USCA1 Opinion
[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
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No. 96-1264
ALFREDO G. HUALDE-REDIN, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
ROYAL BANK OF PUERTO RICO, ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees.
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APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Jose Antonio Fuste, U.S. District Judge]
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Before
Selya, Boudin and Lynch,
Circuit Judges.
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Alfredo Hualde-Redin, Maria Susana Costa and Paul Martin
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Hualde on brief pro se.
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Carlos Lugo-Fiol, Solicitor General, Edda Serrano-Blasini,
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Deputy Solicitor General, and Vannessa Ramirez, Assistant
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Solicitor General, Department of Justice, on brief for appellees
State Court Judges and Marshals, The Clerk of The Supreme Court
of Puerto Rico, and Government Attorney Ivette Acosta.
Goldman Antonetti & Cordova on brief for appellees Ramon
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Dapena, Jorge Souss, Ivonne Palerm, Goldman Antonetti & Cordova,
Mr. Carlos Del Valle and American International Insurance Co.
De Corral & De Mier on brief for appellee General Accident
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Insurance Co.
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March 19, 1997
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Per Curiam. We affirm the dismissal of plaintiffs'
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action for the reasons stated by the district court in its
January 31, 1996 decision.
No basis warranting Judge Fuste's recusal was stated in
any of plaintiffs' motions.
With respect to the district court's order barring
plaintiff from proceeding pro se in the future, we clarify as
follows. The last sentence of the court's January 31, 1996
order is vacated and the following is substituted:
Mr. Alfredo Hualde-Redin is enjoined from
filing any civil action pro se in the United States
District Court for the District of Puerto Rico
without first obtaining permission from that court
to proceed pro se. In seeking leave to proceed pro
se, Mr. Alfredo Hualde-Redin must (1) clearly
caption his motion as an "Application Pursuant to
Court Order Seeking Leave to Proceed Pro Se," (2)
attach a copy of this order to the motion, (3)
certify that the claim or claims he seeks to
present are new claims never before raised and
disposed of on the merits by any federal court, (4)
certify that the claim or claims are not frivolous
or taken in bad faith, and (5) include in the
motion the following information:
A. A list of all lawsuits currently
pending or filed previously with the
district court, including the name,
number, and citation, if applicable, of
each case, and the current status or
disposition of any appeal; and
B. A list apprising the district
court of all outstanding injunctions or
orders limiting plaintiff's access to
federal court, including orders and
injunctions requiring plaintiff to seek
leave to file matters pro se or requiring
him to be represented by an attorney,
including the name, number, and citation,
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if applicable, of all such orders or
injunctions.
Failure to comply strictly with the terms of this
injunction will be sufficient grounds for denying
leave to proceed pro se.
The order, as clarified, is affirmed. Our clarification does
not prevent the district court from imposing further
conditions or sanctions in the future if the present
injunction is not sufficient to curb Mr. Hualde-Redin's
frivolous and abusive litigation. Even if Mr. Alfredo
Hualde-Redin does certify in the terms specified, the
district court retains authority to deny the Application in
the exercise of its reasoned discretion.
Appellees have requested attorneys' fees in their
briefs. Although appellants' appellate arguments are all
frivolous, we deny appellees' request for attorneys' fees
because appellees have not yet filed a separate motion for
attorneys' fees as required by Fed. R. App. P. 38. This
denial is without prejudice to filing a motion in compliance
with Fed. R. App. P. 38 and Loc. R. 39.2. Appellees' costs
pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 39 will be allowed.
The judgment, as clarified, is affirmed.
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