Filed: May 29, 2003
Latest Update: Feb. 22, 2020
Summary: Byron Barber on brief pro se.disciplinary hearing as well as administrative review;make clear that Barber received all the process he was due.allegations fail to state a claim of constitutional dimension.district court judge, violated 28 U.S.C. § 636;
Not for Publication in West’s Federal Reporter
Citation Limited Pursuant to 1st Cir. Loc. R. 32.3
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 02-2040
BYRON BARBER,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
A.T. WALL, ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
[Hon. Mary M. Lisi, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Boudin, Chief Judge,
Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge,
and Lipez, Circuit Judge.
Byron Barber on brief pro se.
Michael B. Grant on brief for appellees.
May 28, 2003
Per Curiam. Byron Barber, an inmate at the Adult
Correctional Institute ("ACI") in Rhode Island, appeals pro se from
the district court's dismissal of his complaint, upon the
recommendation of a magistrate judge, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6). Defendants-appellees, employees and officials of ACI,
have moved for summary affirmance.
Barber asserted due process and equal protection
violations arising out of a debit from Barber's inmate account of
a total of $237.03 in satisfaction of two orders of restitution
entered against him by the prison disciplinary review board for
destruction of government property. Barber also alleged that the
debit constituted an unlawful taking in violation of the Fifth
Amendment. However, Barber's own allegations state that he
received disciplinary reports which gave him notice of the charges
and of the estimated repair costs, and that he was afforded a
disciplinary hearing as well as administrative review; indeed,
Barber asserts that he "challenged and contested [the disciplinary
charges and orders of restitution] to the extent of administrative
remedies within the Department of Corrections." These allegations
make clear that Barber received all the process he was due. See
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 445, 454 (1974); Smith v.
Massachusetts Dep't of Correction,
936 F.2d 1390, 1398-1400 (1st
Cir. 1991); Campbell v. Miller,
787 F.2d 217, 222 (7th Cir. 1986).
-2-
Moreover, to the extent Barber's allegations can be read
to assert a substantive challenge to defendants' actions, his
allegations fail to state a claim of constitutional dimension. See
Coyne v. City of Somerville, 972 F.2d 440, 444 (1st Cir. 1992)("It
is bedrock law in this circuit . . . that violations of state
law–even where arbitrary, capricious, or undertaken in bad faith–do
not, without more, give rise to a denial of substantive due process
under the U.S. Constitution").
Barber's equal protection and takings claims were
likewise properly dismissed by the district court. Barber fails to
allege that the law was somehow applied differently to him based
upon a "suspect classification" or that any application of law
affected a fundamental right, see Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-
17 (1982), and it is clear that the debiting of funds from Barber's
account in satisfaction of a properly imposed restitution order
does not amount to a taking or other wrongful interference with a
property interest. See Splude v. Apfel,
165 F.3d 85, 91 (1st Cir.
1999).
Finally, we reject Barber's contention on appeal that the
evaluation of his claims by a magistrate judge, rather than a
district court judge, violated 28 U.S.C. § 636; the magistrate's
preparation of the report and recommendation on defendants' motion
to dismiss was entirely appropriate and in accordance with the
provisions of § 636(b)(1)(B).
-3-
Affirmed. See Loc. R. 27(c).
-4-
