Filed: Jan. 26, 2001
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: , Guillermo Gil, United States Attorney, Miguel A. Fernandez, and Isabel Mu Court for the District of Puerto Rico. This appeal followed.involving Rule 60(b)(4).Bosworth St., ___ F.3d ___, ___ (1st Cir.of the government's case.denial of the motion for relief from judgment.summary judgment order.
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 00-1554
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff, Appellee,
v.
ONE RURAL LOT NO. 10,356, ETC.,
Defendant.
____________________
NITZA M. LAFUENTE-RIVERA AND GREGORIO ROSA-MEDINA,
Claimants, Appellants.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Carmen Consuelo Cerezo, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Selya, Circuit Judge,
Coffin and Campbell, Senior Circuit Judges.
Luis Rafael Rivera on brief for appellants.
Guillermo Gil, United States Attorney, Miguel A. Fernandez
and Isabel Muñoz-Acosta, Assistant United States Attorneys, on
brief for appellee.
January 26, 2001
Per Curiam. On September 5, 1997, the United States
commenced a forfeiture action in the United States District
Court for the District of Puerto Rico. In its verified
complaint, the government described a particular parcel of
improved land (Rural Lot No. 10,356) in Islote Ward, Arecibo,
Puerto Rico (the Property), alleged that the Property had been
used to facilitate the distribution of narcotics in violation of
21 U.S.C. § 856(a),1 and claimed that the Property therefore was
forfeitable under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7). The claimants, Nitza
LaFuente-Rivera and Gregorio Rosa-Medina, opposed the petition
for forfeiture (denying that the Property had been used to
facilitate drug trafficking, notwithstanding Rosa-Medina's
conviction for federal narcotics offenses) and timely filed a
claim.
1 This statute renders it unlawful to —
(1) knowingly open or maintain any place for the
purpose of manufacturing, distributing, or using any
controlled substance;
(2) manage or control any building, room, or
enclosure, either as an owner, lessee, agent,
employee, or mortgagee, and knowingly and
intentionally rent, lease, or make available for use,
with or without compensation, the building, room, or
enclosure for the purpose of unlawfully manufacturing,
storing, distributing, or using a controlled
substance.
21 U.S.C. § 856(a).
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In due course, the United States moved for summary
judgment. The claimants filed an objection. Ruling on the
papers, the district court granted summary judgment in the
government's favor on February 24, 1999. Rosa-Medina did not
appeal from the final order of forfeiture. LaFuente-Rivera
initially filed a notice of appeal, but failed to follow
through; we subsequently dismissed her appeal (No. 99-1512) for
want of prosecution.
On July 13, 1999, the claimants moved for relief from
judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). The district court denied
their request. This appeal followed.
We need not tarry. On appeal, the claimants argue only
that the lower court should have set aside the judgment of
forfeiture under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4)
(authorizing the district court to relieve a party from a final
judgment if "the judgment is void"). At the core of their
argument is the contention that the district court's judgment is
void because the government, in its complaint for forfeiture,
identified the "wrong" parcel of real estate (and that,
therefore, the district court should have granted their motion
to set aside that judgment).
In support of this contention, the claimants make a
plausible showing that the criminal activity of which the
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government complains occurred not on the Property, but on an
adjacent parcel of real estate (owned by Rosa-Medina's sister).
We reluctantly conclude, however, that this showing comes too
late. "A motion for relief from judgment cannot be used merely
to reargue a point already decided." Barrett v. Lombardi, ___
F.3d ___, ___ (1st Cir. 2001) [Nos. 00-1834, 00-1835, slip op.
at 10]. By the same token, such a motion cannot serve as a
surrogate for a direct appeal. Cotto v. United States, 993 F.2d
274, 278 (1st Cir. 1993). Against this well-defined legal
backdrop, courts routinely have held parties to the predictable
consequences of allowing adverse parties to configure the
record. E.g., Kelly v. United States,
924 F.2d 355, 358 (1st
Cir. 1991).
This tendency has been particularly pronounced in cases
involving Rule 60(b)(4). In application, that rule has been
confined to a narrow class of cases. "A judgment is void, and
therefore subject to relief under Rule 60(b)(4), only if the
court that rendered judgment lacked jurisdiction or in
circumstances in which the court's action amounts to a plain
usurpation of power constituting a violation of due process."
United States v. Boch Oldsmobile, Inc., 909 F.2d 657, 661 (1st
Cir. 1990) (emphasis omitted). This extreme condition does not
obtain here: the United States duly commenced the forfeiture
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action, the district court plainly had jurisdiction over it,
service was properly effected, and the government proffered a
prima facie showing of probable cause to believe that the
Property was subject to forfeiture. See United States v. 15
Bosworth St., ___ F.3d ___, ___ (1st Cir. 2001) [No. 00-1215,
slip op. at 8]. The claimants' opposition to the motion for
summary judgment raised the misidentification question, but
failed to persuade. The claimants have offered no convincing
reason why they should be allowed to raise the point anew.
In our view, the key to this appeal is that the
identity of the parcel to which the probable cause showing
pertained was not jurisdictional but, rather, merely an element
of the government's case. Consequently, the district court had
power to rule on the government's complaint and declare the
Property forfeit. Even taking the claimants' current
allegations as true (for argument's sake), the most that can be
said is that the district court erred in granting the summary
judgment motion. This is clearly not enough: an error in the
exercise of jurisdiction is simply not the same thing as a total
lack of jurisdiction — and only the latter demands judicial
intervention under Rule 60(b)(4). See id. at 661-62. Put
bluntly, a judgment is not void simply because it is or may have
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been erroneous; it is void only if, from its inception, it was
a legal nullity. Id. at 661.
We need go no further. The only issue cognizable on
this appeal is the propriety vel non of the district court's
denial of the motion for relief from judgment. See Hoult v.
Hoult, 57 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1995) (confirming that, on an
appeal from a denial of a Rule 60(b) motion, the court of
appeals "may not consider the merits of the underlying
judgment"). On that issue we hold, without serious question,
that the district court did not err in refusing to grant the
requested relief. Although we are not without some sympathy for
the claimants' position, the initial judgment was not a nullity.
The real problem — if there is one — arises out of the
claimants' failure diligently to pursue a direct appeal from the
summary judgment order. In this sense, then, they are the
authors of their own misfortune.
Affirmed.
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