Filed: May 16, 2001
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: , Donald K. Stern, United States Attorney, and Michael, Ricciuti, Assistant U.S. Attorney, on Motion for Summary, Disposition for appellee.base offense level pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, comment.magistrate judge.that Oliveras acted willfully.United States v. Baltas, 236 F.3d 27, 40 (1st Cir.
[NOT FOR PUBLICATION–NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT]
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 99-1846
UNITED STATES,
Appellee,
v.
RAMON OLIVERAS A/K/A VIDAL,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Nathaniel M. Gorton, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Selya, Boudin and Lynch,
Circuit Judges.
Susan E. Taylor on brief for appellant.
Donald K. Stern, United States Attorney, and Michael
Ricciuti, Assistant U.S. Attorney, on Motion for Summary
Disposition for appellee.
May 10, 2001
Per Curiam. Ramon Oliveras appeals from his
sentence on the ground that the district court erred in
enhancing his base offense level for obstruction of justice
under section 3C1.1 of the United States Sentencing
Guidelines (U.S.S.G.) and in failing to grant his request
for a downward departure from the guideline sentencing
range, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3. The government has
filed a Motion for Summary Disposition, pursuant to Loc. R.
27(c).
I. Obstruction of Justice
Oliveras received a two-level enhancement to his
base offense level pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, for
willfully obstructing justice by “providing materially false
information to a judge or magistrate.” § 3C1.1, comment.
(n.4(f)). The defendant admits that he misinformed Pretrial
Services about his name and his place of birth and that he
confirmed such misinformation at his bail hearing before a
magistrate judge. Such conduct has been held by this court
to constitute obstruction of justice within the meaning of
§ 3C1.1. See United States v. Thomas, 86 F.3d 263, 264 (1st
Cir. 1996); United States v. Biyaga,
9 F.3d 204, 206 n.2 (1st
Cir. 1993).
Oliveras now argues that the district court erred
by granting the enhancement without making a factual finding
that Oliveras acted willfully. As the willfulness argument
was not made below, we will apply the plain error standard
of review. See United States v. Rivera-Ruiz, 244 F.3d 263,
272 (1st Cir. 2001). This court has not decided “whether [a]
specific intent requirement should be superimposed on the
explicit examples given in the guideline commentary.”
Thomas, 86 F.3d at 264. Even if such a requirement exists,
however, this court has stated that it “do[es] not demand
that judges, when explaining the bases for their rulings,
‘be precise to the point of pedantry.’”
Id.
Viewed in context, the district court’s finding
that “what Mr. Diaz did did constitute obstruction of
justice,” implicitly included a finding that Oliveras acted
“willfully.” See United States v. Mafanya,
24 F.3d 412, 415
(2d Cir. 1994)(reasoning that “[c]ommon sense suggests that
the reason appellant sought to conceal his true identity on
July 9, and thus his criminal record, from the magistrate
judge was appellant’s hope of being released on bail”). In
the absence of any alternative explanation or motive for
defendant’s admittedly false statements to Pretrial
Services, the district court’s enhancement of Oliveras’ base
-3-
offense level for willful obstruction of justice does not
constitute plain error.
II. Denial of Downward Departure
Oliveras argues that the district court erred in
refusing to grant him a downward departure from the
guideline sentencing range, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3,
because his criminal history category over-represented the
seriousness of his criminal history. “Generally, an
appellate court lacks jurisdiction to review a sentencing
court’s discretionary decision not to depart below the
guideline sentencing range. An exception to this general
rule applies when the sentencing court’s decision not to
depart is based upon its belief that it lacks the authority
or power to depart.” United States v. Mangos, 134 F.3d 460,
465 (1st Cir. 1998) (citations omitted).
The exception does not apply here. Nothing in the
record indicates that the district court believed it lacked
authority to depart downward in this case. Instead, the
record indicates that the district court understood that it
had authority to depart pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3, but
that it exercised its discretion in declining to make such
a departure. We lack jurisdiction to review this claim. See
United States v. Baltas, 236 F.3d 27, 40 (1st Cir. 2001).
-4-
The government’s Motion for Summary Disposition is
granted. Oliveras’ sentence is affirmed. See Loc. R. 27(c).
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