Filed: Mar. 31, 2000
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: KARL PIHL;Diane Pihl on brief pro se., Regina Williams Tate and Murphy, Hesse, Toomey & Lehane on, brief for appellees Lowell School Committee, City of Lowell and, George Tsandikos.discretion of the district court and usually reserved for, parties who prevail at the end of a placement dispute.
[NOT FOR PUBLICATION–NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT]
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 99-1672
KARL PIHL; DIANE PIHL,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
CITY OF LOWELL; GEORGE TSANDIKOS; MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT
OF EDUCATION; LOWELL SCHOOL COMMITTEE,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Douglas P. Woodlock, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Selya, Circuit Judge,
Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge,
and Lipez, Circuit Judge.
Diane Pihl on brief pro se.
Regina Williams Tate and Murphy, Hesse, Toomey & Lehane on
brief for appellees Lowell School Committee, City of Lowell and
George Tsandikos.
MARCH 29, 2000
Per Curiam. We have reviewed the parties' briefs
and the record on appeal. We affirm the judgment of the
district court, essentially for the reasons stated in its
memorandum and order, dated April 26, 1999.
A parent is entitled to reimbursement only if a
court concludes "both that the public placement violated
[the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act] and that
the private school placement was proper under the Act."
Florence County School Dist. Four v. Carter,
510 U.S. 7, 15
(1993). The question of whether an individualized
educational program (IEP) is adequate and appropriate is a
mixed question of fact and law. Roland M. v. Concord School
Comm.,
910 F.2d 983, 990 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
499
U.S. 912 (1991). Absent a mistake of law, we accept the
district court's conclusion regarding adequacy and
appropriateness so long as it is not clearly erroneous on
the record as a whole.
Id. at 991. The district court
correctly recited and applied the law and its conclusions
vis-a-vis the Brown School and Mrs. Pihl's home-based
program is not clearly erroneous.
We add that, in any event, "[r]eimbursement is a
matter of equitable relief, committed to the sound
discretion of the district court" and "usually reserved for
parties who prevail at the end of a placement dispute."
Id.
at 999 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). We
find no abuse of discretion in the district court's
rejection of Mrs. Pihl's claim for reimbursement of out-of-
pocket expenses for home aides between 1984 and 1988.
Affirmed.
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