USCA1 Opinion
December 14, 1994 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
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No. 94-1009
IN RE:
SAN JUAN DUPONT PLAZA HOTEL FIRE LITIGATION.
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FEDERICO QUINONES ARTAU,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
HOTEL SYSTEMS INTERNATIONAL, ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees.
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APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Raymond L. Acosta, U.S. District Judge]
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Before
Selya, Circuit Judge,
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Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge,
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and Cyr, Circuit Judge.
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Roberto Roldan Burgos and Bufete Jose Antonio on brief for
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appellant.
James M. Harris, Theodore A. Pianko, and Sidley & Austin on
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brief for appellees.
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Per Curiam. This case arises from the now-infamous
Per Curiam.
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conflagration that devastated the San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel on
New Year's Eve (December 31, 1986). Plaintiff-appellant Federico
Quinones Artau, an assistant district attorney, was called to the
scene in his official capacity and spent the better part of
several days there. He claims that his exposure to conditions at
the site (e.g., copious amounts of smoke) made him ill.
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Consequently, he filed for, and received, workers' compensation
benefits.
In due course, appellant's thoughts turned to a
potential third-party recovery. To this end, he filed suit in
the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico.
His suit named a variety of persons and firms allegedly
instrumental in causing the blaze or aggravating its deleterious
effects, and sought damages for personal injury, including pain
and suffering, lost earnings, medical expenses, and the like.
The district court, after first requiring appellant to flesh out
his claims, dismissed the suit for failure to state a cause of
action upon which the court might grant relief. See Fed. R. Civ.
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P. 12(b)(6). This appeal eventually ensued.1
We need not linger. In this diversity case, the
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1We leave to one side the questions that appellees have
raised concerning the timeliness of the appeal. See In re D.C.
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Sullivan Co., 843 F.2d 596, 598 (1st Cir. 1988) (explaining that,
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where a decision on the merits is straightforward and will
resolve the case in favor of the party asserting want of
appellate jurisdiction, the appellate court, in its discretion,
may hinge its decision on the merits instead of on the
jurisdictional issue).
2
substantive law of Puerto Rico controls. See Crellin
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Technologies, Inc. v. Equipmentlease Corp., 18 F.3d 1, 4 (1st
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Cir. 1994) (citing Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78
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(1938)). Puerto Rico adheres to an expanded version of the hoary
"Fireman's Rule," recast in modern times as the "Professional
Rescuer's Rule." Under that rule, there is no tort liability
when, as in this case, the risk created by the defendants'
conduct is one that the plaintiff predictably encounters when he
enters upon private property in the course of carrying out his
professional duties as, say, a firefighter or police officer.
See Soto Rivera v. Tropigas de P.R., Inc., 117 D.P.R. 863, 867
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(1986); see also Ortiz Andujar v. E.L.A., 122 D.P.R. 817 (1988);
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Alvarado v. United States, 798 F. Supp. 84, 87-88 (D.P.R. 1992).
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Appellant's case seems to fit squarely within the four corners of
the Soto Rivera doctrine, as his injuries arose in the course of
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his employment, he received benefits (i.e. workers' compensation)
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for those injuries from the State Insurance Fund, and he assumed
the risk of the conditions existing at the fire scene when he
reported for duty.2
To be sure, we recognize that appellant strives
valiantly to distinguish his case from earlier precedents,
largely on the ground that district attorneys, unlike, say,
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2We base our decision on a slightly different ground than
that employed by the district court. We view such a shift as
well within our authority. See Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 895
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F.2d 46, 49 (1st Cir. 1990) (explaining that an appellate court
is free to affirm a judgment on any independently sufficient
ground made manifest by the record); Polyplastics, Inc. v.
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Transconex, Inc., 827 F.2d 859, 860-61 (1st Cir. 1987) (same).
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firefighters or police officers, are not usually, or even
regularly, assigned to visit fire scenes, and are not customarily
exposed to peculiar environmental hazards in performing their
wonted duties. But we must apply Puerto Rico law in this case,
and the Puerto Rico Supreme Court has given no indication that it
will carve out any exception to the Soto Rivera doctrine, let
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alone honor the novel distinction that appellant seeks to draw.
That ends the matter: we have repeatedly warned that a litigant
who, like appellant, deliberately chooses "to reject a state-
court forum in favor of a federal forum . . . is in a perilously
poor position to grumble" about the federal court's unwillingness
to blaze new, uncharted state-law trails. Kassel v. Gannett Co.,
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875 F.2d 935, 950 (1st Cir. 1989). Accord Porter v. Nutter, 913
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F.2d 37, 40-41 (1st Cir. 1990); Croteau v. Olin Corp., 884 F.2d
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45, 46 (1st Cir. 1989); Cantwell v. University of Massachusetts,
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551 F.2d 879, 880 (1st Cir. 1977). We may, perhaps, be
unadventurous in our interpretation of Puerto Rico law, but a
plaintiff who seeks out a federal venue in a diversity action
should not anticipate greater daring.
Affirmed. See 1st Cir. Loc. R. 27.1.
Affirmed.
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