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Scarpa v. Dubois, 93-2118 (1994)

Court: Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Number: 93-2118 Visitors: 13
Filed: Jun. 06, 1994
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: June 6, 1994 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION] UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT ____________________ No. 93-2118 NAZZARO SCARPA, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. LARRY E. DUBOIS, ET AL. On August 10, 1993, the district court granted Scarpa's motion to add Friel and McKenna as defendants.
USCA1 Opinion












June 6, 1994 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
____________________


No. 93-2118

NAZZARO SCARPA,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

LARRY E. DUBOIS, ET AL.,

Defendants, Appellees.


____________________

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. William G. Young, U.S. District Judge]
___________________

____________________

Before

Selya, Cyr and Boudin,
Circuit Judges.
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____________________

Nazzaro Scarpa on brief pro se.
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Nancy Ankers White, Special Assistant Attorney General, and
____________________
William D. Saltzman on brief for appellee Larry E. Dubois.
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____________________


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Per Curiam. On April 26, 1993, while a prisoner in
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the Northeastern Correctional Center (NCC), in Concord,

Massachusetts, Nazzaro Scarpa filed, pro se, a lawsuit,

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, against Larry E. Dubois, the

Commissioner of Correction. Scarpa sued Dubois, not in his

official capacity, but in his individual capacity. Scarpa

alleged that (a) his cell contained exposed asbestos pipe

insulation; (b) Dubois knew that the insulation was ripped,

but did nothing to protect Scarpa from this exposure; (c)

asbestos was blown about when his window was open; (d) Scarpa

washed white powdery asbestos from his face every morning;

(e) he coughed and choked from the asbestos; and (f) he had

been seen by a doctor, who prescribed medication for an

inflamed throat and ordered a chest x-ray.1 Scarpa alleged

a violation of the Eighth Amendment (made applicable to the

states via the Fourteenth Amendment) and requested five

million dollars in damages.

Scarpa attached to his 1983 complaint a copy of a

letter, dated December 1992, from Howard S. Wensley, Director

of the Division of Community Sanitation of the state

Department of Public Health. The letter was not addressed to

defendant Dubois. Rather, it was addressed to Jake Gadsen,



____________________

1. Scarpa attached to his complaint a label to a
prescription for tetracycline. The label references a Dr.
O'Dwyer. We presume, therefore, that Dr. O'Dwyer also
ordered the x-ray.

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Administrator of NCC. Defendant Dubois was "cc-ed" on the

letter, as were seven governmental officials and agencies.

The letter recited that NCC had been inspected on

November 24, 1992, in accordance with public health laws and

regulations. A 12-page "Report of Condition" was attached to

the letter. The report listed cells and other areas of NCC

where the inspectors had found public health code violations.

The violations listed in the report included, for example,

broken window crank mechanisms, cracked windows, lack of hot

water in a bathroom sink, a badly pitted floor, cigarette

butts on floor, and a chipped toilet bowl. It cited Cell 36

as having "asbestos pipe insulation ripped." The cover

letter from Director Wensley to Administrator Gadsen did not

discuss the existence of asbestos. It did state the

following:

The inspection revealed the need for
extensive window work. Problems include
broken window crank mechanisms, windows
that won't close tightly, and cracked
windows. It was also noted that there is
water leaking through the walls into the
electrical room.

In accordance with Section 451.404
of the previously mentioned regulations
please indicate next to each entry on the
enclosed Report of Condition, a plan of
correction. Said plan of correction
should detail the specific steps that
will be taken and the date by which
compliance should be expected.

In July 1993, Scarpa moved to add Clare Friel, a nurse

at NCC, and Scott McKenna, the Director of Treatment at NCC,


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as additional defendants. Simultaneously, Scarpa moved for

summary judgment. In addition to reiterating the allegations

of his complaint, Scarpa alleged that he submitted several

requests for medical treatment, but had "never been called"

by Friel and that she refused to send him for the ordered x-

ray. He further alleged that he had received a memorandum

from McKenna, which told him to submit a grievance. Scarpa

stated that he had done so, but that the grievance was

"disregarded" (not, we note, that he got no response) and he

was denied the requested treatment.

On August 10, 1993, the district court granted Scarpa's

motion to add Friel and McKenna as defendants. That same

day, the court denied Scarpa's request for summary judgment

and ordered judgment for the defendants, sua sponte.

Judgment entered on August 23 and Scarpa has appealed.

We affirm. To succeed on a claim alleging a violation

of the Eighth Amendment, Scarpa must show both an objective

component (was the deprivation sufficiently serious?) and a

subjective component (did the official/s act with a

sufficiently culpable state of mind?). Wilson v. Seiter, 501
______ ______

U.S. 294, 298 (1991); DesRosiers v. Moran, 949 F.2d 15, 18
__________ _____

(1st Cir. 1991); Sires v. Berman, 834 F.2d 9, 12 (1st Cir.
_____ ______

1987). In other words, Scarpa must show a deliberate

indifference to a serious medical need. Wilson v. Seiter,
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501 U.S. at 303; see also Hudson v. McMillian, 112 S. Ct.
___ ____ ______ _________

995, 1000 (1992).2

At best, Scarpa's complaint alleges only that Dubois

knew that the piping insulation in Cell 36 was ripped and

that he did nothing in response. Scarpa asks that we infer

Dubois' knowledge from the fact that Dubois apparently

received a copy of Director Wensley's letter and report

directed to Administrator Gadsen. That report noted the

ripped insulation in Cell 36 among a 12-page list of

violations. That particular violation was not singled out by

Director Wensley in any manner, as contrasted with the

highlighting of the need for extensive window repair and of

leaking water in the electrical room. Scarpa thus asks that

we infer Dubois' knowledge from a report, directed to

another's attention, in which the reference to ripped

asbestos pipe insulation in Cell 36 was subsumed among more

than 100 other notations of violations.3


____________________

2. We construe Scarpa's complaint as complaining about
Dubois' failure to remove him from Cell 36 and Friel's and
McKenna's conduct in treating his medical condition. The
standard remains the same. "Whether one characterizes the
treatment received by [the prisoner] as inhumane conditions
of confinement, failure to attend to his medical needs, or a
combination of both, it is appropriate to apply the
'deliberate indifference' standard articulated in Estelle [v.
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Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976)]." Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. at
______ ______ ______
303 (citation omitted).

3. There is no evidence that exposed asbestos was rampant in
NCC. Cell 36 was the only cell in which ripped pipe
insulation was noted. Apart from it, the only other
reference to asbestos in Director Wensley's report was the

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Even if we were to grant that Dubois' knowledge of the

existence of ripped asbestos pipe insulation in Cell 36 is a

reasonable inference, the mere presence of asbestos does not

violate the Eighth Amendment. See, e.g., McNeil v. Lane, 16
_________ ______ ____

F.3d 123, 124-25 (7th Cir. 1994) (the mere presence of

asbestos-covered pipes does not constitute an Eighth

Amendment violation); Diaz v. Edgar, 831 F. Supp. 621, 624
____ _____

(N.D. Ill. 1993) (same). Scarpa failed to allege, much less

show, that Dubois knew of the dispersal of asbestos powder in

Cell 364 and Scarpa's medical complaints and, thus, that

Dubois acted (or his failure to act was joined) with a

sufficiently culpable state of mind. Scarpa, therefore,

failed to show deliberate indifference on Dubois' part.

In order to establish deliberate
indifference, the complainant must prove
that the defendants had a culpable state
of mind and intended wantonly to inflict
pain. The requisite state of mind may be
manifested by the officials' response to
an inmate's known needs or by denial,
_____
delay, or interference with prescribed
health care. While this mental state can
aptly be described as "recklessness," it
is recklessness not in the tort-law sense
but in the appreciably stricter criminal-



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notation that "friable asbestos pipe insulation" was found in
the "old boiler room" in the basement.

4. Even granting that Director Wensley's Report of Condition
sufficed to give notice to Dubois of ripped asbestos pipe
insulation in Cell 36, that report did not describe friable
asbestos in Cell 36. Contrast the report's description of
"friable asbestos pipe insulation" found in the old boiler
room in the basement.

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law sense, requiring actual knowledge of
______
impending harm, easily preventable.

DesRosiers v. Moran, 949 F.2d at 19 (citations omitted)
__________ _____

(emphasis added).

As for defendants Friel and McKenna, all that Scarpa's

allegations amount to is a claim that (a) Friel refused to

send him for an ordered x-ray; (b) McKenna instructed him to

file a grievance; and (c) Scarpa did, but he was unhappy with

the results of that process.5 Summary judgment in favor of

McKenna was clearly appropriate. McKenna informed Scarpa of

a procedure by which to get relief. It is perverse to

suggest that such conduct could amount to deliberate

indifference in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

And, in the circumstances of this case, even accepting

as true for purposes of summary judgment, the allegation as

to Friel's conduct, we do not believe that it meets the

threshold for deliberate indifference to a serious medical

need. Scarpa got some treatment, i.e, the prescribed

medication, for his medical complaints. Although he

apparently failed to receive additional ordered treatment, he

was directed to file, and did file, a grievance. That the

grievance process did not produce a renewed order for an x-



____________________

5. As pointed out, supra, at 4, Scarpa does not say that he
_____
got no response to the grievance; rather, he claims that, in
response, he was denied the requested medical treatment. In
any event, he does not claim that McKenna disregarded the
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grievance.

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ray suggests to us that the prescribing doctor did not

consider the need for an x-ray to be a grave one. Cf. Sires
___ _____

v. Berman, 834 F.2d at 13 ("Where the dispute concerns not
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the absence of help, but the choice of a certain course of

treatment, or evidences mere disagreement with considered

medical judgment, we will not second guess the doctors.").

Moreover, the purpose of an x-ray is not preventative

treatment, but to show a presently-existing injury. Harm to

Scarpa exists from the failure to provide the x-ray during

his period of incarceration only if it resulted in a delayed

diagnosis of injury. We note that, subsequent to the filing

of this lawsuit, but prior to the filing of his appellate

brief, Scarpa was released from prison. He, therefore, has

had the opportunity to obtain an x-ray, if he continued to

believe his medical condition warranted one, and to point out

what, if anything, of significance was revealed by a later-

obtained x-ray that would have also shown up in an earlier x-

ray that was refused him. He has not done so. Indeed, his

brief on appeal does not address, with any specificity, the

alleged failure to provide an x-ray. That omission is

telling. See Ryan v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 916 F.2d 731,
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734 (1st Cir. 1990) ("It is settled in this circuit that

issues adverted to on appeal in a perfunctory manner,

unaccompanied by some developed argumentation, are deemed to

have been abandoned.").



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For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment in
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favor of the defendants.

Affirmed.
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Source:  CourtListener

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