[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
____________________
No. 97-1117
JAMES E. COFIELD, JR. AND JUAN M. COFIELD,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION,
Defendant, Appellee.
____________________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Patti B. Saris, U.S. District Judge] ___________________
____________________
Before
Torruella, Chief Judge, ___________
Boudin and Stahl, Circuit Judges. ______________
____________________
Edwin A. McCabe, Philip Y. Brown and McCabe Brown on brief for ________________ _______________ ____________
appellants.
James C. Heigham and Choate, Hall & Stewart on brief for __________________ _________________________
appellee.
____________________
August 25, 1997
____________________
Per Curiam. We have carefully reviewed the record ___________
and read the briefs on appeal. We affirm the district
court's judgment dismissing the complaint of appellant James
E. Cofield for essentially the reasons stated in the court's
Memorandum and Order, dated October 31, 1996. See Local Rule ___
27.1. We add only two comments.
1. Statute of Limitations. We assume, without _______________________
deciding, that appellant argued below that Fannie Mae had
perpetrated a fraud on the bankruptcy court. Nonetheless,
the claim cannot succeed. Simply, appellant may not pursue
the fraud claim now, either via motion or in an independent
action, because he could have litigated it in the adversary
proceeding. That is, from the undisputed facts, it is plain
that appellant knew of Fannie Mae's alleged fraud before the
adversary proceeding was dismissed. As we pointed out in a
recent case, Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) does not permit a party to
relitigate, in an independent action or by motion, issues
that the party had a fair opportunity to litigate in the
former action. See Geo. P. Reintjes Co. v. Riley Stoker ___ ______________________ ____________
Corp., 71 F.3d 44, 49 (1st Cir. 1995) (citing 7 J. Moore, _____
Moore's Federal Practice 60.37 (1995)). At the least, _________________________
appellant could have filed a motion for reconsideration of
the order of dismissal.
2. Malicious Prosecution. Appellant's reliance on _____________________
comment j to 674 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts _______________________________
-2-
(1977) does not help him. That comment emphasizes that
"[w]hether a withdrawal or an abandonment constitutes a final
termination of the case in favor of the person against whom
the proceedings are brought . . . depends upon the __________________
circumstances under which the proceedings are withdrawn." ___________________________________________________________
Id. cmt. j (emphasis added). The circumstances surrounding ___
Fannie Mae's decision to let the bankruptcy order of
dismissal stand, even assuming such decision amounts to
abandonment, establish that, as the district court found, the
adversary proceeding, in relation to Fannie Mae's claims
against appellant, did not terminate in either party's favor.
We therefore summarily affirm the judgment of the ______
district court and, as per counsel's representation in the
reply brief, withdraw the appeal of Juan M. Cofield.
-3-