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Georgacarakos v. United States, 94-1559 (1994)

Court: Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Number: 94-1559 Visitors: 10
Filed: Oct. 21, 1994
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: October 19, 1994 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION] UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT ____________________ No. 94-1559 PETER N. GEORGACARAKOS, Petitioner, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent, Appellee. See United States v. Doane, 975 F.2d ___ _____________ _____ 8, 11 (1st Cir.
USCA1 Opinion









October 19, 1994
[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

____________________

No. 94-1559

PETER N. GEORGACARAKOS,
Petitioner, Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent, Appellee.
____________________

No. 94-1750

PETER N. GEORGACARAKOS,
Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant, Appellee.
____________________

APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE

[Hon. Morton A. Brody, U.S. District Judge]
___________________
____________________

Before

Cyr, Boudin and Stahl,
Circuit Judges.
______________
____________________

Peter N. Georgacarakos on brief pro se.
______________________
Jay P. McCloskey, United States Attorney, and Michael M. DuBose,
_________________ _________________
Assistant United States Attorney, on brief for appellee.


____________________


____________________

















Per Curiam. After carefully reviewing the record
__________

and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the

district court. We do so essentially for the reasons set

forth in the Report and Recommendation of the magistrate

judge which was adopted by the district court in its order

dated May 12, 1994.

Specifically, we agree that under the standards set

forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984),
__________ __________

counsel's choice to forego an entrapment defense plainly was

an objectively reasonable choice, given appellant's criminal

history and the evidence. As for the jury instructions

concerning venue, we add that even if they had been reviewed

for abuse of discretion -- the standard of review applicable

to properly preserved objections -- appellant still would not

have prevailed. Under this standard, "[t]he trial court

should be reversed only if the instruction was capable of

confusing and thereby misleading the jury." United States v.
_____________

Fischbach & Moore, Inc., 750 F.2d 1183, 1195 (3d Cir. 1984),
________________________

cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1029 (1985).
____________

The venue instruction, viewed in light of all

evidence, was not misleading. As we held in appellant's

direct appeal, even had the jury accepted appellant's version

of the events, the evidence of venue in Maine was "so clear"

that "no reasonable juror could have found otherwise."

United States v. Georgacarakos, 988 F.2d 1289, 1297 (1st Cir.
_____________ _____________



















1993). Further, when the instruction is considered in the

context of the charge as a whole, it is plain that there was

no abuse of discretion. See United States v. Doane, 975 F.2d
___ _____________ _____

8, 11 (1st Cir. 1992) (quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S.
____ ________

141, 146-47 (1973)). Given our findings concerning the

adequacy of the instructions on constructive and joint

possession, counsel's failure to timely object to the venue

instruction did not deprive appellant of "a trial whose

result is reliable." See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
___ __________

Therefore, he was not prejudiced.

Because we affirm the judgment of the district
______

court, appellant's appeal of the denial of bail is moot.





























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Source:  CourtListener

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