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Cofield v. Federal National, 97-1117 (1997)

Court: Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Number: 97-1117 Visitors: 4
Filed: Sep. 09, 1997
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: , James C. Heigham and Choate, Hall Stewart on brief for, __________________ _________________________, appellee.perpetrated a fraud on the bankruptcy court.former action.against appellant, did not terminate in either party's favor.reply brief, withdraw the appeal of Juan M. Cofield.
USCA1 Opinion












[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
____________________


No. 97-1117


JAMES E. COFIELD, JR. AND JUAN M. COFIELD,

Plaintiffs, Appellants,

v.

FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION,

Defendant, Appellee.

____________________


APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Patti B. Saris, U.S. District Judge] ___________________

____________________

Before

Torruella, Chief Judge, ___________
Boudin and Stahl, Circuit Judges. ______________

____________________

Edwin A. McCabe, Philip Y. Brown and McCabe Brown on brief for ________________ _______________ ____________
appellants.
James C. Heigham and Choate, Hall & Stewart on brief for __________________ _________________________
appellee.


____________________

August 25, 1997
____________________
















Per Curiam. We have carefully reviewed the record ___________

and read the briefs on appeal. We affirm the district

court's judgment dismissing the complaint of appellant James

E. Cofield for essentially the reasons stated in the court's

Memorandum and Order, dated October 31, 1996. See Local Rule ___

27.1. We add only two comments.

1. Statute of Limitations. We assume, without _______________________

deciding, that appellant argued below that Fannie Mae had

perpetrated a fraud on the bankruptcy court. Nonetheless,

the claim cannot succeed. Simply, appellant may not pursue

the fraud claim now, either via motion or in an independent

action, because he could have litigated it in the adversary

proceeding. That is, from the undisputed facts, it is plain

that appellant knew of Fannie Mae's alleged fraud before the

adversary proceeding was dismissed. As we pointed out in a

recent case, Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) does not permit a party to

relitigate, in an independent action or by motion, issues

that the party had a fair opportunity to litigate in the

former action. See Geo. P. Reintjes Co. v. Riley Stoker ___ ______________________ ____________

Corp., 71 F.3d 44, 49 (1st Cir. 1995) (citing 7 J. Moore, _____

Moore's Federal Practice 60.37 (1995)). At the least, _________________________

appellant could have filed a motion for reconsideration of

the order of dismissal.

2. Malicious Prosecution. Appellant's reliance on _____________________

comment j to 674 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts _______________________________



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(1977) does not help him. That comment emphasizes that

"[w]hether a withdrawal or an abandonment constitutes a final

termination of the case in favor of the person against whom

the proceedings are brought . . . depends upon the __________________

circumstances under which the proceedings are withdrawn." ___________________________________________________________

Id. cmt. j (emphasis added). The circumstances surrounding ___

Fannie Mae's decision to let the bankruptcy order of

dismissal stand, even assuming such decision amounts to

abandonment, establish that, as the district court found, the

adversary proceeding, in relation to Fannie Mae's claims

against appellant, did not terminate in either party's favor.

We therefore summarily affirm the judgment of the ______

district court and, as per counsel's representation in the

reply brief, withdraw the appeal of Juan M. Cofield.

























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Source:  CourtListener

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