Filed: Oct. 11, 2002
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: Andrew D. Tempelman and Priscilla Tempelman on brief pro se.equitable redemption. 1993), and Holloway v. United, States, 789 F.2d 1372 (9th Cir. the involvement of government counsel at the auction).district court in its motion to confirm the sale.appeal to general principles of equity.
[NOT FOR PUBLICATION--NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT]
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
Nos. 01-2729
02-1376
UNITED STATES,
Plaintiff, Appellee,
v.
ANDREW D. TEMPELMAN; PRISCILLA TEMPELMAN,
Defendants, Appellants.
APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
[Hon. Paul J. Barbadoro, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Selya, Lynch and Lipez,
Circuit Judges.
Andrew D. Tempelman and Priscilla Tempelman on brief pro se.
Eileen J. O'Connor, Assistant Attorney General, Thomas J.
Clark and Patricia M. Bowman, Attorneys, Department of Justice, and
Thomas P. Colantuono, United States Attorney, on brief for
appellee.
October 10, 2002
Per Curiam. Last year, this court affirmed a pair of
rulings in which the district court (1) concluded that the
appellant taxpayers owed substantial amounts in unpaid federal
income taxes and (2) authorized a foreclosure sale of their
property. See United States v. Tempelman, 12 Fed. Appx. 18,
2001 WL 725370 (1st Cir. 2001) (per curiam), cert. denied,
122
S. Ct. 842 (2002). The property has since been sold at public
auction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2001(a). In the instant
appeals, the taxpayers now challenge a trio of orders in which
the district court (1) confirmed the sale, (2) authorized the
disbursement of the proceeds, and (3) denied their request for
"equitable redemption." We affirm.1
None of the taxpayers' several assignments of error
requires extended discussion. "It is well established that
confirmation of a judicial sale rests in the sound discretion
of the district court and will not be disturbed on appeal
except for abuse." United States v. Peters, 777 F.2d 1294,
1298 n.6 (7th Cir. 1985). Such sales "enjoy a certain favor in
the law" and will not be overturned "[i]n the absence of
1
The government has suggested that, because the sale has
occurred and the proceeds disbursed, one or both of the appeals are
moot. Yet in contrast to cases such as Oakville Dev. Corp. v.
F.D.I.C., 986 F.2d 611 (1st Cir. 1993), and Holloway v. United
States,
789 F.2d 1372 (9th Cir. 1986), the relief sought by the
taxpayers here includes more than just a request to prevent or
overturn the sale. Their challenge to the district court's refusal
to recognize a right of redemption, for example, presents an
ongoing controversy.
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substantial grounds." Schwartz v. J.R. Cianchette & Sons
Corp., 362 F.2d 500, 505 (1st Cir. 1966); accord, e.g., M.R.R.
Traders, Inc. v. Cave Atlantique, Inc.,
788 F.2d 816, 818 (1st
Cir. 1986). No "substantial grounds" have been cited here.
The taxpayers advance various objections to the manner in which
the sale was conducted. Yet their complaints, in turn, involve
events that were necessitated by their own conduct (the
relocated auction site), or that operated to their benefit (the
revised property tax arrangement), or that were trivial (the
timing of the notices; the mistaken listing of the property's
address; the involvement of government counsel at the auction).
Furthermore, the government disclosed all such matters to the
district court in its motion to confirm the sale. The
taxpayers filed their opposition to that motion three days
after a court-imposed deadline (and two days after the court's
ruling). And neither in that opposition nor on appeal have
they made a colorable showing of prejudice. Under these
circumstances, it cannot be said that the court abused its
discretion in confirming the sale.
We likewise perceive no error in the denial of the
motion for equitable redemption. As the taxpayers concede, 28
U.S.C. § 2001(a) confers no redemption rights. Their reliance
on 26 U.S.C. § 6337(b), which applies to property sold under a
levy and distraint proceeding, is misplaced. See, e.g., United
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States v. Heasley, 283 F.2d 422, 427 (8th Cir. 1960); cf. United
States v. Rodgers,
461 U.S. 677, 695-700 (1983) (explaining
distinction between administrative levy and judicial forfeiture
proceedings). Even if state law redemption rights could be
invoked in this context--a proposition we need not decide--the
timing of the taxpayers' motion would render the relevant New
Hampshire statute inapplicable. See N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
80:69 (permitting redemption "at any time before a deed ... is
given by the collector"). And the taxpayers' lack of "clean
hands"--as evidenced, inter alia, by their unauthorized refusal
to vacate the premises as ordered--suffices to reject their
appeal to general principles of equity.
Affirmed.
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