USCA1 Opinion
[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
____________________
No. 96-2100
KEVIN AND BOBBI RAYZOR, THE MINOR BR,
REPRESENTED BY HER PARENTS, KEVIN AND BOBBI RAYZOR,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant, Appellee.
____________________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Salvador E. Casellas, U.S. District Judge]
____________________
Before
Selya, Circuit Judge,
Coffin and Cyr, Senior Circuit Judges.
____________________
Andres Guilemard-Noble with whom Joan S. Peters was on brief
for appellants.
Steve Frank, Attorney, Appellate Staff Civil Division,
Department of Justice, with whom Frank
W.
Hunger, Assistant
Attorney General,
Guillermo Gil
, United States Attorney, and
Robert
S. Greenspan
, Attorney, Appellate Staff Civil Division, Department
of Justice, were on brief for appellee.
___________________
JULY 22, 1997
___________________
COFFIN, Senior
Circuit
Judge. Appellants Kevin and Bobbi
Rayzor seek to hold the United States responsible for the sexual
abuse of their daughter by a babysitter whose name they obtained
from a list allegedly recommended by the Navy. The Rayzors filed
suit for damages under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. S
1346(b), asserting that the Navy was negligent in directing them to
select a babysitter from a Red Cross generated list without first
checking the qualifications of the individuals on the list. The
district court granted summary judgment for the government on both
that claim and a related First Amendment claim. We affirm.
I. Background
Appellant Kevin Rayzor, a petty officer in the Navy, was
stationed with his wife and young daughter at a base in Ceiba,
Puerto Rico. The Rayzors claim that the Navy instructed them to
hire babysitters for sporadic child care needs only from a list
provided by the American Red Cross at the base's Family Service
Center. That list contained the names of teenagers who had
completed the nine-hour Red Cross babysitting course offered at the
Two points warrant some elaboration. First, there is some
confusion about whether the district court misunderstood the
allegation to be that the Navy advised the Rayzors
not to hire from
the Red Cross list. Unraveling the confusion is unnecessary
because our assumption that the Navy did direct the Rayzors to use
the list exclusively is most advantageous to the Rayzors, whose
claim of negligence would be absurd, rather than just fruitless, if
they had hired a sitter from the list despite the Navy's explicit
directive not to do so.
Second, the Rayzors' assertion that they were directed to hire
from the Red Cross list is based only on their own statement and is
not attributed to any particular individual or document. For
purposes of summary judgment, we accept the allegation as true.
base. The course covered the basics of first aid and outlined the
duties of a babysitter.
The Rayzors hired an individual from the list, and discovered
the next day that she had physically and sexually abused their two-
year-old daughter. They subsequently filed their complaint under
the FTCA alleging that the Navy was negligent in "certif[ying]" the
sitter, and in falsely representing that she was qualified to
provide safe babysitting services. Appellants also alleged that
the Navy violated their First Amendment rights by warning them "to
keep silent" about the incident.
The district court granted summary judgment for the
government. It ruled that the FTCA was inapplicable because the
Red Cross and its employees were not government employees whose
conduct was actionable under the statute. It also held that an
FTCA action was not viable because the Navy's alleged actions did
not constitute negligence under local law. Although the government
did not respond in its summary judgment motion to the First
Amendment claim, the district court
sua
sponte dismissed the claim
The Navy sought to have the sitter prosecuted but the U.S.
Attorney's office declined to prosecute because the sitter was a
juvenile.
The Navy operates two fulltime child care programs at the
base, the Child Development Center/Preschool (CDC) and a Family
Home Care Program (FHC), neither of which is at issue in this case.
The Navy has issued detailed instructions for each of these
programs, including background checks for FHC providers, who are
private individuals who care for up to six children in a Navy
housing unit. See App. at 24-41.
for lack of supporting evidence. The Rayzors then filed this
appeal.
II. Federal Tort Claims Act
Our review of a grant of summary judgment is de novo, and we
evaluate the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party. See Coyne v. Taber Partners I, 53 F.3d 454, 457 (1st Cir.
1995). Even from that vantage point, however, the Rayzors'
negligence claim lacks luster.
Their claim, in essence, is that the Navy should have probed
the backgrounds of the babysitters on the Red Cross list before
recommending them to base residents. Under Puerto Rico law, which
is applicable in this FTCA suit,
see
Attallah v.
United States
, 955
F.2d 776, 781 (1st Cir. 1992), such a claim is actionable only if
a reasonable factfinder could find that the Navy had a duty to
exercise due diligence to avoid foreseeable risks to the Rayzors,
and that the Navy failed to fulfill that responsibility. See
Coyne, 53 F.3d at 458-60;
Malave Felix
v.
Volvo Car Corp.
, 946 F.2d
967, 971 (1st Cir. 1991). Even assuming, as the Rayzors argue at
length, that the Navy acquired a duty to protect them as a result
of its recommendation that they hire a babysitter from the Red
Cross list -- a legal proposition about which we have doubts -- we
think no reasonable factfinder could find either a failure to
exercise due diligence or a foreseeable risk of harm.
The Rayzors do not appeal the court's holding that Red Cross
workers are not federal employees, limiting their challenge on the
FTCA claim to the court's ruling that they failed to make a viable
showing of negligence.
The Navy's only representation about the sitters on the Red
Cross list was an implicit statement that they were preferable to
other sitters because of their relationship with the international
humanitarian agency, making them something of a known quantity.
The Rayzors offer no evidence to support their contention that the
Navy lacked due diligence in failing to investigate the individuals
whose names appeared on the list. They cite to no incidents of
child abuse involving Red Cross sitters generally, or concerning
the specific individuals on the list at the base in Ceiba.
Moreover, all of the individuals on the Red Cross list were
teenagers, ranging in age from 11 to 17, and we cannot accept that
a reasonable factfinder would have concluded that the Navy had an
obligation to do background checks on minors who had undergone Red
Cross training, in the absence of particularized concern. In
short, a reasonable person would not have foreseen a need to
investigate these Red Cross-affiliated sitters to prevent harmful
criminal conduct.
Although foreseeability typically is both a "factbound and
case-specific" issue, see Coyne, 53 F.3d at 460 -- foreclosing
summary judgment -- "the evidence must be such that the factfinder
rationally can conclude that the risk complained of is among the
universe of risks recognizable by reasonably prudent persons acting
with due diligence under the same or similar circumstances." Id.
(citing Pacheco v. Puerto
Rico
Water
Resources
Auth., 112 D.P.R.
367, 372 (1982)). As we have noted, however, the Rayzors have
proffered no basis upon which a factfinder could conclude that it
was foreseeable to the Navy that this, or any other teenage
babysitter who had taken a Red Cross babysitting course, would
engage in criminally abusive mistreatment of her charge.
Cf.,
e.g.,
Coyne, 53 F.3d at 461 (reversing summary judgment where defendants
were on notice of the potential for violence); Elba v. Univ.
of
P.R., 90 J.T.S. 13 (1990) (Official English Translation: No. RE-86-
214, slip op. at 21-23) (university's failure to provide adequate
security in high-risk area gave rise to violent assault of female
student);
Negron v.
Orozco Rivera
, 113 P.R. Offic. Trans. 921, 927-
29 (1983) (reasonable person would have foreseen eruption of
violence in police station, given prior confrontation between armed
officer and decedent). See also Mas v. United
States, 984 F.2d
527, 530 (1st Cir. 1993) (showing of negligence under Puerto Rico
law requires "a demonstration that the defendant has either actual
or constructive knowledge of a dangerous condition"). We therefore
conclude that the Rayzors failed to generate a sufficient factual
dispute to survive the government's motion for summary judgment on
the FTCA claim. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's
dismissal of that claim.
III. First Amendment Claim
We previously have observed that liability for a breach of
duty under Puerto Rico law requires a causal relationship between
the breach and the ensuing harm, meaning that "'the damage must
have been foreseeable and
avoidable had the omitted action been
timely taken,'" Coyne v. Taber
Partners
I, 53 F.3d 454, 459 (1st
Cir. 1995) (quoting Elba v. Univ.
of
P.R., 90 J.T.S. 13 (1990)
(Official English Translation: No. RE-86-214, slip op. at 12)
(emphasis added)). The Rayzors offer no evidence that a background
check would have revealed the unsuitability of the sitter.
The Rayzors also alleged that the government violated their
First Amendment rights by threatening that they should keep quiet
about the abuse incident. The government's motion for summary
judgment did not address this claim, but the court dismissed it
sua
sponte because it could not find any proof in the record to verify
the allegation. The court stated in its opinion:
Mr. Rayzor has failed to identify or indicate who, if
anyone, threatened him. In our opinion, a claim not
supported by affirmative evidence does not present a
genuine issue for trial. Unsupported allegations or
denials are not enough to defeat a motion for summary
judgment. Anderson v. Liberty
Lo[bby],
Inc. 477 U.S.
242, 252 (1986).
The only apparent evidence on this claim contained in the
appellate materials consists of two affidavits, one from each of
the Rayzors. The content relevant to a First Amendment claim in
Kevin Rayzor's affidavit is as follows:
[W]e were harassed and threatened by Navy officers in an
attempt to cover-up the incident. . . . I was told by an
officer of the Navy that I better keep my wife's mouth
shut, or I would have problems with my records.
Bobbi Rayzor's affidavit merely repeats the allegation of
harassment and threats, and alleges that action on her application
to be licensed as a Child Care Provider was delayed because of the
couple's complaints about the incident.
We agree with the district court's judgment that these
statements are inadequate to warrant a trial on the First Amendment
claim. They fail to identify who made the threatening statement(s)
or when they were made, the basis for Mrs. Rayzor's assertion that
this incident affected her application to become a base Child Care
Provider, or how Officer Rayzor's records could be affected by
public disclosure of the assault.
Appellants imply in their brief that summary judgment on this
claim is premature because no discovery has been conducted. So far
as we can tell, lack of discovery was not an issue below. The
government moved for summary judgment on March 18, 1994, and the
district court dismissed the case more than two years later on July
28, 1996. Appellants do not assert that they requested, but were
denied, discovery. Instead, they maintain that their affidavits
constituted "ample evidence" to survive summary judgment.
As we already have explained, we disagree that their proffer
is adequate. It is virtually axiomatic that "neither 'conclusory
allegations,' . . . nor '[b]rash conjecture coupled with earnest
hope that something concrete will materialize, is []sufficient to
block summary judgment.'" J. Geils Band Employee Benefit Plan v.
Smith
Barney
Shearson,
Inc., 76 F.3d 1245, 1251 (1st Cir. 1996)
(citations omitted). This is all the Rayzors have offered.
We have some concern about the court's sua
sponte grant of
summary judgment on the First Amendment claim in light of the
government's failure to move for brevis disposition on that claim.
This, however, was not an ambush. In its Reply to Plaintiffs'
Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, the
government pointed to the lack of support for both the allegations
of threats and Mrs. Rayzor's contention that the government stalled
her license to become a Child Care Provider. The Reply was filed
on June 27, 1994, more than two years before the court ruled.
We therefore are satisfied that appellants had adequate notice
of the government's challenge to the sufficiency of their "threat"
allegations. See
Penobscot Indian Nation
v.
Key Bank of Maine
, 112
F.3d 538, 562 (1st Cir. 1997) (quoting Berkovitz v. Home
Box
Office, Inc., 89 F.3d 24, 29 (1st Cir. 1996)) ("'targeted party'"
must be given "'appropriate notice and a chance to present its
evidence on the essential elements of the claim or defense'").
In these circumstances, to preclude summary judgment on the First
Amendment claim based on the government's failure to seek it
explicitly would be to waste judicial resources for the sake of
pointless technicality. We decline to do so.
For the foregoing reasons, the summary judgment of the
district court is affirmed.
