% of an 8-hour work day." (Tr. at 497.) In addition, Plaintiff would be expected to miss six or more days of work per month due to her impairments. (Tr. at 497.)

The ALJ gave Dr. Fedoriw's opinion little weight stating:

(Tr. at 23.)

An ALJ may discount the opinion of a treating physician if it is inconsistent with the objective medical record as whole — or as stated here "substantially incongruent with the available medical record." See Batson, 359 F.3d at 1195 ("[A]n ALJ may discredit treating physicians' opinions that are conclusory, brief, and unsupported by the record as a whole, or by objective medical findings.") (internal citations omitted); Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2002) (an ALJ need not accept a medical opinion that is brief, conclusory, or inadequately supported by clinical findings); Magallenes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989) (a lack of supporting clinical findings is a legitimate reason to reject a physician's opinion); Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2008) (the incongruity between a physician's opinion and the patient's record is a specific and legitimate reason to discount a physician's opinion).

Here, in support of his finding, the ALJ cited to numerous conflicts throughout the medical record between Dr. Fedoriw's opined-to limitations and Plaintiff's physical abilities, including, her ability to squat without difficulty, demonstrate normal gait, and complete walking exercises without difficulty during examination. The ALJ also cited to multiple examples throughout the medical record demonstrating mostly unremarkable and normal findings. The Court finds that the ALJ set forth a detailed summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stating his interpretations thereof, and making findings. The ALJ's finding that the objective medical evidence did not support Dr. Fedoriw's opinion is a legitimate reason.

2. Mary Hymen, MOT, OTR/L

In July 2015, licensed occupational therapist Mary Hymen examined Plaintiff. OTR Hymen observed Plaintiff's knee squat and crouch did not meet "Occasional criteria." (Tr. at 289.) Plaintiff's ability to stand was "reduced from normal due to posture, pain and for short periods only." (Tr. at 290.) Plaintiff reported significant back pain and "lying down, use of narcotic medication and Tramadol help reduce her pain and that sitting, and standing increase her pain." (Tr. at 290.) Plaintiff was also:

(Tr. at 290.) Plaintiff reported her activities of daily living, such as making coffee or food and performing self-care. (Tr. at 290.) Plaintiff often had to change positions from sitting or standing to lying down or reclining in a comfortable chair. (Tr. at 290.) OTR Hymen stated that Plaintiff "does not qualify at the any physical demand level" of the U.S. Department of Labor classification criteria. (Tr. at 291.) Plaintiff "does not meet the requirements to perform her current full time position due to inability to sit. In addition she has difficulty comprehending some tasks and is slow to complete unfamiliar tasks, [and] this may not meet the position standards." (Tr. at 291.)

As established previously and, as relevant to the instant case, occupational therapists would be categorized as "other sources" under the regulations. Their opinions may be discounted if the ALJ gives reasons germane to each witness for doing so. Here, the ALJ failed to consider, much less mention, any part of OTR Hymen's assessment.

The Ninth Circuit has set forth its standard for harmless error: "[W]here the ALJ's error lies in a failure to properly discuss competent lay testimony favorable to the claimant, a reviewing court cannot consider the error harmless unless it can confidently conclude that no reasonable ALJ, when fully crediting the testimony, could have reached a different disability determination." Stout v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1056 (9th Cir. 2006).

In this case, the Court cannot confidently conclude that the ALJ's error in failing to address OTR Hymen's assessment was harmless — given that she found that Plaintiff "does not qualify at the any physical demand level" of the U.S. Department of Labor classification criteria, and "does not meet the requirements to perform her current full time position due to inability to sit, . . . and may not meet the position standards." The Court will remand this matter for further proceedings on this issue.

B. Plaintiff's Subjective Complaints

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in rejecting her subjective complaints in the absence of clear and convincing reasons for doing so.

To determine whether a claimant's testimony regarding subjective pain or symptoms is credible, the ALJ must engage in a two-step analysis. "First, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has presented objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment `which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged.' The claimant, however, `need not show that her impairment could reasonably be expected to cause the severity of the symptom she has alleged; she need only show that it could reasonably have caused some degree of the symptom.'" Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1036-37 (9th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). "Second, if the claimant meets this first test, and there is no evidence of malingering, `the ALJ can reject the claimant's testimony about the severity of her symptoms only by offering specific, clear and convincing reasons for doing so.'" Id. at 1037 (citations omitted). General assertions that the claimant's testimony is not credible are insufficient. See Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 750 (9th Cir. 2007). The ALJ must identify "what testimony is not credible and what evidence undermines the claimant's complaints." Id. (quoting Lester, 81 F.3d at 834).

In weighing a claimant's credibility, the ALJ may consider many factors, including, "(1) ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation, such as the claimant's reputation for lying, prior inconsistent statements concerning the symptoms, and other testimony by the claimant that appears less than candid; (2) unexplained or inadequately explained failure to seek treatment or to follow a prescribed course of treatment; and (3) the claimant's daily activities." Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1284 (9th Cir. 1996); see Orn, 495 F.3d at 637-39.2 The ALJ also considers "the claimant's work record and observations of treating and examining physicians and other third parties regarding, among other matters, the nature, onset, duration, and frequency of the claimant's symptom; precipitating and aggravating factors; [and] functional restrictions caused by the symptoms. . . ." Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284 (citation omitted).

Plaintiff was 58 years old as of the hearing, and had a high school education. (Tr. at 34.) Plaintiff's past relevant work included jobs at the sedentary or light, skilled level. At the hearing, Plaintiff testified she had to quit her last job when it became too difficult to perform her duties because of back pain. (Tr. at 36.) Plaintiff often missed a whole day of work, or had to leave early, because of pain. (Tr. at 41.) Plaintiff also found it hard to concentrate on her job duties due to pain. (Tr. at 42-43.) Plaintiff was absent from work almost the entire month of January 2014 because of increased back pain. (Tr. at 41-42.) Plaintiff missed work at least once per week thereafter until she stopped working altogether in June 2014. (Tr. at 42.)

Plaintiff had back pain, which radiated into her left leg. (Tr. at 37-38, 39.) She occasionally used a cane "When I feel unstable, I find that it helps getting me up and down out of chairs, walking, that type of thing." (Tr. at 38.) Plaintiff had increased pain with standing, sitting, or performing household chores for too long. (Tr. at 39-40.) She could stay in one position, either sitting, standing, or walking, for 15 to 20 minutes before needing to lie down. (Tr. at 44.) Plaintiff needed to lie down or recline to relieve pain three or four times, for 40 minutes to one hour, during a typical eight-hour day. (Tr. at 44-45.) Plaintiff lived with her boyfriend, who did "yard work, vacuuming, anything that might have heavy lifting involved. Just things that I, I can't do." (Tr. at 47.)

1. Objective Medical Evidence

The ALJ first found that Plaintiff's alleged physical limitations were not "well supported by the record." Objective medical evidence is a relevant consideration regarding a claimant's credibility. See, e.g., Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2005) ("Although lack of medical evidence cannot form the sole basis for discounting pain testimony, it is a factor that the [ALJ] can consider in his credibility analysis."); Carmickle v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1161 (9th Cir. 2008) ("Contradiction with the medical record is a sufficient basis for rejecting the claimant's subjective testimony."). Because an ALJ cannot simply state that a claimant's testimony is contradicted by the record, see Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1208 (9th Cir. 2001) ("[G]eneral findings are an insufficient basis to support an adverse credibility determination."), the ALJ must specifically identify which "testimony is not credible and what evidence suggests the complaints are not credible," Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 918 (9th Cir. 1993).

In support of his finding, the ALJ states the following:

(Tr. at 21-22.)

The Court finds that the ALJ's specific recital of medical evidence with multiple citations to the record, specifically addressing the limitations testified to by Plaintiff at the hearing provides a clear and convincing reason for rejecting Plaintiff's credibility.

2. Activities of Daily Living

The ALJ determined that Plaintiff's allegations regarding her pain and limitations were inconsistent with her activities of daily living. An ALJ may reject a claimant's symptom testimony if it is inconsistent with the claimant's daily activities. See Burch, 400 F.3d at 681. But, "ALJs must be especially cautious in concluding that daily activities are inconsistent with testimony about pain, because impairments that would unquestionably preclude work and all the pressures of a workplace environment will often be consistent with doing more than merely resting in bed all day." Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1016 (9th Cir. 2014). Thus, an ALJ may use a claimant's daily activities to discredit symptom testimony only if the claimant "spend[s] a substantial part of [her] day engaged in pursuits involving the performance of physical functions that are transferable to a work setting." Orn, 495 F.3d at 639 (emphasis added).

Here, the ALJ found that Plaintiff's ability to perform personal care routines like dressing, bathing, prepare her own meals and feeding herself, doing laundry, and folding clothes without difficulty was inconsistent with the severity alleged. Additionally, the ALJ found that Plaintiff's ability to go out alone, drive, and go shopping for groceries indicated that she was not as limited as alleged. (Tr. at 22.)

The Court finds that although the ALJ provides a list of activities attempting to demonstrate inconsistency, he never specifies how long or how often Plaintiff can engage in these activities or if the activities comprise a substantial part of Plaintiff's day. The ALJ also never specifies how engaging in these activities is inconsistent with Plaintiff's specific allegations of disability — leaving the Court infer inconsistency from its review from the record. The ALJ also makes no finding as to whether these activities are transferrable to the workplace. The ALJ's listing of activities does not clearly detail which part of Plaintiff's testimony is not credible or what evidence undermines Plaintiff's complaints. The ALJ's conclusory findings do not equate to clear and convincing reasons.

In summary, having considered both of the factors addressed by the ALJ to discount Plaintiff's credibility, the Court concludes that, overall, the ALJ fails to provide a sufficient basis to find Plaintiff's allegations not entirely credible. Thus, the ALJ has not supported his decision to discredit Plaintiff's allegations with specific, clear and convincing reasons and, therefore, the Court finds error.

V. CONCLUSION

"[R]emand for further proceedings is appropriate where there are outstanding issues that must be resolved before a determination can be made, and it is not clear from the record that the ALJ would be required to find claimant disabled if all the evidence were properly evaluated." Hill v. Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153, 1162 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 593 (9th Cir. 2009)). "[T]he proper course, except in rare circumstances, is remand to the agency for additional investigation or explanation." INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16 (2002) (per curiam). The Ninth Circuit has held that when "additional proceedings can remedy defects in the original administrative proceeding, a social security case should be remanded." Marcia v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 172, 176 (9th Cir. 1990) (remanding "to the Secretary for proper consideration of step three equivalence"). Here, the record contains evidentiary conflicts that make an award of benefits inappropriate and require further evaluation on remand. Specifically, remand is appropriate for a renewed residual functional capacity assessment, which accurately takes into consideration OTR Hymen's assessment, as well as, Plaintiff's subjective complaints.

For the reasons discussed in this Order, the Commissioner's decision will be vacated and this matter will be remanded for further administrative proceedings consistent with this Order.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that the Commissioner's decision is VACATED and this matter is REMANDED to the Commissioner for further administrative proceedings as set forth in

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk of the Court to enter judgment accordingly.