Filed: Jan. 11, 2005
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: Salvador Medina De La Cruz on brief for appellant.in light of the evidence of her nonexertional impairment.record of any hospitalization for that condition.and work-week.substantial evidence to support the ALJ's determination.physicians in assessing appellant's RFC., 826 F.2d 136, 144 (1st Cir.
Not For Publication in West's Federal Reporter
Citation Limited Pursuant to 1st Cir. Loc. R. 32.3
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 04-1382
INGRID CRUZ RAMOS,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
JO ANNE BARNHART, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. José Antonio Fusté, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Selya, Lynch and Lipez,
Circuit Judges.
Salvador Medina De La Cruz on brief for appellant.
H.S. Garcia, United States Attorney, Lisa E. Bhatia, Assistant
U.S. Attorney, and Karen B. Burzycki, Assistant Regional Counsel,
Social Security Administration, on brief for appellee.
January 11, 2005
Per Curiam. Claimant Ingrid Cruz Ramos appeals from a
decision of the district court upholding the Commissioner's denial
of disability and disability insurance benefits under the Social
Security Act. After carefully reviewing the briefs and record, we
affirm the Commissioner's decision.
On appeal, appellant argues that it was error for the
Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") to apply the Medical-Vocational
Guidelines (the "Grid"), 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2,
in light of the evidence of her nonexertional impairment.
Appellant also argues that the Commissioner failed to demonstrate
through particularized proof that appellant was capable of
performing jobs which exist in significant numbers in the national
economy.
We conclude that there is ample support in the record for
the ALJ's determination that appellant's mental impairment did not
significantly affect her ability to perform the full range of jobs
at the relevant exertional level. Although appellant cites
treating source evaluations in support of her contention that her
mental condition significantly limited her ability to function in
a work setting, the record contains substantial countervailing
evidence. While the evidence shows that appellant was consistently
diagnosed with severe depression, she was treated conservatively,
demonstrated no suicidal or homicidal thinking, and there is no
record of any hospitalization for that condition. Examination
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notes consistently indicate that appellant was alert, that she
demonstrated fair judgment, and that her orientation, intellect,
insight, and memory were adequate. The state agency consultative
examining psychiatrist noted that, although appellant's flow of
thought was slow, it was logical, coherent, and relevant. In
addition, appellant herself reported that she got along well with
co-workers and supervisors while she was working. The non-
examining state agency psychiatrist and psychologist concluded,
based on their review of the medical evidence, that appellant was
capable of understanding, remembering, and carrying out simple and
detailed instructions, could sustain attention and concentration
for at least two-hour periods, and could complete a normal workday
and work-week. Accordingly, the non-examining physicians opined
that appellant's mental impairment did not significantly affect her
residual functional capacity ("RFC"). These assessments and the
reports of the consultative examining physicians provide
substantial evidence to support the ALJ's determination. See
Berrios Lopez v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 951 F.2d 427,
431-32 (1st Cir. 1991); Gray v. Heckler,
760 F.2d 369, 373 (1st
Cir. 1985).
To the extent appellant contends that her treating
psychiatrist's opinion was entitled to controlling weight, her
argument fails because the treating physician's opinion is
inconsistent with the bulk of the medical evidence and is not
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supported by any progress notes or clinical or laboratory findings.
The ALJ was justified in according the treating psychiatrist's
report little weight. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d). T o t h e
extent appellant suggests that the ALJ should have obtained the
testimony of a medical expert to resolve any apparent conflicts
between the treating physicians' assessments and the opinions of
the state agency physicians, her argument is unavailing because RFC
is not a medical assessment, but is instead an administrative
finding reserved to the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e).
Moreover, as discussed above, it was appropriate for the ALJ to
rely on the reports of the consultative and non-examining
physicians in assessing appellant's RFC. See Evangelista v.
Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 826 F.2d 136, 144 (1st Cir.
1987) (ALJ may piece together relevant medical facts from the
findings and opinions of multiple physicians). Since the
consultative and non-examining physicians concluded that appellant
suffered from mild limitations at most, the ALJ's RFC determination
appears to be sufficiently supported by the record.
Having determined that the ALJ's finding that appellant's
RFC was not significantly affected by nonexertional limitations, it
is apparent that application of the Grid was appropriate and that
no 'particularized proof' of appellant's specific vocational
capabilities or other vocational evidence was required. See Ortiz,
890 F.2d at 524 (reliance on Grid appropriate if nonexertional
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limitation reduces claimant's occupational base only marginally);
Lugo, 794 F.2d at 17 (similar). Accordingly, in light of
appellant's age, education, and past work experience, the ALJ
properly found that Medical-Vocational Rule 203.19 directed a
finding that appellant was not disabled. Affirmed. See 1st
Cir. R. 27(c).
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