Filed: Sep. 01, 2000
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: court's denial of habeas relief.Garcia did not confess in the instant case.unreasonable application clause of section 2254(d)(1).clearly established Supreme Court precedent.
[NOT FOR PUBLICATION–NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT]
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 99-1862
CARLOS GARCIA,
Petitioner, Appellant,
v.
PAUL MURPHY, SUPERINTENDENT,
Respondent, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Reginald C. Lindsay, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Chief Judge,
Stahl and Lynch, Circuit Judges.
Carlos Garcia on Motion in Opposition to the Respondent’s
Motion to Dismiss, pro se.
Thomas F. Reilly, Attorney General, and Annette Benedetto,
Assistant Attorney General, on brief for appellee.
August 31, 2000
Per Curiam. Petitioner-appellant Carlos Garcia
appeals the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas
corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Having carefully
reviewed the record in this case, we uphold the district
court's denial of habeas relief.
In order to obtain habeas relief in the instant
case, Garcia must show that the adjudication of his claim
"resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal
law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States." 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1). We discern no rule in the
Supreme Court's Confrontation Clause jurisprudence which
directly governs the alleged error in this case. Cruz v.
New York, 481 U.S. 186 (1987), which prohibits the admission
of a codefendant's confession in cases where the defendant's
own confession is also admitted, is inapplicable since
Garcia did not confess in the instant case. Richardson v.
Marsh,
481 U.S. 200, 211 (1987) specifically addresses a
situation in which a nontestifying codefendant's confession
has been redacted to eliminate all reference to a defendant.
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The statement admitted in this case contains specific
references to Garcia.
Since there is no clearly established Supreme Court
law to which the SJC's decision in this case can be
"contrary," we must evaluate Garcia's petition under the
"unreasonable application" clause of section 2254(d)(1).
O'Brien v. Dubois, 145 F.3d 16, 26 (1st Cir. 1998).
Specifically, we must determine whether the SJC decision is
"objectively reasonable." Williams v. Taylor,
120 S. Ct.
1495, 1520-21 (2000). For the writ to issue in this case,
the SJC decision must be "so devoid of record support, or so
arbitrary, as to indicate that it is outside the universe of
plausible, credible outcomes."
O'Brien, 145 F.3d at 25.
The SJC relied on the general presumption endorsed
by the Supreme Court that a Confrontation Clause violation
is less likely to occur when, as in the instant case, the
admitted statement does not expressly incriminate a
defendant but becomes so only when linked with other trial
evidence. Richardson, 481 U.S. at 208. Moreover, again in
accord with Supreme Court doctrine,
id. at 211, the SJC paid
precise attention to the facts of the case and especially to
the "clear and forceful" instructions given to the jury that
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it was not to consider the statement against Garcia,
Commonwealth v. James, 424 Mass. 770, 784,
678 N.E.2d 1170,
1180 (1997). Nothing in this calculus leads us to believe
that the SJC's conclusion that no constitutional violation
occurred was "outside the universe of plausible, credible
outcomes." Hence, there was no unreasonable application of
clearly established Supreme Court precedent.
Affirmed.
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