Filed: Jun. 23, 2000
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: and Lipez, Circuit Judge.Emmett S. Muldoon on brief pro se.Assistant U.S. Attorney, on brief for appellee.benefits while they are incarcerated.district court erred in relying on those cases.complaint by adding claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 407(a), (b).
[NOT FOR PUBLICATION–NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT]
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 99-2013
EMMETT S. MULDOON,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
Defendant, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. George A. O’Toole, Jr., U.S. District Judge]
Before
Selya, Circuit Judge,
Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge,
and Lipez, Circuit Judge.
Emmett S. Muldoon on brief pro se.
Donald K. Stern, United States Attorney, and Anita Johnson,
Assistant U.S. Attorney, on brief for appellee.
June 22, 2000
Per Curiam. Plaintiff, a state prisoner, appeals
the dismissal of his complaint challenging the
constitutionality of the provision of the Social Security
Act which disqualifies persons confined pursuant to a felony
conviction 1 from receiving social security disability
benefits while they are incarcerated. 42 U.S.C. § 402(x)
(1998).
On appeal, plaintiff acknowledges that Section
402(x) has been upheld against constitutional challenge by
every court to consider the matter, but he argues that the
district court erred in relying on those cases. He urges
that his claims are entirely different from those raised and
rejected in prior cases. The "fundamental" basis of his
challenge, he explains, is that his due process right to
obtain private counsel of his choice is violated by the
suspension of these benefit payments. He wishes to hire
counsel to assist him in postconviction proceedings and in
1Effective April 7, 2000, an amendment enlarges the
disqualified class to include those who are confined on or after
the effective date pursuant to a conviction for "a criminal
offense." 42 U.S.C. § 402(x) (2000).
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civil suits connected to his former business. However,
there is no due process right to government expenditures
for such a purpose.
We also apprehend no merit to plaintiff's other
claims, which he characterizes as raising similarly unique
theories under a myriad of other constitutional provisions,
the Rehabilitation Act, and the Americans with Disabilities
Act. There also was no prejudicial error in the district
court's failure to rule on plaintiff's motion to amend the
complaint by adding claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 407(a), (b).
The proposed amendment did not state a claim upon which
relief could be granted.
Affirmed.
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