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Galarza v. SHHS, 93-1703 (1994)

Court: Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Number: 93-1703 Visitors: 2
Filed: Mar. 10, 1994
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: March 10, 1994 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION] UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT ___________________ No. 93-1703 NELLY ROMAN GALARZA, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Defendant, Appellee. Gray v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 369, 371 ____ _______ (1st Cir. ________ -7-
USCA1 Opinion




March 10, 1994 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT


___________________


No. 93-1703




NELLY ROMAN GALARZA,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,

Defendant, Appellee.


__________________

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO


[Hon. Juan M. Perez-Gimenez, U.S. District Judge]
___________________

___________________

Before

Breyer, Chief Judge,
___________
Torruella and Selya, Circuit Judges.
______________

___________________

Juan A. Hernandez Rivera and Raymond Rivera Esteves on brief
________________________ ______________________
for appellant.
Guillermo Gil, United States Attorney, Maria Hortensia Rios,
_____________ ____________________
Assistant United States Attorney, and Joseph E. Dunn, Assistant
_______________
Regional Attorney, Department of Health & Human Services, on
brief for appellee.



__________________

__________________



















Per Curiam. Plaintiff appeals from a district
__________

court decision affirming a final decision of the Secretary of

Health and Human Services that appellant did not meet the

disability requirements of the Social Security Act for

purposes of obtaining disability benefits. We affirm the

judgment below. Appellant's application for

disability benefits alleged an inability to work beginning at

age 47, due to asthma, chest pain, back pain, high blood

pressure and a nervous condition. After a hearing at which

appellant was represented by counsel, an Administrative Law

Judge ("ALJ") found that appellant suffered from bronchial

asthma and allergic rhinopharyngitis. The medical evidence,

however, did not indicate that these conditions were as

severe as appellant claimed, and the ALJ found appellant's

testimony on this point "not credible." The ALJ concluded

that appellant was capable of performing her past relevant

work as a photo supply sales clerk or customer service

representative. The Appeals Council affirmed after a

separate review, modifying the record to include a finding

that evidence of appellant's alleged mental impairment also

reflected a lack of the requisite severity, both alone and in

combination with her other medical conditions.

In sum, the Secretary found that appellant was "not

disabled" at step four of the familiar regulatory five-step

sequential analysis, in that she was able to perform her past



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relevant work. See 20 C.F.R. 404.1520. Appellant then
___

appealed to the district court, where the magistrate

undertook a thorough and detailed review of the record,

concluding that there was substantial evidence to support the

Secretary's decision. The district judge accepted the

magistrate's recommendation and entered judgment accordingly.

While appellant attempts here to reargue the

substantial evidence issue on the basis of the entire record,

in the district court she interposed only one specific

objection to the magistrate's report. She argued that the

ALJ's finding that she could return to her past relevant work

was error because the Secretary had not produced expert

vocational testimony proving that her work environment was

"entirely free of irritants, pollutants and other potentially

damaging conditions." Since appellant and her counsel were

notified that a failure to object would result in waiver of

any issue not specifically raised, on appeal we need address

only the issue properly preserved. United States v.
______________

Valencia-Copete, 792 F.2d 4 (1st Cir. 1986) (after proper
_______________

notice, failure to file a specific objection to magistrate's

report will waive the right to appeal); P.R. Loc. R. 510.2;

see also Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985) (upholding
_________ ______ ___

constitutionality of waiver rule).

Appellant's objection misperceives the burden of

proof at the preliminary stages of the sequential analytic



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process, and assumes a conclusion about her condition that is

not supported by the evidence. "It is well settled that a

claimant seeking disability benefits has the initial burden

of proving that her impairments prevent her from performing

her former type of work." Gray v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 369, 371
____ _______

(1st Cir. 1985); see also Goodermote v. Secretary of HHS, 690
________ __________ ________________

F.2d 5, 7 (1st Cir. 1982) (explaining burdens at steps of

sequential analytic process). The burden includes an

obligation to present evidence relating to the particular

demands of the job that the claimant alleges she cannot

perform. Dudley v. Secretary of HHS, 816 F.2d 792, 795 (1st
______ ________________

Cir. 1987).

The medical evidence produced did not require a

finding that appellant needed a work environment "entirely

free" of irritants. The evidence showed a history of asthma

dating back to 1986, but with at most only a few sporadic

episodes that might be characterized as severe. Overall,

appellant's treating allergist reported that her asthma

attacks were not frequent, not severe, and her lungs were

clear between episodes. Pulmonary function studies and the

remainder of the medical evidence were consistent with a

conclusion that appellant suffered only a mildly restrictive

ventilatory impairment. Appellant had no exertional

limitations whatsoever according to two residual functional

capacity assessments. Although one of the assessments might



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be construed as urging that appellant avoid any contact with

extreme cold, wetness, humidity or fumes, the weight of the

medical evidence most strongly corroborated the conclusion in

the second assessment, that appellant should avoid only

"concentrated exposure" to these irritants. The ALJ's

evaluation of appellant's testimonial credibility, and his

resolution of conflicts between her testimony and the medical

evidence are entitled to deference. Frustaglia v. Secretary
__________ _________

of HHS, 829 F.2d 192, 195 (1st Cir. 1987).
______

Appellant offered no evidence that her past

relevant work generally involved exposure to concentrated

amounts of irritants, although she did show that at one time,

during a company move, she was exposed to large amounts of

dust. Appellant's burden, however, required proof that she

could not return to her past type of work generally, not just

a particular job. Gray, 760 F.2d at 372. Her own
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description of her work experience as primarily indoor,

office work, instead suggested a likely lack of severely

limiting environmental factors. As appellee's brief points

out, occupational reference materials available for

administrative notice reflect a general absence of

environmental concerns in the relevant job categories. See
___

U.S. Dep't of Labor, Selected Characteristics of Occupations
________________________________________

Defined in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles 227, 243
___________________________________________________

(1981) (annotating general characteristics of work



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environments for customer service representatives and

photographic supplies salespersons); see also Gray, 760 F.2d
________ ____

at 372 (approving administrative notice of occupational

reference materials).

In light of the lack of convincing evidence

suggesting a contrary result, we see no error in the ALJ's

failure to employ a vocational expert to describe

environmental conditions at the relevant work sites.

Appellant's reliance on Social Security Rulings 85-18 and 86-

8 ("SSRs") is misplaced. SSR 86-8 (superseded in part by SSR

91-7c) provides that when an impairment has only a minimal

effect on a person's ability to perform basic work

activities, "in the absence of contrary evidence" or a

showing of "unique" work features, the ALJ may "reasonab[ly]

conclude that the claimant is able to perform her past

relevant work." That is exactly what the ALJ did here.

The other regulation, SSR 85-15, is largely

inapposite because it focuses on a claimant's ability to

engage in the entire range of occupations (step five of the

sequential process). That issue is one on which the

Secretary bears the burden of proof, but it is not relevant

unless the claimant first demonstrates an inability to return

to her past relevant work. In any event, to the extent that

SSR 85-15 provides guidance in assessing non-exertional

impairments, it does not require the use of a vocational



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expert to assess the impact of every medical restriction on

exposure to irritants, no matter how minor. Rather, SSR 85-

15 specifically observes that a medical limitation requiring

avoidance only of concentrated exposures is not likely to

have more than a minimal effect in most job environments.

Where there is a greater restriction, the ruling states, the

ALJ should either consult occupational reference materials or

obtain the services of a vocational expert.

This is not a close or difficult case, nor one

beyond the ken of the average person familiar with office

environments. The medical evidence supported only minimal

restrictions and generally those restrictions have little, if

any, effect in work environments consistent with appellant's

past work experience. If further support was needed, it was

forthcoming in the occupational reference materials.

Accordingly, the judgment below is affirmed.
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Source:  CourtListener

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