EILEEN S. WILLETT, Magistrate Judge.
Pending before the Court is Irene Owens' ("Plaintiff") appeal of the Social Security Administration's ("Social Security") denial of her application for disability insurance benefits. The Court has jurisdiction to decide Plaintiff's appeal pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the Court has the power to enter, based upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the case for a rehearing. Both parties have consented to the exercise of U.S. Magistrate Judge jurisdiction. (Doc. 13).
After reviewing the Administrative Record ("A.R.") and the parties' briefing (Docs. 14, 15, 18), the Court finds that the Administrative Law Judge's ("ALJ") decision contains harmful legal error. For the reasons explained in Section II below, the decision is reversed and the case is remanded to the Commissioner of Social Security for an immediate award of benefits.
The Social Security Act (the "Act") provides for disability insurance benefits to those who have contributed to the Social Security program and who suffer from a physical or mental disability. 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1). To be eligible for benefits based on an alleged disability, the claimant must show that he or she suffers from a medically determinable physical or mental impairment that prohibits him or her from engaging in any substantial gainful activity. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The claimant must also show that the impairment is expected to cause death or last for a continuous period of at least 12 months. Id.
To decide if a claimant is entitled to Social Security benefits, an ALJ conducts an analysis consisting of five questions, which are considered in sequential steps. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). The claimant has the burden of proof regarding the first four steps:
If the analysis proceeds to the final question, the burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner:
The Court must affirm an ALJ's decision if it is supported by substantial evidence and is based on correct legal standards. Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2012); Marcia v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 172, 174 (9th Cir. 1990). Although "substantial evidence" is less than a preponderance, it is more than a "mere scintilla." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Id.
In determining whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision, the Court considers the record as a whole, weighing both the evidence that supports and detracts from the ALJ's conclusions. Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 1998); Tylitzki v. Shalala, 999 F.2d 1411, 1413 (9th Cir. 1993). If there is sufficient evidence to support the ALJ's determination, the Court cannot substitute its own determination. See Morgan v. Comm'r of the Social Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999) ("Where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, it is the ALJ's conclusion that must be upheld."); Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1989). This is because the ALJ, not the Court, is responsible for resolving conflicts and ambiguities in the evidence and determining credibility. Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 750; see also Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995).
The Court also considers the harmless error doctrine when reviewing an ALJ's decision. This doctrine provides that an ALJ's decision need not be remanded or reversed if it is clear from the record that the error is "inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination." Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted); Molina, 674 F.3d at 1115 (an error is harmless so long as there remains substantial evidence supporting the ALJ's decision and the error "does not negate the validity of the ALJ's ultimate conclusion") (citations omitted).
Plaintiff, who was born in 1953, has worked at Walgreens as a pharmacy technician and beauty advisor. (A.R. 40, 56, 190). In 2014, Plaintiff applied for disability insurance benefits. (A.R. 184-203). Plaintiff's applications alleged that on January 15, 2014, Plaintiff became limited in her ability to work due to conditions that include chronic pain and fatigue, dizziness, daily headaches, and depression. (A.R. 190, 193). Social Security denied the applications on February 19, 2015. (A.R. 100-03). In July 2015, upon Plaintiff's request for reconsideration, Social Security affirmed the denial of benefits. (A.R. 108-10). Plaintiff sought further review by an ALJ, who conducted a hearing on May 24, 2017. (A.R. 36-59).
In her September 29, 2017 decision, the ALJ found that Plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. (A.R. 15-28). The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review, making the ALJ's decision the final decision of the Social Security Commissioner. (A.R. 1-6). On August 21, 2018, Plaintiff filed a Complaint (Doc. 1) requesting judicial review and reversal of the ALJ's decision.
The ALJ determined that Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since January 15, 2014, the alleged onset date. (A.R. 18). Neither party disputes this determination.
The ALJ found that Plaintiff has the following severe impairments: (i) status post cervical fusion 2011; (ii) degenerative disc disease of the thoracic spine; and (iii) degenerative joint disease of the left shoulder. (A.R. 18). This determination is undisputed.
The ALJ determined that Plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 of the Social Security regulations. (A.R. 20). Neither party disputes the ALJ's determination at this step.
The ALJ found that Plaintiff has retained the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b), except that Plaintiff
(A.R. 20). Based on the assessed RFC and testimony of the Vocational Expert ("VE") at the administrative hearing, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff is capable of performing her past relevant work as a pharmacy technician and beauty advisor. (A.R. 27-28). Plaintiff disputes this determination, asserting that the ALJ improperly weighed the opinions of her treating physicians and improperly discounted her testimony regarding her symptoms. (Doc. 14).
In light of the determination at Step Four that Plaintiff is not disabled, the ALJ did not make findings at Step Five.
In weighing medical source opinions in Social Security cases, there are three categories of doctors: (i) treating doctors, who actually treat the claimant; (2) examining doctors, who examine but do not treat the claimant; and (3) non-examining doctors, who neither treat nor examine the claimant. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). An ALJ must provide clear and convincing reasons that are supported by substantial evidence for rejecting the uncontradicted opinion of a treating or examining doctor. Id. at 830-31; Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005). An ALJ cannot reject a treating or examining doctor's opinion in favor of another doctor's opinion without first providing specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence. Bayliss, 427 F.3d at 1216; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(4) (an ALJ must consider whether an opinion is consistent with the record as a whole); see also Batson, 359 F.3d at 1195; Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2002); Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1041 (finding it not improper for an ALJ to reject a treating physician's opinion that is inconsistent with the record).
Plaintiff's treating physician Christopher Stalberg, M.D. completed a Medical Assessment, dated October 20, 2014. (A.R. 581-82). Dr. Stalberg opined that Plaintiff can sit, stand, or walk for less than two hours in an eight-hour workday. (A.R. 581). Dr. Stalberg also opined that Plaintiff can lift or carry less than ten pounds. (Id.). In addition, Dr. Stalberg stated that Plaintiff's medications cause sedation and dizziness. (A.R. 582). Dr. Stalberg assessed that Plaintiff would miss six or more days of work a month due to her medical conditions. (Id.). Dr. Stalberg's opinions may not be discounted without specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record.
In explaining why she discounted Dr. Stalberg's Medical Assessment, the ALJ stated:
(A.R. 26). As explained below, the Court finds that the ALJ did not provide specific and legitimate reasons for discounting Dr. Stalberg's opinions.
First, an ALJ may not insert his or her interpretation of the results in place of an examining physician's opinion. See also Schmidt v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 117, 118 (7th Cir. 1990) ("[J]udges, including administrative law judges of the Social Security Administration, must be careful not to succumb to the temptation to play doctor. The medical expertise of the Social Security Administration is reflected in regulations; it is not the birthright of the lawyers who apply them. Common sense can mislead; lay intuitions about medical phenomena are often wrong.") (citations omitted). Dr. Stalberg's Medical Assessment was completed on the same day that Dr. Stalberg examined Plaintiff. (A.R. 582, 628-29). The October 20, 2014 examination notes reflect that Dr. Stalberg diagnosed Plaintiff with chronic pain syndrome, depressive disorder, chronic fatigue, and cervical spine degeneration. (A.R. 628). Dr. Stalberg indicated on the Medical Assessment that his opinions regarding Plaintiff's limitations result from documented objective, clinical, or diagnostic findings. (A.R. 582). There is no evidence in the record suggesting that Dr. Stalberg relied on Plaintiff's subjective complaints, rather than on documented objective, clinical, or diagnostic findings, in completing the Medical Assessment. See Ryan v. Commissioner of Social Security, 528 F.3d 1194, 1199-1200 (9th Cir. 2008) (reversing an ALJ's decision and ordering payment of benefits where the ALJ improperly rejected the opinion of the examining psychiatrist whose opinions were based on the psychiatrist's mental status examination). In addition, the ALJ did not rely "explicitly upon substantial objective evidence of [Plaintiff's] lack of credibility" when explaining why Dr. Stalberg's opinions were discounted. Calkins v. Astrue, 384 F. App'x 613, 615 (9th Cir. 2010) (concluding that "an ALJ must be permitted to discount an opinion based principally upon a claimant's self-reporting if the record contains objective evidence that the self-reporting is not credible").
The Court finds that the ALJ's decision does not sufficiently explain the ALJ's reasons for concluding that the objective medical evidence does not support Dr. Stalberg's opinions. See Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 495 (9th Cir. 2015) (explaining that the Court cannot "speculate as to the grounds for the ALJ's conclusions"); see also Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 632 (9th Cir. 2007) ("The ALJ must do more than offer his conclusions. He must set forth his own interpretations and explain why they, rather than the doctors', are correct.") (citation omitted); Regennitter v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 166 F.3d 1294, 1299 (9th Cir. 1999) ("[C]onclusory reasons will not justify an ALJ's rejection of a medical opinion.").
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has noted that "there is no authority that a `check-the-box' form is any less reliable than any other type of form; indeed, agency physicians routinely use these types of forms to assess the intensity, persistence, or limiting effects of impairments." Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664, 677 n.4 (9th Cir. 2017). In Popa v. Berryhill, 872 F.3d 901, 907 (9th Cir. 2017), the Ninth Circuit found that "the fact [a nurse practitioner], an `other source,' provided information in a check-box form provides no reason to reject her opinions, much less a germane reason." In this circumstance, the Court finds that the ALJ erred in rejecting Dr. Stalberg's opinions on the ground that the opinions were presented in a "check-off" report. See Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1013 (9th Cir. 2014) (finding that an ALJ committed "a variety of egregious and important errors," including failing "to recognize that the opinions expressed in check-box form in the February 2008 RFC Questionnaire were based on significant experience with Garrison and supported by numerous records, and were therefore entitled to weight that an otherwise unsupported and unexplained check-box form would not merit").
In addition, the ALJ's decision does not explain how Plaintiff's daily activities translate to the ability to sustain competitive employment on a full-time basis. See Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1016 (stating that the Ninth Circuit has "repeatedly warned that ALJs must be especially cautious in concluding that daily activities are inconsistent with testimony about pain, because impairments that would unquestionably preclude work and all the pressures of a workplace environment will often be consistent with doing more than merely resting in bed all day"); Stout v. Comm'r Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1054 (9th Cir. 2006) (explaining "the ALJ, not the district court, is required to provide specific reasons for rejecting lay testimony"); Embrey, 849 F.2d at 421-22 (conclusory reasons do "not achieve the level of specificity" required to justify an ALJ's rejection of an opinion); Blakes v. Barnhart, 331 F.3d 565, 569 (7th Cir. 2003) ("We require the ALJ to build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to her conclusions so that we may afford the claimant meaningful review of the SSA's ultimate findings.").
For the above reasons, the Court finds that the ALJ improperly discounted Dr. Stalberg's opinions. This error is harmful and alone requires remand. As such, the Court does not address Plaintiff's arguments regarding the other alleged errors in the ALJ's decision.
Ninth Circuit jurisprudence "requires remand for further proceedings in all but the rarest cases." Treichler v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1101 n.5 (9th Cir. 2014). The Ninth Circuit, however, has adopted a test to determine when a case should be remanded for payment of benefits in cases where an ALJ has improperly rejected claimant testimony or medical opinion evidence. Id. at 1100-01; Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1020. This test is commonly referred to as the "credit-as-true" rule, which consists of the following three factors:
Where a court has found that a claimant has failed to satisfy one of the factors of the credit-as-true rule, the court does not need to address the remaining factors. Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1107 (declining to address final step of the rule after determining that the claimant has failed to satisfy the second step). Moreover, even if all three factors are met, a court retains the discretion to remand a case for additional evidence or to award benefits. Id. at 1101-02. A court may remand for further proceedings "when the record as a whole creates serious doubt as to whether the claimant is, in fact, disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act." Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1021. In Treichler, the Ninth Circuit noted that "[w]here an ALJ makes a legal error, but the record is uncertain and ambiguous, the proper approach is to remand the case to the agency." 775 F.3d at 1105.
After examining the record, the Court finds no outstanding issues of fact to be resolved through further proceedings. Dr. Stalberg opined that Plaintiff can only stand for less than two hours in an eight-hour workday. (A.R. 581). At the administrative hearing, the VE testified that Plaintiff's past relevant work as a pharmacy technician and beauty advisor "require being on your feet the vast majority of the day, if not all[.]" (A.R. 57). The VE also testified that Plaintiff has no skills that would be transferable to a sedentary job. (Id.). The VE's testimony establishes that if Dr. Stalberg's opinions were credited-as-true, the ALJ would be required to find that Plaintiff is disabled. The Court does not find any material evidence in the record that creates serious doubt that Plaintiff is in fact disabled. Therefore, based on the record, the Court finds it inappropriate to remand the case for further proceedings. See Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 595 (9th Cir. 2004) ("Allowing the Commissioner to decide the issue again would create an unfair `heads we win; tails, let's play again' system of disability benefits adjudication."); Moisa v. Barnhart, 367 F.3d 882, 887 (9th Cir. 2004) ("The Commissioner, having lost this appeal, should not have another opportunity to show that Moisa is not credible any more than Moisa, had he lost, should have an opportunity for remand and further proceedings to establish his credibility.") (citation omitted). The Court will remand the case for an immediate award of benefits effective January 15, 2014 (the disability onset date).
Based on the foregoing,
