[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
____________________
No. 96-2143
JOSE DEMELO,
Petitioner, Appellee,
v.
CHARLES T. COBB, ET AL.,
Respondents, Appellants.
____________________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Robert E. Keeton, U.S. District Judge] ___________________
____________________
Before
Selya, Circuit Judge, _____________
Cyr, Senior Circuit Judge, ____________________
and Lynch, Circuit Judge. _____________
____________________
Frank W. Hunger, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, _________________
David M. McConnell, Assistant Director, and Kristen A. Giuffreda, ___________________ _____________________
Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, Department
of Justice, on Motion to Vacate for appellants.
____________________
February 27, 1997
____________________
Per Curiam. Section 440(c) of the Antiterrorism and ___________
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214, 1277 (Apr. 24, 1996) (AEDPA), provides for the
mandatory detention of certain categories of criminal aliens
pending deportation proceedings. The district court here
determined that 440(c) did not apply to those aliens, such
as petitioner, who had been convicted and released from
incarceration prior to AEDPA's effective date. See DeMelo v. ___ ______
Cobb, 936 F. Supp. 30 (D. Mass. 1996). Respondents, having ____
appealed from this ruling, now suggest that their appeal has
become moot in light of the intervening enactment of the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (Sept. 30, 1996)
(IIRIRA). As a result, they request that the district court
order be vacated "to the extent it relies on a finding that
section 440(c) of the AEDPA is inapplicable," and also that
the case be remanded for further proceedings. Petitioner has
filed no opposition.
We agree that the advent of IIRIRA has rendered moot the
question of whether AEDPA's mandatory-detention provision
applies here--the sole issue raised on appeal. With the
implementation of the "transition period custody rules," see ___
IIRIRA 303(b)(3), section 440(c) of AEDPA has specifically
been rendered inoperative during the interim period, see ___
IIRIRA 303(b)(2); the question of AEDPA's applicability is
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thus no longer in contention. In so concluding, we express
no opinion as to whether IIRIRA's transitional rules--as
opposed to the rules governing detention under the pre-AEDPA
regime, to the extent they might differ--apply to petitioner.
We likewise agree that it is appropriate under the
circumstances to vacate the district court's order to the
extent it relies on a finding that 440(c) of AEDPA is
inapplicable. See, e.g., United States v. Munsingwear, 340 ___ ____ _____________ ___________
U.S. 36, 39 (1950); Knight v. Mills, 836 F.2d 659, 671-72 ______ _____
(1st Cir. 1987) (ordering partial vacatur); Bethell v. _______
Florida, 741 F.2d 1341, 1342 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) _______
(similar).
The motion to vacate is allowed; the district court's ________________________________________________________
order of June 19, 1996 is vacated as moot to the extent it _____________________________________________________________
relies on a finding that 440(c) of AEDPA is inapplicable. _____________________________________________________________
The case is remanded to the district court for further _____________________________________________________________
proceedings as appropriate. ___________________________
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