[NOT FOR PUBLICATION--NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT]

                 United States Court of Appeals

                     For the First Circuit











No. 98-1198



                       CAROLINE G. DOUGLAS,



                      Plaintiff, Appellant,



                                v.



             NEW HAMPSHIRE SUPREME COURT PROFESSIONAL

                    CONDUCT COMMITTEE, ET AL.,



                      Defendants, Appellees.







           APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT



                FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE



         [Hon. Steven J. McAuliffe, U.S. District Judge]









                              Before



                     Torruella, Chief Judge,

                   Cyr, Senior Circuit Judge,

                   and Boudin, Circuit Judge.

                                

                                





     Caroline G. Douglas on brief pro se.

     Philip T. McLaughlin, Attorney General and Daniel J. Mullen,

Senior Assistant Attorney General on brief for appellees.











December 29, 1998







                                

                                

            Per Curiam.  Plaintiff Caroline Douglas appeals a

    district court judgment that dismissed her amended complaint

    for declaratory and injunctive relief to enjoin the New

    Hampshire Supreme Court Professional Conduct Committee (NHPCC) 

    from instituting disciplinary proceedings against her.  The

    district court's dismissal order was based on the abstention

    principle enunciated in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971),

    and extended to attorney disciplinary proceedings in Middlesex

    County Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Association, 457

    U.S. 423 (1982).  

              Applying de novo review, see Brooks v. New Hampshire

    Supreme Court, 80 F.3d 633, 638 (1st Cir. 1996), we affirm. 

    The allegations in plaintiff's amended complaint establish that

    the disciplinary investigations commenced by the NHPCC are the

    sort of judicial proceedings that warrant abstention, as

    evidenced by the cases cited in the district court's opinion. 

    Plaintiff's argument to the contrary is meritless.  See, e.g.,

    Wightman v. Texas Supreme Court, 84 F.3d 188, 190-91 (5th Cir.

    1996)(applying Younger to disciplinary proceeding in its early

    stages), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 744 (1997); Fieger v. Thomas,

    74 F.3d 740, 746-49 (6th Cir. 1996)(applying Younger where

    attorney could raise constitutional claims before state bar

    disciplinary board and, via petition for mandamus or petition

    for discretionary review, before state supreme court); Brooks,

    80 F.3d at 638 (applying Younger where, inter alia, state

    disciplinary proceeding was only in the "embryonic" stage).    The allegations in plaintiff's amended complaint are

    also insufficient to state a claim within the "bad faith"

    exception to the Younger principle.  See Wightman, 84 F.3d at

    190 ("[t]he bad faith exception is narrow and is to be granted

    parsimoniously"); Bettencourt v. Board of Registration in

    Medicine, 904 F.2d 772, 779 (1st Cir. 1990)(similar). 

    Plaintiff's conclusory allegation that she was acting as a

    private citizen is insufficient to suggest that the NHPCC acted

    in bad faith in opening its investigations.  See Judge v. City

    of Lowell, ___ F.3d ___, ___ (1st Cir. 1998), 1998 WESTLAW

    789187 at *4("the element of illegal motive must be pleaded by

    alleging specific non-conclusory facts from which such a motive

    may reasonably be inferred, not merely by generalized

    asseveration alone[]"); Collins v. County of Kendall, Illinois,

    807 F.2d 95, 98 (7th Cir. 1986)(plaintiff asserting bad faith

    prosecution must allege specific facts to support an inference

    of bad faith).  Plaintiff's allegation that the NHPCC followed

    improper procedures in initiating the September 15, 1997

    complaint also fails to raise the specter of bad faith, for

    plaintiff has failed to identify any rule that prohibited the

    opening of the complaint in the fashion alleged.  We further

    cannot say that the "Hewson complaint" described a scenario

    that was patently beyond the NHPCC's jurisdiction, nor that its

  docketing was a "manifest" example of bad faith.    Finally,

    that the NHPCC failed to pursue a number of complaints against

    plaintiff's ex-husband is irrelevant to whether the complaints

    against plaintiff were opened in bad faith.  See Mason v.

    Departmental Disciplinary Committee, 894 F.2d 512, 515 (2d Cir.

    1990)(allegation that professional conduct board was at fault

    because it failed to adjudicate misconduct charges against

    others was irrelevant to determining propriety of board's

  inquiry into plaintiff).    Finally, plaintiff's allegations

    concerning the NHPCC's alleged  bias in favor of politically

    influential attorneys are too general to overcome the

    presumption of integrity that we must ascribe to the

    defendants.  See, e.g., Hirsh v. Justices of the Supreme Court

    of California, 67 F.3d 708, 713 (9th Cir. 1995); Bettencourt,

    904 F.2d at 780.   

       Affirmed.