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Armstrong v. Jefferson, 94-1060 (1994)

Court: Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Number: 94-1060 Visitors: 14
Filed: Jul. 25, 1994
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: United States Court of Appeals United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit For the First Circuit ____________________ No. 94-1060 ROLAND L. ARMSTRONG AND REILOUS LATNEY, Plaintiffs, Appellants, v. JEFFERSON SMURFIT CORPORATION AND SMURFIT PENSION SERVICES COMPANY, Defendants, Appellees.
USCA1 Opinion












United States Court of Appeals
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
For the First Circuit
____________________

No. 94-1060

ROLAND L. ARMSTRONG AND REILOUS LATNEY,

Plaintiffs, Appellants,

v.

JEFFERSON SMURFIT CORPORATION
AND SMURFIT PENSION SERVICES COMPANY,

Defendants, Appellees.

____________________

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Frank H. Freedman, Senior U.S. District Judge]
__________________________

____________________

Before

Cyr, Boudin and Stahl,
Circuit Judges.
______________

____________________

David A. Robinson with whom Jay N. Michelman and Michelman Law
__________________ _________________ _____________
Offices were on brief for appellants.
_______
Michael L. Mulhern, with whom Deborah Gage Haude, Winston &
____________________ ___________________ __________
Strawn, John O. Mirick, and Mirick, O'Connell, DeMaillie & Lougee,
______ _______________ _______________________________________
were on brief for appellees.


____________________

July 22, 1994
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Stahl, Circuit Judge. In this appeal, plaintiffs-
_____________

appellants Roland L. Armstrong and Reilous Latney challenge

the district court's dismissal of their action brought

pursuant to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of

1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq. We affirm.
__ ____

I.
I.
__

STANDARD OF REVIEW AND BACKGROUND
STANDARD OF REVIEW AND BACKGROUND
_________________________________

Because we are reviewing the grant of a Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, we will accept the

allegations of the complaint as true for purposes of our de
__

novo review. See Vartanian v. Monsanto Co., 14 F.3d 697, 700
____ ___ _________ ____________

(1st Cir. 1994). If, under any theory, these allegations are

sufficient to state a claim for which the relief sought can

be granted, we will reverse the district court's dismissal of

plaintiffs' complaint. See id.
___ ___

Plaintiffs are disabled retirees who participated

in an employee welfare benefit plan sponsored by defendant-

appellee Jefferson Smurfit Corporation and administered by

defendant-appellee Smurfit Pension and Insurance Services

Company. In early 1992, defendants made what plaintiffs

claim was a "highly unusual" offer of either (1) continuing

to participate in the existing retiree group medical

insurance program at new 1992 monthly premium costs, or (2)

discontinuing participation in the program in exchange for





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lump sum payments.1 In the course of making this offer,

defendants neither informed plaintiffs that the lump sum

payments were subject to taxation nor advised plaintiffs to

seek tax counsel in making their elections. Plaintiffs

elected to receive the lump sum payments. Subsequently, they

incurred substantial tax liabilities.2

Plaintiffs allege that defendants stood to gain

from plaintiffs' election of the lump sum payments, and that

defendants' failure to inform them of possible tax

implications was prompted by a desire to encourage such an

election. Plaintiffs further contend that they would not

have elected to receive the lump sum payments had they been

aware of the tax consequences. The theory of their case is

that defendants' failure either to inform them that the lump

sum payments would be subject to taxation or to advise them

to seek tax counsel constituted a breach of defendants'

ERISA-prescribed fiduciary duties, see section 404(1)(A) and
___

(B), codified at 29 U.S.C. 1104(a)(1)(A) and (B),3 and


____________________

1. Plaintiff Armstrong was offered a lump sum of $120,000.
Plaintiff Latney was offered a lump sum of $55,000.

2. Plaintiff Armstrong incurred over $37,000 in federal and
state tax liabilities. Plaintiff Latney incurred almost
$17,000 in federal and state tax liabilities.

3. Section 404(a)(1) directs fiduciaries of ERISA plans to
discharge their duties with respect to a plan "solely in the
interest of the participants and beneficiaries of the plans."
Subsection A of this provision instructs fiduciaries to act
"for the exclusive purpose of . . . (i) providing benefits to
participants and their beneficiaries; and (ii) defraying

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entitles them to recover the federal and state taxes they

paid on the lump sum payments. At oral argument, plaintiffs'

counsel made clear that reimbursement for the taxes paid by

plaintiffs -- the remedy requested in plaintiffs' complaint -

- is the only remedy sought in this case.

The district court rejected plaintiffs' argument on

two separate grounds. The court first ruled that plaintiffs'

allegations are insufficient to state a claim for breach of

fiduciary duty under ERISA. It then held, in the

alternative, that ERISA does not permit the remedy plaintiffs

are seeking. Accordingly, it granted defendants' motion to

dismiss the complaint. This appeal followed.

II.
II.
___

DISCUSSION
DISCUSSION
__________

The question of whether plaintiffs' complaint is

sufficient to state a claim for breach of fiduciary duty is a

close one, given (1) plaintiffs' allegation that defendants

intentionally withheld the information, and (2) that the
_____________

common law trust principles incorporated into section 404(a)

require a fiduciary to disclose material facts affecting the

interests of participants and beneficiaries which the



____________________

reasonable expenses of administering the plan." Subsection B
of this provision mandates that fiduciaries act "with the
care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances
then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity
and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an
enterprise of like character and with like aims."

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fiduciary knows the participants and beneficiaries do not

know, and which such parties need to know for their

protection in dealing with third persons. See, e.g., Bixler
___ ____ ______

v. Central Pa. Teamsters Health & Welfare Fund, 12 F.3d 1292,
___________________________________________

1300 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing Restatement (Second) of Trusts

173, comment d (1959)). It is, however, a question that we

need not answer, for the relief plaintiffs seek is

unavailable under ERISA.

Plaintiffs primarily frame their claim as one

brought pursuant to ERISA section 502(a)(3), codified at 29

U.S.C. 1132(a)(3).4 Under section 502(a)(3), a plan

participant or beneficiary can "obtain . . . appropriate

equitable relief" to redress violations of ERISA or the terms

of a plan. We note that it is not at all clear that this

provision empowers plan participants or beneficiaries to sue

fiduciaries directly for breach of a fiduciary duty rather

than on behalf of the plan. See Massachusetts Mutual Life
___ _________________________


____________________

4. In the final paragraph of their appellate brief,
plaintiffs raise for the first time a halfhearted alternative
argument that the reimbursement they are seeking can be
viewed as "benefits due to [them] under the terms of [their]
plan," and that they therefore have stated a claim under
ERISA section 502(a)(1)(B), codified at 29 U.S.C.
1132(a)(1)(B) (allowing participants and beneficiaries to
recover, inter alia, benefits due them under the terms of
_____ ____
their ERISA plans). While this argument strikes us as a bit
farfetched, given that lump sum payments seem not to have
been contemplated by the plan and were offered in lieu of
__ ____ __
continued plan participation, we regard it as waived and will
not address it on the merits. See FDIC v. World Univ. Inc.,
___ ____ ________________
978 F.2d 10, 13 (1st Cir. 1992) (arguments raised for the
first time on appeal ordinarily are deemed waived).

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Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 151-52 (1985) (Brennan,
________ _______

J., concurring in the judgment) (noting ambiguity in majority

opinion as to whether ERISA imposes upon fiduciaries

actionable duties beyond those running to the plan itself).

Even if we assume arguendo that such a suit is
________

authorized, however, plaintiffs' claim founders because the

Supreme Court, after a comprehensive review of the entire

statute, clearly has held that the compensatory legal damages

they are seeking here do not fall within the "appropriate

equitable relief" authorized by ERISA's section 502(a)(3).

See Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 113 S. Ct. 2063, 2068-72
___ _______ ______________

(1993). In the face of this recent, on-point Supreme Court

decision, plaintiffs presented the district court with two

rather weak arguments. First, plaintiffs made much of the

fact that they were seeking only "make-whole" damages. What

they overlooked, however, is that Mertens precludes make-
_______

whole damages which are not equitable in nature. Second,

plaintiffs, reading significance into the fact that, unlike

the instant action, Mertens involved a claim under section
_______

502(a)(3) against a nonfiduciary, contended that, for several
___

reasons, section 502(a)(3) would allow for the recovery of

money damages against fiduciaries. All of these arguments

are answered, however, by the fact that the status of the

defendant (i.e., fiduciary or nonfiduciary) does not affect

the question of whether compensatory legal damages constitute



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"appropriate equitable relief" under the statute. This is
____

the question answered, in the negative, by the Mertens Court.
_______

And, this negative answer compels the conclusion that

plaintiffs are precluded from recovering damages for the

federal and state tax liabilities they incurred on the lump

sum payments.5

III.
III.
____

CONCLUSION
CONCLUSION
__________

For the reasons stated above, we affirm the

district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint.

Affirmed. Costs to appellees.
Affirmed. Costs to appellees.
________ _____ __ _________




















____________________

5. On appeal, plaintiffs argue for the first time that their
damages claim constitutes an equitable claim for
"restitution." This argument is highly dubious; the tax
payments at issue would seem to be completely distinct from
any ill-gotten profits which might properly be made subject
to a viable restitution claim. At any rate, because
plaintiffs did not present this argument to the district
court in the first instance, we regard it as waived. See
___
World Univ., 978 F.2d at 13.
___________

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Source:  CourtListener

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