USCA1 Opinion
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
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No. 93-1664
JONATHAN C. HORSLEY, et al.,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
MOBIL OIL CORPORATION,
Appellee.
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No. 93-1736
JONATHAN C. HORSLEY, et al.,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
MOBIL OIL CORPORATION,
Appellee.
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APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. William G. Young, U.S. District Judge]
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Before
Cyr, Circuit Judge,
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Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge,
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and Stahl, Circuit Judge.
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Christopher M. Perry, with whom Brendan J. Perry and Terance P.
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Perry were on brief for appellants.
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Brian P. Flanagan, with whom F. Dore Hunter and Flanagan &
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Hunter, P.C. were on brief for appellee.
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February 3, 1994
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CYR, Circuit Judge. We must decide whether either
CYR, Circuit Judge.
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punitive damages or damages for loss of parental and spousal
society allegedly caused by a nonfatal injury to a seaman aboard
a vessel in territorial waters are recoverable in an unseaworthi-
ness action under the general maritime law. On plenary review,
see Gaskell v. The Harvard Coop. Soc'y, 3 F.3d 495, 497 (1st Cir.
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1993), we affirm the summary judgment entered against plaintiffs-
appellants based on the analysis required under Miles v. Apex
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Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19 (1990).
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I
I
BACKGROUND
BACKGROUND
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Plaintiffs-appellants Jonathan C. Horsley and his wife,
Elizabeth Horsley, allege that he sustained a back injury in the
course of his duties aboard a vessel owned by defendant-appellee
Mobil Oil Corporation while operating in the territorial waters
of the Gulf of Maine. Their unseaworthiness action involves,
inter alia, claims for punitive damages by Jonathan C. Horsley;
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and damages for loss of parental society by their minor son and
loss of spousal society by Elizabeth Horsley. The district court
entered summary judgment for Mobil on all three claims.1
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1Jurisdiction over this interlocutory admiralty appeal is
based on 28 U.S.C. 1292 (a)(3). See Martha's Vineyard Scuba
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Headquarters, Inc. v. Unidentified, Wrecked, and Abandoned Steam
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Vessel, 833 F.2d 1059, 1064 (1st Cir. 1987).
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II
II
DISCUSSION
DISCUSSION
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The Supreme Court has decided that damages for loss of
society are not cognizable in a general maritime action for the
wrongful death of a seaman, because "[i]t would be inconsistent
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with [the Supreme Court's] place in the constitutional scheme
were we to sanction more expansive remedies in a judicially-
created cause of action in which liability is without fault than
Congress has allowed in cases of death resulting from negli-
gence." Miles, 498 U.S. at 33. The Court reasoned that the
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remedial limitations imposed by Congress in admiralty actions
predicated on negligence likewise restrict an admiralty court's
power to fashion damages remedies in actions under the general
maritime law, such as the present unseaworthiness claim against a
vessel where liability may be imposed without establishing fault.
See Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 94-95 (1946)
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(noting unseaworthiness "is essentially a species of liability
without fault"). Thus, the admiralty court's remedial autonomy
is "both direct[ed] and delimit[ed]" by federal statute, Miles,
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498 U.S. at 27, insofar as Congress has spoken directly to the
point in issue, id. at 31, citing Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higgin-
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botham, 436 U.S. 618, 625 (1978).
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Two statutes are directly relevant to general maritime
claims based on fatal injury: the Death on the High Seas Act
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(DOHSA), 46 U.S.C. 761, et seq., and the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.
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688, both enacted in 1920. DOHSA makes specific provision only
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for the recovery of damages for pecuniary loss. See 46 U.S.C.
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762 ("The recovery . . . shall be a fair and just compensation
for the pecuniary loss sustained by the persons for whose benefit
the suit is brought . . . ."). Notwithstanding that the fatal
injury at issue in Miles did not take place on the high seas, the
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Supreme Court considered DOHSA indicative of congressional intent
in cases involving fatal injuries to seamen in territorial waters
as well. Miles, 498 U.S. at 31.
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Since the Jones Act does afford a right of action to
dependents of seamen fatally injured in territorial waters, it
formed the principal focus of inquiry in Miles. The Jones Act
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simply incorporated by reference the remedial scheme established
twelve years earlier under the Federal Employee Liability Act
(FELA), 46 U.S.C. 688. FELA, the progenitor of all federal
liability schemes, simultaneously afforded a uniform cause of
action for railroad workers and dispensed with traditional
master-and-servant defenses. See generally Rogers v. Missouri
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Pac. R. Co., 352 U.S. 500 (1957). FELA's language is unhelpful
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on its face, however, as it simply provides for "damages,"
without further elaboration. 45 U.S.C. 51.
This seeming dead-end is averted, nevertheless, by
Congress's adoption and incorporation, in the Jones Act, of the
remedial scheme previously established under FELA. The courts
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may assume that Congress, at the time it enacted the Jones Act,
was cognizant of the decisional law developed under FELA during
the twelve-year interim between the enactment of the two stat-
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utes. Miles, 498 U.S. at 32; see generally Cannon v. University
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of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 696-97 (1979) ("It is always appropri-
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ate to assume that our elected representatives, like other
citizens, know the law . . . .").
The Miles Court relied extensively on just such a
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decision, see Michigan Cent. R. Co. v. Vreeland, 227 U.S. 59
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(1913), which revealed yet another evolutionary layer in the
development of wrongful death statutes:
In [Vreeland] the Court explained that
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the language of the FELA wrongful death pro-
vision is essentially identical to that of
Lord Campbell's Act, 9 & 10 Vict. ch. 93
(1846), the first wrongful death statute.
Lord Campbell's Act also did not limit ex-
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plicitly the "damages" to be recovered, but
that Act and the many state statutes that
followed it consistently had been interpreted
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as providing recovery only for pecuniary
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loss.
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Miles, 498 U.S. at 32 (emphasis added), citing Vreeland, 227 U.S.
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at 69-71. Finally, the Miles Court retraced the development of
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wrongful death statutes into the Twentieth Century and the
meaning of the unelaborated FELA term "damages" became clear:
When Congress passed the Jones Act, the
Vreeland gloss on FELA, and the hoary tradi-
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tion behind it, were well established. In-
corporating FELA unaltered into the Jones
Act, Congress must have intended to incorpo-
rate the pecuniary limitation on damages as
well. We assume that Congress is aware of
existing law when it passes legislation.
There is no recovery for loss of society in a
Jones Act wrongful death action.
Id.
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Uniformity provided the companion rationale for the
Miles decision. See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398
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U.S. 375, 402 (1970) ("admiralty law should be 'a system of law
coextensive with, and operating uniformly in, the whole
country.'" (quoting The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558, 575
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(1875))). As noted, damages awarded under DOHSA are restricted
to pecuniary loss. Miles cautions that the traditional gap-
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filling function of the admiralty court is to be exercised only
in furtherance of the presumed congressional objective of unifor-
mity:
We no longer live in an era when seamen and
their loved ones must look primarily to the
courts as a source of substantive legal pro-
tection from injury and death; Congress and
the States have legislated extensively in
these areas. In this era, an admiralty court
should look primarily to these legislative
enactments for policy guidance. We may sup-
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plement these statutory remedies where doing
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so would achieve the uniform vindication of
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such policies consistent with our constitu-
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tional mandate, but we must also keep strict-
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ly within the limits imposed by Congress.
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Miles, 498 U.S. at 27 (emphasis added). Thus, Miles "restore[d]
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a uniform rule applicable to all actions for the wrongful death
of a seaman, whether under DOHSA, the Jones Act, or the general
maritime law[,]" by limiting damages in wrongful death actions to
the amount of pecuniary loss. Miles, 498 U.S. at 33.
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A. Damages in Nonfatal-Injury Cases
A. Damages in Nonfatal-Injury Cases
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The district court relied primarily on Murray v.
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Anthony J. Bertucci Constr. Co., 958 F.2d 127 (5th Cir.), cert.
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denied, 113 S. Ct. 190 (1992), in holding that Miles precludes
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punitive damages and damages for loss of society under the Jones
Act. See also Smith v. Trinidad Corp., 992 F.2d 996 (9th Cir.
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1993) (adopting Murray reasoning) (per curiam); and Lollie v.
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Brown Marine Serv., Inc., 995 F.2d 1565 (11th Cir. 1993) (same).
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For the reasons discussed below, we agree.
Under the analysis obligated by Miles, we inquire
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whether Congress has preempted all interpretive discretion on the
part of the admiralty court as the traditional protector and
benefactor of its wards in extending damages relief for non-
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pecuniary loss in the present context. At the outset, we note
distinctions pertinent to our inquiry. First, since DOHSA is
inapplicable to nonfatal injuries sustained by a seaman aboard a
vessel operating in territorial waters, it has no direct bearing
on the damages remedies presently at issue. Accordingly, whatev-
er direct analogic bearing DOHSA had in Miles is diminished in
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the present context. Second, as concerns the Jones Act, Vreeland
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is inapposite to the availability of damages for nonpecuniary
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loss in cases involving nonfatal injuries.2 The Miles methodolo-
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2At a time when wrongful death statutes were very much the
exception, the Vreeland Court explicitly distanced its analysis
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from that involved in nonfatal injury cases:
This [wrongful death] cause of action is
independent of any cause of action the dece-
dent had, and includes no damages which he
might have recovered for his injury if he had
survived. It is one beyond that which the
decedent had one proceeding on all togeth-
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er different principles.
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Vreeland, 227 U.S. at 68 (emphasis added). These "all together
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different principles," of course, derived from Lord Campbell's
Act, the first wrongful death statute: "It is a liability for
the loss and damage sustained by relatives dependent upon the
decedent. It is therefore a liability for the pecuniary damage
resulting to them, and for that only." Id. In sum, the evidence
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directly adduced by the Miles Court is not particularly probative
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gy takes us beyond Vreeland, however.
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In Igneri v. Cie. de Transports Oceaniques, 323 F.2d
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257 (2d Cir. 1963), the Second Circuit inquired into the avail-
ability of damages for loss of society under the Jones Act and
concluded as follows:
The failure of the Jones Act to confer . . .
a right [to loss of society/consortium
damages] on the spouse of a seaman cannot be
dismissed as an inadvertence. The policy of
the Federal Employees Liability Act, the
regime which the Jones Act made applicable to
seamen, was that the new remedy for the
employee was to be exclusive and that claims
of relatives recognized by state law were to
be abrogated; the FELA had been thus authori-
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tatively construed before the Jones Act was
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passed.
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Igneri, 323 F.2d at 266 (emphasis added), citing New York Cent. &
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H. R.R. v. Tonsellito, 244 U.S. 360 (1917) (FELA precludes claim
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brought by father for "loss of services" of minor son injured in
course of employment with railroad). Finally, the thrust of the
Supreme Court's holding in Tonsellito is that FELA affords a
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remedy to injured workers and only to workers, not to their
relatives: "Congress having declared when, how far, and to whom
carriers shall be liable on account of accidents in the specified
class, such liability can neither be extended nor abridged
. . . ." New York Cent. & H. R.R., 244 U.S. 360, 362 (1917); see
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also New York Cent. R.R. v. Winfield, 244 U.S. 147 (1917); Erie
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R.R. v. Winfield, 244 U.S. 170 (1917). Thus, the Tonsellito
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rationale ineluctably precludes the present claims for damages
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beyond the discrete confines of wrongful death actions.
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for loss of parental and spousal society.3
Similarly, compelling evidence precludes Jonathan
Horsley's claim for punitive damages. "It has been the unanimous
judgment of the courts since before the enactment of the Jones
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Act that punitive damages are not recoverable under" FELA.
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Miller v. American President Lines, Ltd., 989 F.2d 1450, 1457
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(6th Cir. 1993) (emphasis added), citing Kozar v. Chesapeake & O.
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R. Co., 449 F.2d 1238, 1240-43 (6th Cir. 1971) (citing cases).
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Once again, therefore, since the Supreme Court's authoritative
interpretation of FELA antedated enactment of the Jones Act,
Miles mandates the conclusion that punitive damages are not
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available in an unseaworthiness action under general maritime
law.
III
III
CONCLUSION
CONCLUSION
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Under the analysis prescribed in Miles v. Apex Marine
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Corp., 498 U.S. 19 (1990), an admiralty court may not extend the
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remedies available in an unseaworthiness action under the general
maritime law to include punitive damages or damages for loss of
parental or spousal society. Accordingly, the district court
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3No court of appeals recognizes a claim for loss of parental
society under general maritime law. Murray, 958 F.2d at 132 n.3,
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citing De Loach v. Companhia de Navegacao Lloyd Brasileiro, 782
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F.2d 438 (3d Cir. 1986); and Madore v. Ingram Tank Ships, Inc.,
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732 F.2d 475 (5th Cir. 1984)). Moreover, the cognizability of
such claims in a minority of the states, Prosser & Keeton, Torts
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125 (5th ed. 1984), would provide no basis under Miles for
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recognizing such a remedy in an action for unseaworthiness
closely akin to a strict liability claim where it is not even
widely available in nonadmiralty actions.
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judgment must be affirmed.
Affirmed. The parties shall bear their own costs.
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SO ORDERED.
SO ORDERED.
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