[NOT FOR PUBLICATION--NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT]

                 United States Court of Appeals

                     For the First Circuit











No. 98-1245



                         FRANCISCA COLON,



                      Plaintiff, Appellant,



                                v.



                 SHIRLEY S. CHATER, COMMISSIONER,

                 SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,



                       Defendant, Appellee.







           APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT



                 FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND



        [Hon. Robert W. Lovegreen, U.S. Magistrate Judge]







                              Before



                     Torruella, Chief Judge,

                 Coffin, Senior Circuit Judge,

                   and Stahl, Circuit Judge.

                                

                                





     Donna M. Nesselbush and Green, Greenberg & Nesselbush on brief

for appellant.

     Sheldon Whitehouse, United States Attorney, Mary E. Rodgers,

Assistant U.S. Attorney, and Wayne G. Lewis, Assistant Regional

Counsel, on brief for appellee.









September 30, 1998









                                

                                

            Per Curiam.   Appellant Francisca Colon appeals from

    the district court's decision affirming the final decision of

    the Commissioner of Social Security which denied her disability

    insurance benefits under the Social Security Act.  After

    reviewing the administrative record, we conclude that

    substantial evidence supported the denial of benefits,

    essentially for the reasons given by the district court in its

    decision.  In particular, we note that the district court

    correctly construed the medical record, which showed that both

    of appellant's treating physicians, rheumatologist Dr. Edward

    Lally and orthopedist Dr. Howard Hirsch, ultimately viewed her

    pain to be muscular in origin and that both rejected the view

    that it was due to her clavicular non-union.  We make only the

    following additional comments which relate to claims of error

    not directly addressed by the district court.

                   1.  We do not think that Social Security Ruling

    96-5p required the administrative law judge ("ALJ") to

    recontact Dr. Hirsch to clarify the basis for his opinion that

    the appellant was disabled from December 1993 to December 1994. 

    Under the Ruling, the ALJ was required to do so only if he

    could not "ascertain the basis of the opinion from the case

    record."  The record contained a questionnaire, filled out by

    Dr. Hirsch in July 1995, which stated the basis for his opinion

    that the appellant was disabled.

                   2.  We see no error in the ALJ's failure to

    explain in detail why he discredited the appellant's testimony

    as to her pain.  He does not appear to have discredited the

    specific facts to which she testified, since he determined that

    she had a severe impairment which prevented her from performing

    her past work.  Rather, he apparently declined only to draw the

    ultimate conclusion that her pain left her totally disabled,

    offering legitimate reasons for doing so.  Nor do we agree that

    he mischaracterized her testimony regarding her daily

    activities.  Based on her testimony, the ALJ could reasonably

    infer that, as the only adult regularly present, she cared for

    her two young children who lived with her; that she could drive

    (she stated only that she was not driving at the time of the

    hearing because she did not have a car); that she could shop

    (she testified only that her son lifted the "heavier" things);

    and that she could do some household cleaning (she stated only

    that she had "difficulty" cleaning, that she asked her younger

    son to sweep the floor, and that her adult son, who lived in a

    different state, did general cleaning when he was there). 

    While she did not testify that she visited with friends

    regularly, she did report that fact in her disability

    applications.  Finally, the appellant has not shown that the

    ALJ failed to make the inquiries required by Avery v. Sec'y of

    Health & Human Serv., 797 F.2d 19 (1st Cir. 1986).

                   3.  The ALJ had no need to consult a medical

    expert because the record contained several medical opinions on

    appellant's functional capacity.  Both Dr. Lally and Dr. Hirsch

    offered opinions, and the Commissioner's consulting, non-

    examining physician, Dr. Richard Mignacci, filled out a

    residual capacity assessment form.  While appellant's treating

    physicians differed in their opinions on her functional

    capacity, the ALJ reasonably explained why Dr. Lally's opinion

    should be preferred.

                   4.  The hypothetical, which appellant's counsel

    posed to the vocational expert at the disability hearing, was

    premised in part on the assumption that appellant's ability to

    grasp with her dominant right hand was limited.  Because this

    restriction was not supported by the medical evidence, the ALJ

    did not err in ignoring the expert's response to counsel's

    hypothetical.

                   The decision of the district court is affirmed.