USCA1 Opinion
[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
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No. 97-1273
SAMUEL JONES,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
MASSACHUSETTS BAY TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY AND CHRISTOPHER
J. BLACH,
Defendants, Appellees.
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APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Nancy J. Gertner, U.S. District Judge]
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Before
Selya, Circuit Judge,
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Aldrich, Senior Circuit Judge,
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and Boudin, Circuit Judge.
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Samuel Jones on brief pro se.
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Merita A. Hopkins and Dawna McIntyre on brief for appellees.
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November 6, 1997
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Per Curiam. Samuel Jones appeals from the district
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court's dismissal of his action asserting federal and state
claims against the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority
(the "MBTA") and Christopher Blach, an employee of the City
of Boston. We affirm.
First, given Jones's settlement agreement with the MBTA
which resolved all of his claims against the MBTA, the
district court properly dismissed the action against the
MBTA. See C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, 13A Federal
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Practice and Procedure 3533.2, at 233 (2d ed. 1984)
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(settlement moots a case).1 Second, the grant of summary
1
judgment against Jones on his federal claim against Blach was
also proper. Counsel for Jones expressly informed the
district court that he did not intend to oppose summary
judgment on that claim, and Blach's summary judgment motion
correctly explained why the allegations in the complaint
failed to state a claim for relief. On appeal, Jones has not
explained why, under those circumstances, it was error to
grant summary judgment for Blach. Third, the district court
did not abuse its discretion by declining to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims against Blach
once the court had dismissed the federal claims. Counsel for
Jones essentially asked the court to dismiss the claims and
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1In view of our finding, there is no need to determine
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whether the MBTA was a party on appeal.
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made no argument in support of exercising jurisdiction over
those claims. Under state law, Jones could have refiled the
state claims in state court. See M.G.L. c. 260, 32 (claims
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dismissed for "any matter of form" may be refiled in state
court for one year after their dismissal); Duca v. Martins,
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941 F. Supp. 1281, 1295 n.14 (D. Mass. 1996) (dismissing
state law claim without prejudice after dismissing the
plaintiff's federal claim because M.G.L. c. 260, 32 gave
the plaintiff one year in which to refile his claim in state
court) (citing Liberace v. Conway, 31 Mass. App. Ct. 40, 43,
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574 N.E.2d 1010, 1012, review denied, 411 Mass. 1102 (1991)).
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On appeal, Jones suggests that the claims may "now" be time
barred in state court, but that fact has no bearing on the
propriety of the court's earlier decision not to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims. Finally,
Jones has not explained why his malicious prosecution claim
could properly have been brought under 1983. See Roche et
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ux. Roche v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 81 F.3d 249,
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256 (1st Cir. 1996) ("garden-variety" malicious prosecution
claims cannot be brought under 1983). In addition, his
counsel represented to the district court that the malicious
prosecution claim was a state law claim, and, as such, the
court properly declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over it.
Affirmed.
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