Filed: Feb. 26, 2002
Latest Update: Feb. 22, 2020
Summary: THOMAS F. REILLY, D.A.and Lipez, Circuit Judge.error on appeal. Blake, 696 N.E.2d at 930, n.2.3 Although Browns and Blakes habeas petitions raised, substantially similar issues, the motion to consolidate the two, petitions was denied by both judges to whom the petitions were, originally allotted.
[Not for Publication - Not to be Cited as Precedent]
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 01-1544
ARTHUR BLAKE,
Petitioner, Appellant,
v.
MICHAEL T. MALONEY; THOMAS F. REILLY, D.A.,
Respondents, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. William G. Young, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Selya, Circuit Judge,
Stahl, Senior Circuit Judge,
and Lipez, Circuit Judge.
Margaret G. Barmack and Barmack & Boggs on brief for appellant.
James J. Arguin, Assistant Attorney General, and Thomas F. Reilly,
Attorney General, on brief for appellees.
February 12, 2002
PER CURIAM. Petitioner-Appellant Arthur Blake appeals the
denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging his state
court conviction for armed assault with intent to murder, and related
assault and weapons charges. Citing Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S.
123 (1968), Blake claims first that the trial court violated his Sixth
Amendment right to confront his accusers by admitting statements made
by his non-testifying codefendants to the grand jury, and that the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (“SJC”) failed to correct this
error on appeal. Second, Blake argues that the evidence underlying his
conviction for assault with intent to murder as a joint venturer of
codefendant Damon Brown was constitutionally insufficient. Because
neither argument has merit, we affirm the district court’s order.
The facts of this case have been explained previously, first
by the SJC on direct review, Commonwealth v. Blake, 696 N.E.2d 929,
930-31 (Mass. 1998), and then by this court on review of the habeas
petition filed by Damon Brown, Brown v. Maloney,
267 F.3d 36, 38-39
(1st Cir. 2001). For purposes of this opinion, the relevant facts are
recounted, albeit briefly, below.
Petitioner and Brown attended a “Caribbean Festival” on
August 28, 1993, and were part of a large crowd gathered in Franklin
Park. Later that day in the evening, after attempting to snatch a gold
chain from the neck of Kerry Davis, who was also attending the
Festival, Brown shot and injured several bystanders. Blake and another
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friend of Brown, Angel Rentas, apparently also shot into the crowd
after Brown fired his weapon.1
Identification of the shooters was the central issue before
the jury. Although none of the defendants testified at trial, the
prosecution introduced statements made by Blake and Brown to the grand
jury, in which they claimed that they had been at Rentas’s apartment
from about 7:30 or 8:00 p.m. until approximately midnight, and knew
nothing about the shootings. The government also introduced statements
made by Rentas to the grand jury that Blake and Brown left his
apartment somewhere between 9:00 and 9:30 p.m. Although Petitioner
vehemently opposed the use of these statements by the government at
trial, his objections were overruled.
In his habeas petition, Petitioner alleges that the trial
court violated the Supreme Court’s instruction in Bruton by improperly
admitting into evidence inculpatory statements of non-testifying co-
defendants that also implicated him, thereby infecting the trial with
unfair prejudice.2 Damon Brown presented this precise argument in his
1 Rentas was acquitted at trial. Blake, 696 N.E.2d at 930
n.2.
2
Blake claims that the Commonwealth introduced these
statements to prove that he had offered a false alibi. As his
defense rested on a theory of misidentification, Blake insists
that any evidence that he had previously offered a (false) alibi
would poison the jury against him by suggesting that he had
something to hide and was, in fact, one of the shooters.
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habeas petition, the denial of which we recently affirmed.3 Brown, 267
F.3d at 40-43. As there is no reason for us to retread the same
ground, we reject Blake’s assignment of Bruton error for the reasons
offered in Brown. See
id.
Blake’s contention that there was insufficient evidence to
sustain his conviction as a joint venturer is also meritless. To prove
the existence of a joint venture under Massachusetts law, the
prosecution must demonstrate that the defendant was “(1) present at the
scene of the crime, (2) with knowledge that another intend[ed] to
commit the crime or with intent to commit a crime, and (3) by agreement
[was] willing and available to help the other if necessary."
Commonwealth v. Longo,
524 N.E.2d 67, 70 (Mass. 1988). Blake
acknowledges that the evidence at trial proved that he was at the scene
and that he was firing a gun at approximately the same time as Brown.
Nevertheless, Blake maintains that the Commonwealth failed to satisfy
the third prong, citing the alleged lack of any direct evidence or
basis from which a jury could infer that he intended to help Brown kill
Davis. As the SJC concluded, however, the fact that Blake joined
Brown after the initial shots were fired and also began to shoot in
3 Although Brown’s and Blake’s habeas petitions raised
substantially similar issues, the motion to consolidate the two
petitions was denied by both judges to whom the petitions were
originally allotted. Consequently, Brown’s petition was
considered by Judge Lasker, and Blake’s petition was considered
by Chief Judge Young.
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Davis’s direction provides sufficient evidence to allow a jury to infer
not only “that Blake was available and willing to help Brown, but also
that he, in fact, did so.” Blake, 696 N.E.2d at 934 (citing
Commonwealth v. Williams,
661 N.E.2d 617, 625 (Mass. 1996)).4 We agree
with the district court that Blake has “fail[ed] to advance any
evidence of an unreasonable determination of the facts” by the SJC,
Blake v. Maloney,
142 F. Supp. 2d 135, 139 (D. Mass. 2000) (citing 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2)), and find no error in the proceedings below.
For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s denial of
Petitioner’s habeas petition is affirmed.
4 Even assuming that Blake had no knowledge of Brown’s
malice toward Davis at the beginning of the evening, once Brown
began shooting at Davis, Blake could no longer claim ignorance
of Brown’s criminal intent. Therefore, to the extent that Blake
also seeks to challenge the sufficiency of his conviction under
prong two, we reject his argument.
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