Filed: Oct. 31, 2000
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: GEORGE A. VOSE, ET AL.and Boudin, Circuit Judge.Christopher J. Hightower on brief pro se.Hightower also alleged several state claims.review a district court's factual findings for clear error.Rostoff, 164 F.3d 63, 71 (1st Cir.court considered the proffered testimony of Janet Speck.
[NOT FOR PUBLICATION–NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT]
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 99-1173
No. 99-1883
CHRISTOPHER J. HIGHTOWER,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
GEORGE A. VOSE, ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
[Hon. Mary M. Lisi, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Selya, Circuit Judge
Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge,
and Boudin, Circuit Judge.
Christopher J. Hightower on brief pro se.
Michael B. Grant on brief for appellees.
October 30, 2000
Per Curiam. Christopher J. Hightower appeals
pro se from a judgment entered in favor of various officials
at the Rhode Island Adult Correctional Institutions
following a bench trial, as well from the denial of a post-
judgment motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). The
claims that went to trial stem from events that occurred in
1993 when Hightower was a pretrial detainee. Hightower
alleged that prison officials violated his rights under the
First Amendment by disciplining him in retaliation for
expressing an intent to file a grievance. He further
alleged that his disciplinary hearing did not comport with
the due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Hightower also alleged several state claims. The district
court concluded that Hightower failed to meet his burden as
to each of these claims. We affirm.
Hightower's main argument is that the district
court erred in its factual finding of no retaliation. We
review a district court's factual findings for clear error.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a). Our deference is even greater
where, as here, the factual findings are based on
credibility determinations. See Anderson v. City of
Bessermer City, 470 U.S. 564, 575 (1985); United States v.
Rostoff,
164 F.3d 63, 71 (1st Cir. 1999). In such cases,
"error is seldom considered 'clear' unless the credibility
assessments were based on testimony which was inherently
implausible, internally inconsistent, or critically
impeached.'" Keller v. United States,
38 F.3d 16, 25 (1 st
Cir. 1994).
We discern no clear error here. Contrary to
Hightower's suggestion, we are not persuaded that the
testimony of prison officials was critically impeached at
trial. Nor do we think that Hightower's late-filed list of
"punishable conduct," attached to the Rule 60(b) motion,
demonstrates that defendant Yahn lied or that the
disciplinary board must have acted from an improper motive
in finding him guilty of threatening (but not guilty of
swearing). In this regard, we note that the text of
disciplinary rule (d)-- governing both swearing and
threatening--is arguably ambiguous, and Yahn's stated
interpretation is not obviously wrong. Under the
circumstances, we also find no abuse of discretion in the
denial of the Rule 60(b) motion. See Ahmed v. Rosenblatt,
118 F.3d 886, 891 (1st Cir.1997) (denial of Rule 60(b)
motion reviewed for abuse of discretion), cert. denied,
522
U.S. 1148 (1998).
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We have carefully considered Hightower's remaining
arguments and find them to be without merit. The district
court considered the proffered testimony of Janet Speck.
The proffered evidence would have been insufficient reason
to set aside the district court's factual findings even if
it had been introduced. Hightower makes no persuasive
argument that the district court erred in concluding that he
failed to prove his due process claim, and he makes no
argument at all directed at his state law claims.
Affirmed.
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