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Santos Ramirez v. Lopez Feliciano, 94-1152 (1994)

Court: Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Number: 94-1152 Visitors: 5
Filed: Sep. 06, 1994
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: [NOT FOR PUBLICATION] UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT ____________________ No. 94-1152 HECTOR SANTOS RAMIREZ, ET AL. Rule 311.12; The magistrate judge recommended _____ that the district court grant the motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds.
USCA1 Opinion









[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

____________________

No. 94-1152

HECTOR SANTOS RAMIREZ, ET AL.,

Plaintiffs, Appellants,

v.

CARLOS LOPEZ FELICIANO, ET AL.,

Defendants, Appellees.


____________________


APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

[Hon. Raymond L. Acosta, U.S. District Judge]
___________________


____________________

Torruella, Selya and Cyr,

Circuit Judges.
______________


____________________



Howard Charles, with whom Ortiz, Toro & Ortiz Brunet was on brief
______________ __________________________
for appellants.
Edgardo Rodriguez Quilichini, Assistant Solicitor General, with
_____________________________
whom Pedro A. Delgado-Hernandez, Solicitor General, and Carlos Lugo
___________________________ ___________
Fiol, Deputy Solicitor General, were on brief for appellees.
____



____________________

September 1, 1994

____________________





















Per Curiam. Appellant Hector Santos Ramirez, joined by
Per Curiam.
__________

his family, initiated this civil rights action, see 42 U.S.C.
___

1983, alleging that certain narcotics agents affiliated with

the Puerto Rico Police had conspired to violate his constitu-

tional rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the

United States Constitution by using false statements to obtain

warrants to search his residence and place of business, without

probable cause. The defendant-officers eventually moved for

summary judgment on grounds of qualified immunity and Santos

interposed written opposition.

On the recommendation of the magistrate judge, the

district court ordered all parties to comply with District of

Puerto Rico Local Rule 311.12, which requires a party requesting

or opposing summary judgment to file a detailed factual statement

supported by specific references to the record.1 The statement

____________________

1Notwithstanding Puerto Rico Local Rule 311.12, Santos'
initial opposition to the motion for summary judgment failed to
specify any disputed facts warranting trial. Local Rule 311.12
provides:

Upon any motion for summary judgment, there shall
be served and filed annexed to the motion a separate,
short, concise statement of material facts as to which
the moving party contends there is no genuine issue to
be tried and the basis of such contention as to each
material fact, properly supported by specific reference
to the record.
All material facts set forth in the statement
required to be served by the moving party will be
deemed admitted unless controverted by the statement
required to be served by the opposing party.
The papers opposing a motion for summary judgment
shall include a separate, short, concise statement of
material facts as to which it is contended that there
exists a genuine issue to be tried, properly supported
by specific reference to the record.

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of facts filed by Santos consisted entirely of loosely worded

allegations imported from the complaint, rephrased in the form of

questions of fact, and accompanied by a single record reference

to Santos' own affidavit affirming the allegations in the com-

plaint: "to the best of our knowledge the facts set forth in

[the complaint] are true and should be considered as set forth

herein." The magistrate judge ruled that Santos had failed to

comply with Rule 311.12, and thereupon deemed all uncontroverted

facts set forth in defendants' statement admitted. See D.P.R.
___

Loc. Rule 311.12; supra note 1. The magistrate judge recommended
_____

that the district court grant the motion for summary judgment on

qualified immunity grounds. The recommendation was adopted by

the district court over Santos' timely objection, and Santos

appealed.

Santos concedes that Local Rule 311.12 was duly promul-

gated pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 83. See generally Stepanischen
___ _________ ____________

v. Merchants Despatch Trans. Corp., 722 F.2d 922, 929 (1st Cir.
________________________________

1983) (encouraging adoption of local rules prescribing summary

judgment procedures, and citing the forerunner to D.P.R. Loc.

Rule 311.12 as an exemplar for curbing imprecise summary judgment

practices which force district courts to "ferret through the

record" to assess the viability of competing claims). Of course,

it is well established that the "[d]istrict courts enjoy broad

latitude in administering local rules[, and] are entitled to

demand adherence to specific mandates contained in the rules."

____________________

D.P.R. Loc. Rule 311.12.

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Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. Precision Valley Aviation, Inc., slip
______________________ ________________________________

op. at 8 (1st Cir. June 7, 1994). Recently, we reaffirmed our

longstanding view that "local rules are an important vehicle by

which courts operate[, and they] carry the force of law." Id. at
___

7.

Even though the initial report and recommendation to

the district judge recounted in detail the requirements imposed

by Rule 311.12, as well as the governing summary judgment proce-

dure, Santos' Rule 311.12 statement of facts in opposition to

summary judgment contained but a single "record reference" to a

facially deficient affidavit by Santos, see Sheinkopf v. Stone,
___ _________ _____

927 F.2d 1259, 1270 (1st Cir. 1991) ("It is apodictic that an

'affidavit . . . made upon information and belief . . . does not

comply with Rule 56(e).'") (quoting Automatic Radio Mfg., Inc. v.
__________________________

Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827, 831 (1949)), which rested
________________________

entirely on the conclusory allegations in the complaint, Moreau
______

v. Local 247, International Bhd. of Firemen & Oilers, 851 F.2d
___________________________________________________

516, 518 (1st Cir. 1988) ("The [party opposing summary judgment]

may not merely rest on the pleadings and arguments, but must set

forth specific facts showing a genuine issue about a material

fact."). See generally Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) ("When a motion for
___ _________

summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule,

an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or

denials of the adverse party's pleadings, but . . . must set

forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for

trial."). Since the opposition submitted by Santos did not


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contain a "concise statement of material facts . . . properly

supported by specific reference to the record," as required by

Local Rule 311.12, the specific facts set forth in defendants'

duly supported statement of uncontroverted facts were, quite

properly, deemed admitted. See, e.g., Rivas v. Federacion de
___ ____ _____ _____________

Asociaciones Pecuaria de Puerto Rico, 929 F.2d 814, 816 n.2 (1st
_____________________________________

Cir. 1991). Finally, an independent review of the district court

record, Velez-Gomez v. SMA Life Assur. Co., 8 F.3d 873, 874 (1st
___________ ____________________

Cir. 1993), satisfies us that defendants were entitled to judg-

ment, as a matter of law, based on the unopposed factual showings

made in their statement of uncontroverted facts.

Affirmed.
Affirmed.
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Source:  CourtListener

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