Filed: Jun. 15, 2000
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: Defendants, Appellees.John S. Wessler, with whom Nathanson, Wessler & Onerheim was, on brief, for appellant.under a plan sponsored by her employer, Raytheon Company. The district court rejected her plea. Chandler appeals that order.F.3d 381, 383 (1st Cir.Judge Saris's thoughtful rescript.
[NOT FOR PUBLICATION — NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT]
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 99-1868
ELAINE CHANDLER,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
RAYTHEON EMPLOYEES DISABILITY TRUST AND
METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Patti B. Saris, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Selya and Lynch, Circuit Judges,
and Schwarzer,* Senior District Judge.
John S. Wessler, with whom Nathanson, Wessler & Onerheim was
on brief, for appellant.
Jean M. Kelley, with whom Morrison, Mahoney & Miller, LLP
was on brief, for appellees.
June 14, 2000
______________
*Of the Northern District of California, sitting by designation.
SELYA, Circuit Judge. Ably represented, plaintiff-
appellant Elaine Chandler challenges a fiduciary's determination
deeming her ineligible to receive long-term disability benefits
under a plan sponsored by her employer, Raytheon Company. The
plan is subject to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461.
The denial of benefits occurred when the plan's claims
administrator, defendant-appellee Metropolitan Life Insurance
Company (Met Life), determined that, as of the critical date
(July 1995), Chandler was not "totally disabled" as that term is
defined in the plan. Chandler exhausted her administrative
remedies and then sought judicial review. See 29 U.S.C. §
1132(a)(1)(B). The district court rejected her plea. See
Chandler v. Raytheon Employees Disability Trust, 53 F. Supp. 2d
84 (D. Mass. 1999) (granting summary judgment for the
defendants). Chandler appeals that order.
We previously acknowledged that when a judge accurately
takes the measure of a case and articulates a convincing
rationale, "an appellate court should refrain from writing at
length to no other end than to hear its own words resonate."
Lawton v. State Mut. Life Assur. Co., 101 F.3d 218, 220 (1st
Cir. 1996); accord Cruz-Ramos v. Puerto Rico Sun Oil Co.,
202
F.3d 381, 383 (1st Cir. 2000); Ayala v. Union de Tronquistas,
-3-
Local 901, 74 F.3d 344, 345 (1st Cir. 1996); Holders Capital
Corp. v. California Union Ins. Co. (In re San Juan Dupont Plaza
Hotel Fire Litig.),
989 F.2d 36, 38 (1st Cir. 1993). This
principle has particular force where, as here, a case involves
no more than the application of uncontroversial legal rules to
a specific, highly idiosyncratic set of facts. Thus, we affirm
the judgment below for substantially the reasons elucidated in
Judge Saris's thoughtful rescript.
See 53 F. Supp. 2d at 91.
We add only that we are fully persuaded that the
appropriate standard by which Met Life's decision must be gauged
is whether its actions can be deemed arbitrary and capricious.
See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115
(1989); Recupero v. New Engl. Tele. & Tel. Co.,
118 F.3d 820,
827 (1st Cir. 1997). Because the evidence of record here, taken
as a whole, affords reasonable support for Met Life's
determination, that rampart has not been breached. See Doyle v.
Paul Revere Life Ins. Co.,
144 F.3d 181, 184 (1st Cir. 1998).
We need go no further.
Affirmed.
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