[NOT FOR PUBLICATION--NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT]

                 United States Court of Appeals

                     For the First Circuit











No. 98-1143



                         RICHARD WILKES,



                      Plaintiff, Appellant,



                                v.



                    CITY OF ROCHESTER, ET AL.,



                      Defendants, Appellees.







           APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT



                FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE



         [Hon. Steven J. McAuliffe, U.S. District Judge]







                              Before



                     Torruella, Chief Judge,

                 Coffin, Senior Circuit Judge,

                   and Stahl, Circuit Judge.

                                

                                





     Richard Wilkes on brief pro se.

     Donald E. Gardner, John P. Sherman, and Devine, Millimet &

Branch on brief for appellees.











September 21, 1998







                                

                                





            Per Curiam.  We have carefully reviewed the record in

    this case, including the briefs of the parties.  Except as to

    the disposition of the pendent claims, we find no abuse of

    discretion in the dismissal of this case.  

              Several factors support the decision to dismiss this

    case, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).  First, plaintiff

    violated an explicit court order by failing to file a response

    to defendants' motion to dismiss.  See Figueroa Ruiz v.

    Alegria, 896 F.2d 645, 647 (1st Cir. 1990).  Moreover, this

    disobedience occurred after the district court had shown

    sensitivity to plaintiff's pro se status by extending the time

    for filing a response and explaining exactly why the previous

    response was inadequate.  See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d

    1258, 1261 (9th Cir.) (upholding dismissal where court had

    shown similar "sensitivity" to a pro se plaintiff's inadequate

    complaint), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 915 (1992).  

              Second, dismissal occurred only after plaintiff had

    been explicitly warned of the consequences of his failure to

    obey the court order.  See Figueroa Ruiz, 896 F.2d at 547.

              Third, our review of the record convinces us that

    plaintiff's case, at least in regard to its federal claims,

    suffers from "glaring weaknesses."  Id.  For example, insofar

    as any of plaintiff's constitutional claims are not time

    barred, they are barred by the existence of adequate state

    remedies for inverse condemnation and conversion.  See Culebras

    Enterprises Corp. v. Rivera Rios, 813 F.2d 506, 512-13 (1st

    Cir. 1987) (adequate state remedies bar just compensation

    claim); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984) (deprivation

    of property).  Plaintiff also fails to allege any "enduring

    criminal conduct" sufficient to sustain his RICO claim.  SeeFeinstein v. Resolution Trust Corp., 942 F.2d 34, 45 (1st Cir.

    1991) (RICO claim requires allegation either that predicate

    acts extended more than a few weeks or that a realistic threat

    of continued criminal activity exists).

              A final factor supporting dismissal in this case is

    the need to flush out at any early stage meritless RICO and

    civil rights claims since the mere assertion of these claims

    often has a "stigmatizing effect on those named as defendants." 

    Figueroa Ruiz, 896 F.2d at 650; see also Dartmouth Review v.

    Dartmouth College, 889 F.2d 13, 16 (1st Cir. 1989) (unfounded

    civil rights actions may "tar[] defendant's reputation

    unfairly"). 

              For all the above reason, the district court did not

    abuse its discretion in dismissing plaintiff's federal claims. 

    However, the court order appears to dismiss with prejudice

    plaintiff's pendent state claims as well.  This court has held

    it preferable to dismiss pendent state claims for want of

    jurisdiction.  Figueroa Ruiz, 896 F.2d at 650.

              As to the federal claims, the judgment of dismissal

    is affirmed.  

              As to the pendent claims, the judgment is vacated and

    the case remanded with directions to enter a judgment

    dismissing the pendent claims without prejudice.