Filed: Oct. 14, 2004
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: in Title VII). Ruiz Rivera v. Riley, 209 F.3d 24, 27 (1st Cir.3, Romero's Brief in Opposition to Summary Judgment included a, passing reference to letters from PREPA and the following argument:, In Jensen v. Snelling, 841 F.2d 600, 600-07 (5th Cir.grant the requested accommodations;
Not for Publication in West's Federal Reporter
Citation Limited Pursuant to 1st Cir. Loc. R. 32.3
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 03-2578
JOSÉ ROMERO-VILLANUEVA ET AL.,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
PUERTO RICO ELECTRIC POWER AUTHORITY ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees.
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Daniel R. Domínguez, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Selya, Circuit Judge,
Coffin, Senior Circuit Judge,
and Lipez, Circuit Judge.
José M. Tous-Rodríguez for appellants.
Pedro Manzano Yates for appellees.
October 14, 2004
PER CURIAM. Appellant José Romero-Villanueva challenges
the district court's denial of a motion for reconsideration, filed
after the district court granted appellees' summary judgment motion
on employment discrimination charges. For the reasons set forth
below, we affirm.
I.
Romero-Villanueva (Romero) worked for appellee Puerto
Rico Electric Power Authority (PREPA) for twenty-eight years before
retiring due to health problems in 1999, two years before he became
eligible for full retirement benefits. In the district court, he
asserted that PREPA forced his early retirement by subjecting him
to various forms of discrimination. Romero first claimed that
PREPA's treatment in the wake of two debilitating strokes
violated, inter alia, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42
U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000(e) to 2000(e)-17. He also claimed that he suffered
political discrimination, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and
unlawful retaliation as a result of his refusal to fire employees
affiliated with the Partido Popular Democratico political party.
The trial court granted summary judgment for PREPA,
finding that the discrimination claims were barred by the
applicable statutes of limitations: one year for the § 1983 claim,
see Benitez-Pons v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 136 F.3d 54, 59
(1st Cir. 1998); Sifre v. Puerto Rico Dep't of Health, 38 F. Supp.
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2d 91, 95 (D.P.R. 1999), and 300 days for claims under Title VII,
see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); Provencher v. CVS Pharmacy, Div. of
Melville Corp., 145 F.3d 5, 13 (1st Cir. 1998), and the ADA, see 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(e)(1), 12117(a); Bonilla v. Muebles J.J. Alvarez,
Inc.,
194 F.3d 275, 278 (1st Cir. 1999) (noting that claims brought
under Title I of the ADA must be filed with the appropriate
administrative agency within the same limitations period set forth
in Title VII).
In so holding, the trial court rejected Romero's
contention that the alleged violations fell within the continuing
violation exception to the Title VII statute of limitations, which
might have allowed him to recover for acts beyond the 300-day
period. The court reasoned that Romero was aware of the alleged
discrimination by December 1995, at the latest,1 and thus forfeited
his claim by failing to file a complaint with the appropriate
administrative agency until November 1996, more than 300 days
later. More specifically, because the complaint was filed on
November 8, 1996, any claim originating before January 13, 1996 was
time barred.
Romero then filed a motion to reconsider the grant of
summary judgment. He argued first that the court erred in applying
the ADA statute of limitations, and second, that the claims should
1
Romero requested reasonable accommodations in November 1995
upon returning from his first medical leave.
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be allowed under the doctrine of equitable tolling.2 In support of
the latter, Romero cited two letters from PREPA that he argues
lulled him into believing that he would receive a requested
disability accommodation, thus explaining his delay in filing a
discrimination claim with the appropriate administrative agency.
In denying the motion for reconsideration, the district
court repeated its calculation of the ADA statute of limitations,
applying the 300-day limit set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1)
and counting backwards from the date that Romero filed his
discrimination claim with the Anti Discrimination Unit (ADU), the
Puerto Rican counterpart to the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission. The court also rejected the equitable tolling
argument, finding no evidence that the letters were motivated by a
bad faith desire to prevent Romero from seeking a remedy through
the available administrative channels. Romero now challenges the
order denying his motion for reconsideration, focusing primarily on
the issue of equitable estoppel.
2
The motion to reconsider also faulted the trial court for
failing to address Romero's retaliation claim. The order denying
the motion to reconsider disposed of that assertion, noting that
"after reviewing the pleadings . . . the Court cannot discern that
retaliation claims were ever presented before the Court as a
separate and distinct cause of action for relief . . . . The Court
considers the resolution of the § 1983 and ADA claims to fully
address those federal claims presented." In light of this
disposition and the lack of additional evidence to the contrary, we
find no fault with the district court's ruling.
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II.
Our review of an order denying a motion for
reconsideration is highly deferential. Ordinarily, we will vacate
such an order only when it amounts to an abuse of the trial court's
discretion. Ruiz Rivera v. Riley, 209 F.3d 24, 27 (1st Cir. 2000)
("An appellate court ought not to overturn a trial court's denial
of a motion for reconsideration unless a miscarriage of justice is
in prospect or the record otherwise reveals a manifest abuse of
discretion."); Aybar v. Crispin-Reyes, 118 F.3d 10, 13 (1st Cir.
1997).
A motion for reconsideration is not an opportunity to
present new legal claims or to relitigate issues decided at the
summary judgment stage. Such a motion is properly granted only
upon a showing of manifest error of law or in light of newly
discovered evidence. Landrau-Romero v. Banco Popular de Puerto
Rico, 212 F.3d 607, 612 (1st Cir. 2000).
The court below found that Romero's motion did not fall
into either of these categories. Before so concluding, however, it
considered a legal argument not addressed previously but touched
upon in the plaintiff's motion in opposition to summary judgment:
an equitable estoppel claim based on two letters Romero received
from PREPA.3 Because the trial court dealt with the equitable
3
Romero's Brief in Opposition to Summary Judgment included a
passing reference to letters from PREPA and the following argument:
In Jensen v. Snelling, 841 F.2d 600, 600-07 (5th Cir.
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estoppel issue on its merits and denied the motion for
reconsideration on that basis, we do the same.
III.
We pause first to dispense with a technical matter.
Although the order on appeal refers to "equitable tolling," Romero
correctly points out that the related doctrine of equitable
estoppel is more relevant in this context. Equitable tolling
excuses a plaintiff's delay in asserting his rights when the
plaintiff was unaware of his rights because of employer misconduct.
See Benitez-Pons, 136 F.3d at 61; Kale v. Combined Ins. Co. of Am.,
861 F.2d 746, 752 (1st Cir. 1988). Equitable estoppel, by
contrast, occurs when a party is aware of his rights "but does not
make a timely filing due to his reasonable reliance on his
employer's misleading or confusing representations or conduct."
Kale, 861 F.2d at 752; see also Dillman v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc.,
784 F.2d 57, 60-61 (2d Cir. 1986). Here, Romero does not deny that
he was aware of his rights, but rather claims that correspondence
1988); Chico-Velez v. Roche Products, Inc., 139 F.3d 56
(1st Cir. 1988), both circuits [sic] courts determined
that if defendant acts in some way are [sic] inconsistent
in order to avoid any assertive conduct from the
aggrieved party, without telling the truth and thereby
affecting his claim under the statute of limitations, the
courts will not allow such a defense under the equitable
tolling destine [sic].
The district court did not directly address this claim in its order
granting summary judgment for PREPA. Romero then repeated the
claim verbatim in his motion for reconsideration and his
supplemental motion for reconsideration.
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from PREPA led him to believe that his employer was still
considering his request for reasonable accommodations. This is a
claim of equitable estoppel.
The doctrine of equitable estoppel is reserved for cases
in which "exceptional circumstances" are present. Redman v. U.S.
West Bus. Res., Inc., 153 F.3d 691, 696 (8th Cir. 1998). We have
established four criteria for determining whether equitable
estoppel applies:
(1) The party to be estopped must know the facts; (2) he
must intend that his conduct shall be acted on or must so
act that the party asserting the estoppel has a right to
believe it is so intended; (3) the latter must be
ignorant of the true facts; and (4) he must rely on the
former's conduct to his injury.
Clauson v. Smith, 823 F.2d 660, 661 (1st Cir. 1987). Additionally,
"Evidence of either the employer's improper purpose or his
constructive knowledge of the deceptive nature of his conduct
[i.e., that he knew or should have known] must also be shown."
Kale, 861 F.2d at 752.
Romero's equitable estoppel argument appears to rest
solely on two letters he received from PREPA representatives. The
first letter, dated May 31, 1996, records a physician's
recommendation that Romero "not make any physical effort" at work
in the wake of his stroke. The second, dated August 19, 1996,
though somewhat convoluted, includes a statement that PREPA was
still considering Romero's reasonable accommodation request.
Romero contends that these letters persuaded him that there was a
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possibility that his reasonable accommodation request would be
granted, thereby inducing him to delay filing a discrimination
claim with the ADU.
The trial court rejected this position, noting that the
letters "do not conceal or attempt through fraud to keep Plaintiff
from realizing relief for [the allegedly illegal] employment
actions" and that there was "no other evidence that a bad-faith
attempt existed to prevent Plaintiff from filing an administrative
claim" with the ADU. Having reviewed the record, we agree.
Romero argues that it is irrelevant whether PREPA
intended to delay his filing a claim, and that he need only show
that his reliance was reasonable. This argument misrepresents our
settled understanding of equitable estoppel, which requires a
showing that the employer had an improper purpose or constructive
knowledge that its conduct was deceptive. Kale, 861 F.2d at 752.
Here, there has been no such showing. The letters at issue were
prompted by Romero's request for employment accommodations in light
of his health. The first is a doctor's recommendation regarding
appropriate accommodations, and the second is essentially a status
report on Romero's various claims against PREPA, which also notes
that his reasonable accommodation request was still under analysis.
Neither letter includes any indication that PREPA was likely to
grant the requested accommodations; they are not misleading, nor
would they support a finding that PREPA intended to prevent Romero
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from filing an administrative claim with the ADU. Without
additional evidence of an improper purpose or design to mislead
Romero, the exceptional circumstances required for equitable
estoppel are not present.
Affirmed.
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