USCA1 Opinion
[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
____________________
No. 96-1997
RUBEN O. GIERBOLINI-ROSA, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
BANCO POPULAR DE PUERTO RICO,
Defendant, Appellee.
____________________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Jose Antonio Fuste, U.S. District Judge]
____________________
Before
Selya, Circuit Judge,
Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge,
and Lagueux, District Judge.
____________________
Benny Frankie Cerezo for appellants.
Jay
A.
Garcia-Gregory, with whom Ricardo
L.
Ortiz and Fiddler,
Gonzalez & Rodriguez were on brief for appellee.
____________________
August 18, 1997
____________________
Of the District of Rhode Island, sitting by designation.
CAMPBELL,
Senior Circuit Judge
. This civil action is
a related, non-core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. S 1334(b).
Plaintiffs-appellants Ruben O. Gierbolini-Rosa, Carmen Nidia
Gierbolini-Marrero, and their four children, Ruben Oscar
Gierbolini-Gierbolini, Carlos Ruben Gierbolini-Gierbolini,
Ricardo Jose Gierbolini-Gierbolini, and Nirin Mirnel
Gierbolini-Gierbolini, (collectively referred to as the
"Gierbolinis" or the "appellants") brought suit against Banco
Popular de Puerto Rico ("BPPR") under Puerto Rico's General
Tort Statute, Article 1802 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code, see
31 L.P.R.A. S 5141 (1991), for damages allegedly caused by
defamatory statements made to the Puerto Rico Treasury
Department and the United States Bankruptcy Court. A year
later, BPPR filed its "Motion Requesting Entry of Summary
Judgment Dismissing the Complaint." The United States District
Court for the District of Puerto Rico issued an Opinion and
Order, published as
Gierbolini Rosa
v. Banco Popular de Puerto
1. Section 1334(b) provides as follows:
"(b) Notwithstanding any Act of Congress that confers
exclusive jurisdiction on a court or courts other than the
district courts, the district courts shall have original but
not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising
under title 11, or arising in or related to cases under title
11."
28 U.S.C. S 1334(b) (West 1993).
2. Section 5141 states, in relevant part, as follows:
"A person who by an act or omission causes damage to
another through fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair
the damage so done."
31 L.P.R.A. S 5141 (1991).
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Rico, 930 F. Supp. 712 (D.P.R. 1996), and separate judgment on
June 28, 1996, dismissing the complaint. The court later
entered an amended judgment in compliance with Fed. R. Civ. P.
54(b), stating that there was no just reason for further delay
and that it was in the interest of justice that the judgment
entered on June 28, 1996, be treated as a final judgment for
purposes of appeal.
"We review the district court's grant of summary
judgment de novo, and will uphold that determination if the
record, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party, shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law." Daniels-Recio v. Hospital del Maestro, Inc.,
109 F.3d 88, 92 (1st Cir. 1997) (citations omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Having carefully considered the
arguments, the briefs and the record, we affirm the judgment of
the district court for substantially the same reasons set out
in its Opinion and Order, adding the following.
1. Appellants argue that the district court erred in
applying the common law privilege codified in Section 4 of the
Libel and Slander Act of 1902,
see 32 L.P.R.A. S 3144 (1968),
3. Section 4 of the Libel and Slander Act of 1902 provides as
follows:
"A publication or communication shall not be held or
deemed malicious when made in any legislative or judicial
proceeding or in any other proceeding authorized by law. A
publication or communication shall not be presumed to be
malicious when made:
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to their defamation action brought under the provisions of
Puerto Rico's General Tort Statute, Article 1802 of the Puerto
Rico Civil Code, see note 2, supra.
For this contention, appellants rely mainly upon
Romany v.
El Mundo, Inc.
, 89 P.R.R. 592 (1963), and
Ojeda Ojeda
v.
El Vocero, Inc.
, 94 J.T.S. 131 (1994). However, these cases
do not hold that an action for defamation brought under Article
1802 may not be subject to essentially the same privilege
codified in the Libel and Slander Act of 1902. Rather, they
merely indicate that a libel and slander action brought
pursuant to the Libel and Slander Act of 1902 and a defamation
action brought under Article 1802 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code
are separate and independent causes of action with distinct
elements.
Citing the Puerto Rico Supreme Court's opinion in
Rodriguez v.
El Vocero, Inc.
, 94 J.T.S. 13 (1994), the district
court construed Puerto Rico law as maintaining that, "though
[the action] arises under Section [sic] 1802 of the Civil Code,
defendant may claim the traditional defense of privilege as it
might under the Libel and Slander Act of 1902", that being a
First. In the proper discharge of an official duty.
Second. In a fair and true report of a judicial,
legislative, official or other proceeding, or of anything said
in the course thereof.
Third. To a Commonwealth official upon probable cause
with the intention of serving the public interest or of
securing the redress of a private wrong."
32 L.P.R.A. S 3144 (1968).
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"traditional defense[] that ha[s] always been available."
Gierbolini
Rosa, 930 F. Supp. at 717. We agree with the
court's interpretation, which is supported in two other
decisions of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, namely,
Porto v.
Bentley
Puerto
Rico,
Inc., 92 J.T.S. 175 (1992), and Jimenez
Alvarez v. Silen Maldonado, 92 J.T.S. 95 (1992).
In Porto, a former employee, Ivan Porto, and his
wife, personally and on behalf of the conjugal partnership and
their minor children, sued the company, claiming damages for
"allegedly false, slanderous and libelous accusations" made
against him at the time of his discharge. Porto, P.R. Offic.
Trans. (majority opinion) at 2-3. He alleged that, in a letter
of discharge, he was falsely accused of having unlawfully
appropriated the official company vehicle. Id. (majority
opinion) at 3. Porto's action rested upon Article 1802 of the
Puerto Rico Civil Code, as both parties to the suit were
"private persons." Id. (majority opinion) at 6; see also id.
(concurring opinion) at 1. The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico
explained: "[i]n our jurisdiction the liability rule based on
negligence [governs] all libel tort suits brought by private
persons." Id. (majority opinion) at 8 (citations omitted);
see
also id. (concurring opinion) at 2. Nevertheless, the Porto
Court made reference to the common law privileges codified in
Sections 4 and 5 of the Libel and Slander Act of 1902, and
applied "the qualified privilege for promoting the free flow of
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communication between employer and employee" to defeat the
cause of action for defamation. Id. (majority opinion) at 16-
21; see also 32 L.P.R.A. S 3145 (1968).
Even more in point is the Puerto Rico Supreme Court's
decision in Jimenez
Alvarez, where one of the defendants,
Baldomero Roig Velez, appealed from a partial judgment that
dismissed his counterclaim for damages allegedly caused by
certain defamatory, false and libelous allegations negligently
made in the plaintiff's verified complaint. Jimenez Alvarez,
P.R. Offic. Trans. at 1. Writing for the Supreme Court of
Puerto Rico, Justice Naveira de Rodon framed the issue
presented for review as one of defamation, identifying the
three sources of a defamation claim in Puerto Rico: (1) the
Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico,
(2) the Libel
and Slander Act of 1902, and (3) Article 1802 of the Puerto
Rico Civil Code. Id. at 3-4. Nonetheless, Justice Naveira de
4. Section 5 of the Libel and Slander Act of 1902 states as
follows:
"Malice shall be presumed to exist in any injurious
communication or writing made without justifiable motive and
addressed to any person other than to a relative within the
third degree, or to a person whom the author has under his
guardianship or
when said communication passes between persons
having business in partnership, or other similar association
."
32 L.P.R.A. S 3145 (1968) (emphasis added).
5. Article II, Section 8 of the Constitution of the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico provides as follows:
"Every person has the right to the protection of law
against abusive attacks on his honor, reputation and private or
family life."
P.R. Const. art. II, S 8.
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Rodon noted that the common-law privilege generally applicable
to judicial proceedings "covers anything that may be said with
regard to the controversy, whether it be in the pleadings, in
affidavits, or in open court." Id. at 4 (citation omitted)
(emphasis added). In Puerto Rico, Justice Naveira de Rodon
continued, Section 4 of the Libel and Slander Act of 1902
recognizes a similar kind of privilege, and, for purposes of
that privilege, a complaint shall be deemed to be "'[a]
publication or communication . . . made in [a] . . . judicial
proceeding.'" Id. at 5; see also 32 L.P.R.A. S 3144 (1968).
The court concluded that the common law privilege codified in
Section 4 of the Libel and Slander Act of 1902, regarding
communications in a legislative, judicial or any other
proceeding authorized by law, barred the tort action for
defamation raised in Roig Velez's counterclaim. Id. at 5, 7.
We, therefore, agree with the district court that the
privilege applies in the instant case to immunize BPPR's
conduct in filing the informative return before the Puerto Rico
Treasury Department and the proof of claim before the United
States Bankruptcy Court. The informative return, which BPPR,
as payor, had a legal obligation to file with the Puerto Rico
Treasury Department, qualifies as "[a] publication or
communication . . . made . . . in [a] . . . proceeding
authorized by law." 32 L.P.R.A. S 3144 (1968); see also
Gierbolini
Rosa, 930 F. Supp. at 715-16. The proof of claim
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is, as the district court pointed out, in the nature of an
ordinary civil pleading, and thus forms part of a "judicial
proceeding." 32 L.P.R.A. S 3144 (1968); see also Gierbolini
Rosa, 930 F. Supp. at 716. More specifically, the informative
return and the proof of claim fall, as the district court
found, within the scope of Section 4's first and third
provisos, respectively. See 32 L.P.R.A. S 3144 (1968);
Gierbolini
Rosa, 930 F. Supp. at 718. We need not decide
whether the privilege is an absolute or a qualified privilege
because, even if it is only qualified, there is no evidence of
malice or bad faith on the part of BPPR that would defeat the
claim of privilege in this case. See Gierbolini Rosa, 930 F.
Supp. at 718.
2. Appellants assert that the district court erred in
finding that they had offered insufficient evidence to
establish a causal nexus between the alleged defamatory conduct
and the claimed mental and moral suffering. The appellants
further insist that the district court erred in determining
that they had presented insufficient evidence to substantiate
the nature and the degree of their alleged damages. The three
basic elements of a cause of action under Article 1802 of the
Puerto Rico Civil Code are as follows: (1) a guilty or
negligent act or omission, (2) a causal link between the act or
omission and the damages, and (3) damages. 31 L.P.R.A. S 5141
(1991); see also Gierbolini
Rosa, 930 F. Supp. at 717
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("Plaintiff must show that defendant's wrongful or negligent
actions actually and proximately caused plaintiff certain and
quantifiable damages." (citations omitted)); Rodriguez, P.R.
Offic. Trans. at 7; Ojeda
Ojeda, P.R. Offic. Trans. at 2, 5.
Even assuming arguendo that BPPR's conduct was negligent and
defamatory in the instant case, we nonetheless agree with the
district court that there was insufficient proof of causation
and damages for the complaint to withstand a summary judgment
challenge. See Gierbolini Rosa, 930 F. Supp. at 718-19.
The appellants contend that the district court's
determination on this point is at odds with the position the
same judge took in
Pages v.
Feingold, 928 F. Supp. 148 (D.P.R.
1996). The two cases are, however, distinguishable. In Pages,
there was an unmistakable causal connection between Feingold's
defamatory conduct and Pages' reputational damage. No such
connection exists in the case at hand between BPPR's filing of
the informative return and proof of claim and the Gierbolinis'
alleged mental and moral suffering. See Gierbolini Rosa, 930
F. Supp. at 718-19. And, unlike Pages, where not only mental
and moral, but also financial and reputational damages were
established, the evidence presented here in support of damages
did not go beyond the most conclusory allegations. See
id. at
719.
3. Finally, the appellants contend that the district
court erred in failing to consider the affidavit of attorney
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William Pagan submitted in support of "Plaintiffs' Opposition
to Defendant's Motion Requesting Entry of Summary Judgment
Dismissing the Complaint and for Order Requiring Defendant to
Pay Attorney's Fees and Costs." The appellants maintain that
this affidavit contained facts indicating the publication or
communication of an additional defamatory statement outside the
confines of a privileged legislative, judicial or other
proceeding authorized by law.
The Gierbolinis accompanied their opposition to
BPPR's motion for summary judgment with a "Statement of
Material Facts as to Which There Exists a Genuine Issue to be
Tried." In the statement, the Gierbolinis asserted, for the
first time, that BPPR's "false and public accusations were not
exclusively made through the Proof of Claim and [a related
motion]" filed with the United States Bankruptcy Court, and
that BPPR, through employees at the Coamo branch, "slandered
and destroyed Carmen Gierbolini's reputation." The Pagan
affidavit was cited as supporting these assertions. In that
affidavit, the affiant stated that a BPPR auditor informed him
that Gierbolini-Marrero had been under investigation and would
possibly be charged with fraud and defalcation.
6. The Pagan affidavit provides, in pertinent part, as
follows:
"2. That sometime during the month of July 1992 Gilberto
Canales an Auditor for Banco Popular de Puerto Rico informed me
that Carmen N. Gierbolini had been the subject of an
investigation and would posibly [sic] be accused of fraud and
defalcation."
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We do not believe that the district court was
required to consider the new incident mentioned in the Pagan
affidavit for purposes of determining BPPR's motion for summary
judgment. The conduct which the complaint alleges in paragraph
12 to be "tortious, wrongful, negligent and culpable" under
Article 1802 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code is set out in
paragraphs 9, 10 and 11 of the complaint. These describe
BPPR's filing of the informative return before the Puerto Rico
Treasury Department and the proof of claim and a related motion
before the United States Bankruptcy Court. No mention is made
of a claim of slander based on a statement by a BPPR auditor.
The Gierbolinis' "Answer to Interrogatories"
reaffirmed that they based their charges of defamation on
BPPR's filing of the informative return, the proof of claim and
a related motion. In their answers to Interrogatory No. 17,
addressed to Gierbolini-Marrero, and Interrogatory No. 11,
addressed to Gierbolini-Rosa, both Gierbolini-Marrero and
Gierbolini-Rosa identify BPPR's proof of claim and a related
motion as the basis for their allegation in paragraph 12 of the
complaint. The only other answers that identify any
7. Interrogatories No. 17 and No. 11 provide, in pertinent
part, as follows:
"State the basis for your allegation in paragraph 12 of
the Complaint that BPPR 'falsely and publicly' accused you of
'embezzlement and defalcation'."
Gierbolini-Marrero's answer to Interrogatory No. 17
states:
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defamatory conduct on the part of BPPR are those responding to
Interrogatory No. 15, served on Gierbolini-Marrero, and
Interrogatory No. 9, served on Gierbolini-Rosa, regarding the
alleged falsity of the informative return filed with the Puerto
Rico Treasury Department.
Neither the complaint, nor the interrogatory answers,
nor, for that matter, the "Preliminary Pretrial Order", mention
"Proof of claim filed by BPPR on January 12, 1993 and
Motion filed by BPPR on March 8, 1993 both in B-92-05458."
Gierbolini-Rosa's answer to Interrogatory No. 11 states:
"Proof of claim filed by the BPPR on January 12, 1993 and
Motion field [sic] by BPPR on March 8, 1993, both in the
bankruptcy proceeding."
8. Interrogatories No. 15 and No. 9 provide, in pertinent
part, as follows:
"State the basis for your allegation in paragraph 9 of the
Complaint that the report filed by BPPR with the Treasury
Department was false and, specifically, was filed with the
malicious intent to harass plaintiffs."
Gierbolini-Marrero's answer to Interrogatory No. 15
states:
"BPPR filed form 480.6 (Informative Return) with the
Treasury Department reporting having paid me the amount of
$95,387.22 during 1992 as deferred compensation. BPPR knew
that that was false. The obvious intention was to provoke a
tax investigation of our return by the Treasury Department
since I could not have reported that income in my 1992 tax
return because I never received the payment."
Gierbolini-Rosa's answer to Interrogatory No. 9 states:
"BPPR filed form 480.6 Informative Return with the
Treasury Department reporting having paid my wife the amount of
$95,387.22 during 1992 as deferred compensation. BPPR knew
that the report was false. The obvious intention was to
provoke a tax investigation of our return by the Treasury
Department since we could not have reported that income in our
1992 return because my wife never received such payment."
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any other allegedly defamatory acts. There is no allegation or
assertion of fact in any of these documents indicating that one
of the acts for which recovery is sought consists of a BPPR
auditor telling someone in the community of Coamo that
Gierbolini-Marrero had been under investigation and would
possibly be charged with fraud and defalcation. The appellants
contend that that incident was only discovered afterwards, at
which time it was promptly brought to the district court's
attention through the Pagan affidavit. Appellants, however,
did not move to amend their complaint to charge this alleged
conduct as an additional defamatory act by BPPR. The district
court and BPPR were not required to shoot at a moving target.
They were entitled to proceed on the assumption that the
defamation action rested on the claims in plaintiffs' complaint
as confirmed in their sworn answers to interrogatories.
Affirmed.
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