USCA1 Opinion
[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
____________________
No. 96-2229
No. 97-1025
WALTER D. JOHNSON, JR.,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
MICHAEL MALONEY, ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees.
____________________
APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Douglas P. Woodlock, U.S. District Judge]
____________________
Before
Torruella, Chief Judge,
Stahl and Lynch, Circuit Judges.
____________________
Walter D. Johnson, Jr. on brief pro se.
Nancy
Ankers
White,
Special Assistant Attorney General, and William
D. Saltzman, Department of Correction, on brief for appellees.
____________________
June 5, 1997
____________________
Per Curiam. While incarcerated at MCI-Norfolk in
Massachusetts, plaintiff Walter Johnson suffered severe
injuries upon being stabbed by a fellow inmate. He filed the
instant S 1983 action against various prison officials,
alleging, inter alia, that they had exhibited deliberate
indifference to his safety and health in violation of the
Eighth Amendment. The district court, after first dismissing
the
action
for
want
of
prosecution, then declined to vacate the
order
of
dismissal
on
the independent ground that plaintiff had
failed to state a claim. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
Plaintiff has appealed from both of these rulings. We affirm
on the latter ground alone.
We acknowledge the seriousness of the assault and the
severity of plaintiff's injuries; we find no cause here, on
legal grounds, for extended discussion. It is undisputed, of
course, that "[p]rison officials have a duty ... to protect
prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners."
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994) (quoting Cortes-
Quinones v. Jimenez-Nettleship, 842 F.2d 556, 558 (1st Cir.
1988)
(original citation omitted)). It is likewise clear that
prison authorities have a responsibility to attend to the
"serious medical needs of prisoners." Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S.
97,
104
(1976).
Yet the Eighth Amendment is violated only
when a prison official has manifested "'deliberate
indifference' to a substantial risk of serious harm" to an
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inmate's safety or health. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 828. And
deliberate indifference requires a showing of "subjective
recklessness," id. at 839--i.e., a showing that "the official
knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or
safety," id. at 837.
Nothing in plaintiff's amended complaint, even with all
reasonable inferences drawn in his favor, would permit such a
finding. With respect to the stabbing incident, his factual
allegations
provide
no
basis for concluding that the attack was
in any way foreseeable or that the named defendants
(supervisory
officials all) had any inkling that such an event
might occur. Nor, assuming arguendo that the Farmer inquiry
does not foreclose the matter, has plaintiff proffered any
grounds for imposing supervisory liability on defendants for
the
behavior
of a subordinate. See, e.g., Seekamp v. Michaud,
109
F.3d
802, 808 (1st Cir. 1997). Similarly, with respect to
his medical treatment, plaintiff has pointed to no
circumstances that would permit a finding of deliberate
indifference on the part of defendants.
For these reasons, it "appears beyond doubt that the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim
which
would
entitle
him
to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S.
41, 45-46 (1957) (footnote omitted). We have considered
plaintiff's
remaining claims and find them equally unavailing.
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We therefore agree with the district court that dismissal for
failure to state a claim was warranted.
Affirmed.
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