This appeal is taken from a judgment denying the Debtor his discharge based on a violation of § 727 (a) (4) (A), the giving of a false oath or account in or in connection with his case. The Debtor commenced a Chapter 7 case on May 7, 2008, by the filing of a petition, which was not accompanied by schedules or the statement of financial affairs. On May 22, 2008, the Debtor filed with the assistance of counsel his schedules and statement of financial affairs; the accuracy of the information disclosed therein became the focus of this adversary proceeding. Nearly ten months later, on March 11, 2009, the Debtor filed a substitution of counsel; amended Schedules B, F, I, and J; and an amended statement of financial affairs. When all the pleadings relevant to this appeal were filed, the Debtor was represented by counsel.
The Debtor is a medical doctor. In 2004, two of his employees, Barbara Acosta and Debra Nila ("Plaintiffs"), accused the Debtor of misconduct during their employment. After complaining directly to the Debtor, the Plaintiffs also reported his conduct to the California Medical Board and the Medical Board commenced an investigation. The Debtor was subsequently involved in a physical confrontation with the husband of one of the Plaintiffs, which resulted in the filing of a minor criminal charge against the Debtor. Through 2004 and the first half of 2005 the Debtor continued with his profitable medical practice, the Medical Board proceeded with its investigation, and no lawsuits were filed by or against the Debtor.
Sang Song, the Debtor's wife of 37 years, filed for dissolution of their marriage in December 2004. The dissolution was uncontested, with Sang Song and the Debtor entering into a written agreement on March 31, 2005, for the dissolution of their marriage. A Judgment of Dissolution was entered on May 13, 2005, which incorporated the written dissolution agreement. Because they concluded that physical separation was not practical, the Debtor and Sang Song continued to live in the same home. The dissolution agreement provided for the division of assets between Sang Song and the Debtor, with Sang Song receiving the family home, and quitclaim deeds were recorded. Additionally, under the dissolution agreement Sang Song waived the right to spousal support.
While the dissolution was properly documented and final judgment was entered by the state court, the Debtor and Sang Song did not disclose their divorce to family or friends. The Debtor and Sang Song entered into an agreement allowing the Debtor to pay between $2,500 and $3,000 per month to Sang Song for room, board, and other living expenses. As of the dissolution, the Plaintiffs had not asserted any claims against the Debtor or threatened to sue him. However, in September 2006, the Debtor commenced multiple lawsuits against the Plaintiffs and the husband of one the Plaintiffs. The litigation did not go well for the Debtor, with judgments entered against him on all three suits including awards in favor of the Plaintiffs for $40,258 in damages and $40,906 in attorneys' fees and costs.
The Debtor attempted to set aside the judgments, ultimately failing in each effort. The Plaintiffs, through their attorney, began aggressive collection efforts against the Debtor, including executing on his business checking account and attempting to execute on his profit-sharing plan in March or April 2008. In response, the Debtor stopped using his business checking account and paid his business expenses through Sang Song's personal checking account. Sometime in May 2008 the Debtor established a new business checking account.
The testimony at trial was not clear how monies transferred through Sang Song's checking account were reconciled and accounted for between the Debtor and Sang Song. The Debtor testified that he repaid Sang Song — with some payments being pre-petition and not disclosed on the statement of financial affairs filed by the Debtor under penalty of perjury — to balance the books for the use of her checking account. The Debtor was free to use Sang Song's checking account from March 2008 through May 2008 because Sang Song was traveling in Korea using $10,000 given to her by the Debtor.
In response to Plaintiffs' state-court judgment enforcement efforts against the profit-sharing account, the Debtor filed two claims of exemptions in state court. The state-court judge denied the claims of exemption, leaving the Plaintiffs free to execute against the profit-sharing account. Having failed in state court, the Debtor then obtained representation from what the bankruptcy court describes as well-respected consumer-bankruptcy counsel and commenced the Chapter 7 case.
The Debtor's original and amended Schedules and Statements of Financial Affairs became the focus of this adversary proceeding to deny his discharge. The Plaintiffs commenced the adversary proceeding contending, among other grounds, that the Debtor should be denied a discharge because he had knowingly and fraudulently, in or in connection with the bankruptcy case, given a false oath or account. § 727 (a) (4) (A).
After a four-day trial, the bankruptcy court determined that the Debtor had knowingly and fraudulently given a false oath in his Chapter 7 case with respect to the following information:
1. Neither the original nor the amended statement of financial affairs disclosed the payment of $10,000 to the Debtor's ex-wife in early 2008.
2. Neither the original nor the amended statement of financial affairs disclosed the withdrawal of $9,000 by the Debtor from his business (a sole-proprietorship medical practice) account, which was used to pay either Betty Song, his daughter, or other expenses outside the ordinary course of business. The bankruptcy court found the Debtor's testimony to be that he paid Betty Song in 2007 and 2008.
3. To the extent the Debtor asserts that the payment of $10,000 in early 2008 to his ex-wife was repayment of a debt, it was not disclosed in either the original or amended statement of financial affairs in response to Question 3.
4. Neither the original nor amended statements of financial affairs disclosed substantial payments made to the Debtor's various attorneys during the two-year period preceding the Debtor filing his bankruptcy case.
5. Neither the original nor amended schedules or statement of financial affairs disclosed that the Debtor discontinued the use of his business checking account the month before the bankruptcy case was filed or transfers into and out of an account of his ex-wife, Sang Song, for the operation of his business.
6. The original Schedule I ("Current Income of Individual Debtor(s)") did not disclose the Debtor's substantial Social Security income, and the omission was not corrected for ten months.
7. The original Schedule J ("Current Expenditures of Individual Debtor(s)") did not accurately state the Debtor's expenses. While the Debtor's actual monthly expenses for room, board, and other living expenses were a lump-sum of $3,000 he paid to his ex-wife, the Debtor stated in Schedule J itemized expenses, which did not exist. The itemized expenses are inaccurately stated on Schedule J, totaling $3,910.
8. Neither Schedule G disclosed an executory contract obligating the Debtor to pay $2,500 to $3,000 a month to Sang Song. The bankruptcy court cited to the written agreement, offered as part of Exhibit 247.
9. The Original and Amended Schedule F misstated unsecured claims purportedly owed to members of the Debtor's family. The obligation to Sang Song was not a loan and the Debtor had no basis for listing a claim for Betty Song, his daughter, because he testified that (1) he did not expect to pay Betty Song and (2) Betty Song never billed him for any legal services she provided him.
10. Neither the original nor amended Schedule F list any business debts relating to the Debtor's sole-proprietorship medical practice.
11. Both the Original and Amended Schedule B filed by the Debtor inaccurately state that the Debtor was due a tax refund of $27,000. In the Fall of 2009 the Debtor testified that the actual refund he expected was $5,000.
The bankruptcy court determined that this bankruptcy filing was part of the Debtor's strategy to flee from the creditors whose judgments arose from his own litigious nature. Using the bankruptcy filing to block the Plaintiffs, the bankruptcy court further determined that the Debtor sought to maintain his life as normal — maintaining his medical practice without fear that the Plaintiffs would enforce their judgment against his business bank accounts and protect his threatened profit-sharing plan. On the personal side, the Debtor sought to continue his usual living arrangement with his ex-wife, paying her money for living expenses if and when he determined appropriate.
In not disclosing both the $10,000 he paid to his ex-wife for her trip to Korea just before he filed for bankruptcy (whether as repayment of a "loan" or as a gift), and the other monies for living expenses, the bankruptcy court concluded that the Debtor sought to hide the monies from potential recovery by a bankruptcy trustee. As with the transfers to his ex-wife, the Debtor was motivated to not disclose payments he made to his daughter, Betty Song, in 2007 or 2008 for which there were no billings or other documentation that any obligation was owed in the ordinary course of business. For his other attorneys who were fighting the Plaintiffs and defending the criminal matter, the Debtor sought to keep them working and to protect the undisclosed sums he had paid to them from actions by the Chapter 7 trustee.
The bankruptcy court determined that the inaccurate or omitted statements, which were made under oath, were material to the Debtor's bankruptcy case and were made by the Debtor with a knowing, fraudulent intent. The bankruptcy court further found that many of the statements or omissions were made with such reckless disregard for the truth or completeness thereof that they demonstrated an intent by the Debtor to not provide accurate information. When this reckless disregard of the truth was coupled with the Debtor's apparent motive to favor his family, ex-wife, and attorney creditors, and to hide income, assets, and transfers from his known creditors, the knowing intent of the Debtor to misstate the information in the schedules and statement of financial affairs was established to the bankruptcy court's satisfaction.
Having determined that the Debtor made intentional, knowing, fraudulent statements under oath in his schedules and statement of financial affairs, the bankruptcy court denied the Debtor his discharge pursuant to § 727 (a) (4) (A).
1. Whether the bankruptcy court improperly considered post-petition disallowance of claims in determining if the Debtor made a false oath under § 727 (a) (4) (A).
2. Whether the bankruptcy court erred when it considered the Debtor's nondisclosure of his social security income when it found that the Debtor had made a false oath.
3. Whether the bankruptcy court's characterization of the Debtor's misstatements of fact in his schedules and statements as "wild guesses" is supported by the evidence.
4. Whether the bankruptcy court erroneously considered the nondisclosure of business creditors on Debtor's Schedule F when no evidence was adduced at trial regarding such lack of creditors and the nondisclosure of business creditors was not a disputed or undisputed fact in the joint pretrial order.
5. Whether the bankruptcy court improperly considered payments the Debtor made within the two-year period prior to filing of the petition to attorneys unrelated to bankruptcy law or debt relief in finding that the Debtor made a false oath.
6. Whether in finding that the Debtor made a false oath the bankruptcy court improperly relied upon the Debtor's nondisclosure on Schedule G of an executory contract with his ex-wife, Sang Song, which formed the basis of a disallowed claim.
We review the bankruptcy court's factual findings for clear error, the selection of the applicable legal rules under § 727 de novo, and the application of the facts to those rules de novo.
The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 157 (b) (2) (J) and 1334 (a). The Panel has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 158 (a) (1) and (c) (1).
The party objecting to discharge "bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that [a debtor's] discharge should be denied."
The Debtor's right to a discharge is tempered by the provisions of § 727(a). One ground for denying the debtor a discharge is where the debtor knowingly and fraudulently, in or in connection with the case, made a false oath or account. § 727 (a) (4) (A). "The fundamental purpose of § 727 (a) (4) (A) is to insure that the trustee and creditors have accurate information without having to conduct costly investigations."
"To prevail on this claim, a plaintiff must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that: (1) the debtor made a false oath in connection with the case; (2) the oath related to a material fact; (3) the oath was made knowingly; and (4) the oath was made fraudulently."
"A debtor acts knowingly if he or she acts deliberately and consciously."
However, such recklessness is probative of the debtor having fraudulent intent. When coupled with other factors, a pattern of multiple omissions of material assets or information may support the court drawing the inference of fraud by the debtor.
As correctly argued by Plaintiffs, the Debtor has selectively challenged the findings of the bankruptcy court. No appeal has been taken from the bankruptcy court's first, second, third, fifth, seventh, and eleventh findings. Any objections to these findings are waived.
First, the Debtor intentionally did not disclose in the Statements of Financial Affairs material information. The first is the transfer of $10,000 to his ex-wife shortly before the commencement of the bankruptcy case in response to Question 10.
Second, the Debtor intentionally did not disclose the withdrawal of $9,000 cash from his sole-proprietorship medical practice bank account to pay his daughter. Further, the Debtor also did not disclose the payments which he subsequently testified were made by him to Betty Song in 2007 and 2008.
Third, to the extent that the Debtor asserts that the $10,000 payment to Sang Song, his ex-wife, was in consideration of a debt, the Debtor did not disclose the payment in response to Question 3.
Fourth, the Debtor did not disclose discontinuing the use of his business checking account one month before the bankruptcy case was filed, and transferring monies into and out of a bank account belonging to his ex-wife, Sang Song, for the operation of his business.
Fifth, the original Schedule J did not accurately state the Debtor's expenses. While the Debtor's actual monthly expenses for room, board, and other living expenses were a lump-sum of $3,000 he paid to his ex-wife, Schedule J stated greater itemized expenses which could not be supported.
Sixth, the Debtor misstated that he was due a tax refund of $27,000, when in the Fall of 2009 he subsequently testified that the actual refund he expected was $5,000.
Given these factual conclusions by the bankruptcy court, we must first consider if, assuming that the Debtor is correct in his contention that the bankruptcy court erred in other findings and conclusions, the bankruptcy court's purported errors would have any affect on the outcome. We conclude that the unchallenged findings support the bankruptcy court's judgment denying the Debtor his discharge.
The Debtor's decision not to disclose (1) the $10,000 transfer to his ex-wife, (2) the $9,000 payment to his daughter, and (3) the use of his ex-wife's bank account for the operation of his business, together with the inaccurate reporting of his monthly living expenses on Schedule J and misstatement of his expected tax refund, support the bankruptcy court's conclusion that, by a preponderance of the evidence, he made a false oath regarding material facts with knowing, fraudulent intent.
These uncontested factual conclusions standing alone show a pattern of multiple omissions supporting the bankruptcy court's inference of fraud. The Debtor's reckless disregard of the truth, coupled with the Debtor's obvious motive to favor his family and ex-wife, as well as to hide income, assets, and transfers from his known creditors, satisfactorily establishes the knowing intent of the Debtor to misstate the information in the schedules and statement of financial affairs.
The Debtor was properly denied his discharge pursuant to § 727 (a) (4). Therefore, all of the errors by the bankruptcy court alleged by this appeal were harmless.
Nonetheless, the Panel will also address errors the Debtor alleges were made by the bankruptcy court.
First, the Debtor contends that the bankruptcy court improperly used a post-petition decision regarding claims held by his close relatives — his ex-wife Sang Song and daughter Betty Song — to make its finding that he made a false oath. The only basis for finding that the family debts were mischaracterized or misstated, according to the Debtor, is the disallowance of their claims in the bankruptcy case. The Debtor argues that the
The Debtor's argument is unpersuasive. In the first instance, he did not provide the Panel with an adequate record to review. While attempting to cast this issue as a question of law — whether the bankruptcy court's consideration of post-petition disallowance of claims was proper — this is actually a question centered on the sufficiency of the evidence before the bankruptcy court and its factual finding, a determination reviewed for clear error. Therefore, the Debtor should have provided the Panel with a full transcript, not some 30 pages of excerpts for a four-day trial.
Moreover, as Appellees argue, the bankruptcy judge did not rely upon the disallowance of the claims to conclude that the Debtor mischaracterized or misstated the debts owed to Sang Song and Betty Song. Rather, the bankruptcy court relied upon the Debtor's own testimony at trial where he testified that he paid Sang Song $2,500-$3,500 per month for living expenses,
The Debtor next contends that the nondisclosure his $1,980 monthly Social Security benefit was not material because the claims against him were for primarily nonconsumer debts, he only began receiving the benefit in September 2007, and the benefit is exempt. The Panel reviews this question of law de novo.
Social Security benefits must be disclosed on Schedule I. Keith M. Lundin & William H. Brown,
In fact, the disclosure of the benefits ten months after filing of the petition accounted for 68.5% of the swing in the Debtor's monthly net income ($1,980 of $2,890) as reported on the amended Schedule J. While the benefits are exempt in the Chapter 7 proceeding, disclosure of the benefits is required to afford creditors and the trustee accurate information about a debtor's financial position without having to conduct costly investigation.
The Debtor's argument that the trustee and creditors could have determined the possible existence of additional wealth hidden from view through a review of his schedules is unpersuasive. This argument is premised on the fact that the bank account holding the accumulated Social Security benefits was disclosed on Schedule B.
Not disclosing the Social Security benefits, even in this nonconsumer case, denied the trustee and creditors the full financial picture to which they were entitled. If the trustee, creditors, and other parties in interest could be expected to believe the schedules, the Debtor was losing $2,580 every month. In fact, the Debtor's amended schedules state that he had monthly net income of $310. The bankruptcy court properly found this omission to be material.
Next, the Debtor challenges the bankruptcy court's factual finding that his misstatements and mischaracterizations of his debts, income, and expenses represented "wild guesses." This factual finding is reviewed for clear error.
Again, the Panel notes that this issue may be summarily rejected as the Debtor did not provide an adequate record. For the Panel to properly review the challenged factual finding, the Debtor should have provided the Panel with a full transcript, not some 30 pages of excerpts for a four-day trial. Only with the complete record could the Panel review the sufficiency of the evidence before the bankruptcy court to support its factual finding. The Debtor did not provide an adequate record supporting his contention that insufficient evidence underpins the bankruptcy court's finding that the misstatements and mischaracterizations were "wild guesses," which is cause to affirm. 9th Cir. BAP Rule 8006-1;
The Debtor argues that even if some of the items in his schedules and statements were not accurate, this does not qualify them as "wild guesses." The only place in the record before the Panel where the Debtor utters the phrase "wild guess" is when he answered questions relating to exemptions in a state-court levy proceeding. The phrase "wild guesses" appears only four times in the bankruptcy judge's opinion.
However, the misattribution does not undermine the actual factual finding that the Debtor's "initial Schedule J was a total misstatement of the Debtor's expenses, not reflecting his accurate monthly lump sum payment to Sang Song for room and board and other living expense, but instead itemizing [fictional] expenses . . . ." Mem. Dec'n 18:3-5.
To the extent that the bankruptcy judge may have incorrectly cited the source of the "wild guesses" phrase, this does not undercut her finding that expenses on the initial Schedule J were fiction. Nor was it improper for the bankruptcy judge to use the Debtor's own words — though lifted from a slightly different context — to describe his conduct in the bankruptcy case. Judges have many different literary techniques at their disposal and the effective use of these techniques should not be unnecessarily frustrated.
The bankruptcy court's underlying factual finding — that the initial schedules were inaccurate — is supported by the evidence and the bankruptcy court's decision is not clearly erroneous. The fact that the bankruptcy court elected to use the Debtor's own words to emphasize that he did not base his disclosures in the schedules and statement of financial affairs on the accurate information available to him does not render bankruptcy judge's decision reversible.
The 32-page joint pretrial order in this adversary proceeding did not, according to the Debtor, create a basis for the bankruptcy court to conclude that he did not list business creditors on Schedule F. Because this was not a disputed or undisputed fact, the Debtor concludes that the bankruptcy court improperly considered this factor in determining that he made a false oath. Appellants concede the issue in their briefs, but argue that the error was harmless. The Panel reviews this issue of law de novo and concludes that both parties are incorrect.
It is undisputed that the original and amended schedules were admitted into evidence at trial. As the bankruptcy court observed, neither of the Schedules F included any business creditors other than Appellees. On this point, the bankruptcy court said, "Dr. Song was not a corporation and on any given date he clearly had business obligations which were unpaid, including the petition date." Mem. Dec'n 18:15-17. Though unstated, it is apparent that the bankruptcy court took judicial notice, pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201 (b)-(c), of the fact that ongoing businesses have obligations that remain unpaid at any given point in time. That this issue was not listed in the joint pretrial statement is not fatal to the decision. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 (b) (2)
The Panel does note that bankruptcy court's findings do not include any statement that such creditors existed. Though the absence of such business expenses is contrary to common experience, the Panel gives this finding minimal weight in affirming the bankruptcy court. The other misstatements and omissions are sufficient to sustain the judgment.
The Debtor also attacks the bankruptcy court's finding that he committed a false oath when he did not disclose payments to attorneys for services unrelated to debt relief or his bankruptcy. Because the services were not related to debt relief or his bankruptcy, he contends that disclosure was not required by Question 9 on the statement of financial affairs.
However, the bankruptcy court's opinion notes that in responding to Question 10 on the statement of financial affairs the Debtor did not disclose payments during the two-year period prior to filing of the petition. Unlike Question 9, which asks about transfers during the one-year period prior to filing, Question 10 of the statement of financial affairs requires disclosure of transfers not made during the ordinary course of business during the prior two-year period.
The Debtor rejoins that he "
The Debtor also argues that since there is no clear place on the statement of financial affairs to disclose the payment of attorneys' fees, his nondisclosure is a reasonable omission which should not serve as a basis for a finding of a false oath. This argument is unconvincing. The Debtor has a duty to prepare the petition, statements, and schedules carefully, completely, and accurately.
Moreover, the Debtor had a clear duty to disclose the payments in response to Questions 3 and 10 on the statement of financial affairs. The evidence at trial demonstrated that the Debtor was a medical doctor involved in extensive litigation during the two years prior to the filing of the petition. Though the Debtor suggests that whatever payments he made to attorneys were in the ordinary course of business, at least those payments made to a criminal-defense attorney could not have been in the ordinary course of business. Further, the Debtor was embroiled in the litigation which resulted in the two judgments against him that were being aggressively enforced and resulted in the filing of this bankruptcy case. As the Debtor did not meet his duty in responding to Question 10, the bankruptcy court's determination was proper.
Finally, the Debtor argues that the bankruptcy court improperly concluded that Schedule G did not disclose an executory contract under which the Debtor was making payments of $2,500 to $3,500 a month to Sang Song. The Debtor contends that this is improper because the bankruptcy court subsequently determined that Sang Song did not have a claim in the case and, therefore, there was no executory contract for him to list on Schedule G. This presents a question of law which the Panel reviews de novo.
The bankruptcy court determined that the Debtor did not list the executory contract which was presented in Exhibit 247 at trial. Exhibit 247 is Sang Song's limited opposition to an objection to her proof of claim for priority spousal support debt. The exhibit includes the declarations of Sang Song and the Debtor, as well as the Exhibit A described in the bankruptcy court's decision. Exhibit A is a one-page, handwritten document purportedly signed by Sang Song and the Debtor. The terms of this agreement state that when the Debtor needs financial assistance to operate his medical practice, Sang Song agrees to help him in unstated amounts, if she has enough money, and the Debtor agrees to repay her, on unstated terms, when he is able to do so. Further, they agree that the Debtor will pay Sang Song $2,500 to $3,000 a month, when the Debtor is able to do so. Finally, the Debtor agrees to provide undefined help to Sang Song, who is stated to have rheumatoid arthritis and chronic bronchiectasis, when she needs medical help and has problems with daily activities. Exhibit B to the opposition included in Trial Exhibit 247, which Sang Song identifies as a handwritten ledger of payments from the Debtor, states that the $2,500 to $3,000 a month is for living expenses, and that if the Debtor does not have enough money to pay the living expenses, they can be paid later (on unstated terms and at an unstated time) as a loan.
The decision of the bankruptcy court does not include the basis for the determination that the Debtor knew or should have known that he had an executory contract to be listed on Schedule G, rather than listing Sang Song as a creditor on Schedule F. Neither of the parties address this issue, but assume that there was an executory contract, with the Debtor contending that since the claim of Sang Song was denied there could not be misstatement under oath.
The analysis of this issue begins with § 365, which provides for the treatment of executory contracts and leases, but does not provide for a definition of either. The case law has adopted what is commonly referred to as the "Countryman Definition" that:
Though the conduct of the Debtor in this case may well have been grounds for the bankruptcy court to question the veracity of his statements and the true intentions of listing Sang Song on Schedule F, the Panel cannot conclude that there was an alleged executory contract sufficient that the failure to include Sang Song on Schedule G constitutes a violation of § 727 (a) (4) (A).
Both parties must have an obligation to perform for the contract to be executory.
For the obligation owed to Sang Song, neither the record nor the bankruptcy court's decision establish what obligations either the Debtor or Sang Song were required to perform in the future. The Debtor was not required to continue to live in Sang Song's home or to pay any amounts at a specific time. The Debtor could pay when he thought he had enough money. Sang Song was not committed to allow the Debtor to live at her house and for her to provide the Debtor with other living necessities for any specified period in the future. Both could just walk away from their understanding.
The record does not establish that there was so clearly an executory contract to warrant finding that the Debtor made a false oath by not listing it on Schedule G. Nevertheless, this error is harmless as the weight of the other factual findings support the bankruptcy court's conclusion.
In addition to the unchallenged material nondisclosures and inaccurate disclosures which are sufficient, in and among themselves, to affirm the bankruptcy court ruling, the Panel determines that all but one of the challenged findings are supported by the record. For the one finding which is not supported by the record, the error is harmless.
We conclude that bankruptcy court correctly applied the provisions of § 727 (a) (4) (A) and its decision determining that the Debtor knowingly and fraudulently made false statements under oath in his schedules and statements of financial affairs is not clearly erroneous.
The decision of the bankruptcy court is
Trial Tr. 53:18-55:7.
"Debtor's explanation that these inaccuracies were pure negligence or oversight falls woefully short, especially coming from a person who said under oath that his initial disclosures of financial information were `wild guesses.'" Mem. of Decision on Obj. to Discharge ("Mem. Dec'n") 4:24-5:1.
"Perhaps this itemization was part of what Dr. Song was referring to when he said his initial schedules were `wild guesses.'"
"The sums owed to Betty were apparently more of Dr. Song's `wild guesses' because his testimony was first that he did not expect to pay her, then that he expected to pay her but she never presented him with a billing until after the bankruptcy petition was filed."
"Dr. Song's failure to provide full disclosure of his assets, income and transactions prior to bankruptcy was not an accident and he made no attempt to correct his initial `wild guesses' until he had had plenty of time to understand the potential consequences of the initial falsity."
