Filed: Aug. 16, 2000
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: as Jomar), have appealed a district court judgment terms a short delay in responding to the court's December That deadline was ignored by, Jomar and the date for amended responses extended at Jomar's, request to May 22. sanctions and it certainly had a fair chance to be heard on court orders.
[NOT FOR PUBLICATION–NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT]
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 00-1092
JOMAR PACKAGING CORPORATION; JOSE A. VARGAS-DE-LEON;
MARIA RODRIGUEZ-TOUBENS; CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP VARGAS-
RODRIGUEZ,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
KOBEL INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
Defendant, Appellee.
____________________
JIMMY ANZAI; JANE DOE; CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP ANZAI-DOE,
Defendants.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Daniel R. DomĂnguez, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Chief Judge,
Boudin and Lipez, Circuit Judges.
Jorge Carazo-Quetglas and Toledo Toledo & Carazo-Quetglas,
P.S.C. on brief for appellant.
Ricardo F. Casellas and Fiddler Gonzalez & Rodriguez, LLP.
on brief for appellee.
August 1, 2000
Per Curiam. The appellants, Jose Vargas-de-Leon,
d/b/a Jomar Packaging Corp., Vargas's wife, and their
conjugal relationship (hereinafter referred to collectively
as "Jomar"), have appealed a district court judgment
dismissing their complaint with prejudice for non-compliance
with discovery requests and failure timely to comply with a
court order forewarning of severe consequences for non-
compliance. The appellee, Kobel International, Inc.
("Kobel"), has moved for summary disposition of this appeal.
Upon review of the parties' brief and the record below, we
grant the motion and summarily affirm essentially for the
reasons stated by the district court in its opinion and
order, dated June 30, 1999, and its order denying
reconsideration, dated October 25, 1999.
We add only the following. In its appellate brief,
Jomar persists in contending that "extremely protracted
inaction" did not exist. But it focuses solely on what it
terms a "short" delay in responding to the court's December
-3-
15, 1998 order directing it to comply with the discovery
requests within five days of notice of the order. And, it
contends it was denied due process because, it alleges, the
district court failed to consider the reason given for this
"short" delay (clerical staff Christmas vacation). Jomar
ignores completely, however, its inaction from May 22, 1998,
the date by which it promised to provide the amended
responses, and December 31, 1998, when it provided
apparently simply a rehash of its previously inadequate
responses.1 And it ignores its inaction in failing to
respond to Kobel's repeated motions to compel. Rather than
fail to consider Jomar's excuse for the delay between
December 22 (the due date set by the December 15 order) and
December 31, the district court's opinion more reasonably
suggests that the district court found that excuse
unpersuasive and largely irrelevant in the face of Jomar's
pattern of extended delay for which Jomar had no
explanation.
1The May 22 date was, itself, an extended deadline. The
responses were due March 9, 1998. That deadline was ignored by
Jomar and the date for amended responses extended at Jomar's
request to May 22.
-4-
Jomar reiterates that it did not disobey "repeated"
court orders, but only a single court order. Apart from the
fact that a litigant has no free pass to violate one court
order, Jomar ignores that its failure timely to comply with
the court order was but part of the basis for the dismissal.
Jomar's contention that the district court was required to
provide it with a hearing prior to the dismissal of the
complaint is frivolous. Apparently, Jomar refers to an oral
hearing. But, Jomar was forewarned that failure to comply
with the discovery requests would result in "the most severe
sanctions" and it certainly had a fair chance to be heard on
the moving papers -- an opportunity which Jomar more often
than not neglected. It is rather bold to thereafter
criticize the district court for failing to summon the
parties for an oral hearing. Cf. Spiller v. U.S.V. Labs.,
Inc.,
842 F.2d 535, 538 (1st Cir. 1988) ("Lack of a hearing
does not offend due process where the plaintiff had ample
warning of the consequences of his failure to comply with
court orders.").
Finally, Jomar reiterates that the sanction of
dismissal with prejudice is harsh. While true, it is,
nonetheless, a permitted sanction. See Damiani v. Rhode
-5-
Island Hosp.,
704 F.2d 12, 15 (1st Cir. 1983); Fed. R. Civ.
P. 37(b)(2)(C). Jomar contends that the district court was
obliged, and failed, to consider a lesser sanction. Jomar,
which repeatedly ignored (a) discovery deadlines, even one
to which it had agreed, and (b) motions to compel
compliance, prompting (c) a court order, which was not
timely complied with and then apparently not in an adequate
fashion, is in a poor position to argue that a lesser
sanction would have prompted it to take the appropriate
interest in litigating its case. There was no abuse of
discretion in the district court's dismissal of this
complaint. See National Hockey League v. Metropolitan
Hockey Club,
427 U.S. 639, 642 (1976) (per curiam).
The motion for summary disposition is granted and
the appeal is summarily affirmed.
-6-