Filed: Jun. 15, 2005
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: court-ordered payments.we note that every court to consider the issue has upheld the IFRP, against general, and due process, challenges, see Montano-Figueroa, v. Crabtree, 162 F.3d 548, 548 (9th Cir.owing from Bramson as restitution.habeas cases).The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
Not for Publication in West's Federal Reporter
Citation Limited Pursuant to 1st Cir. Loc. R. 32.3
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 04-2488
MARTIN BRAMSON,
Petitioner, Appellant,
v.
DAVID L. WINN, WARDEN, FEDERAL MEDICAL CENTER DEVENS,
Respondent, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Nathaniel M. Gorton, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Lipez and Howard,
Circuit Judges.
Martin Bramson on brief pro se.
Michael J. Sullivan, United States Attorney, and Christopher
R. Donato, Assistant United States Attorney, on brief for appellee.
June 15, 2005
Per Curiam. Pro se plaintiff-appellant Martin Bramson
appeals from the dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition. After
carefully reviewing the parties' briefs and the record, we affirm.
We briefly address Bramson's arguments.
First, Bramson claims that the Federal Bureau of Prisons
may not set the timing and amount of his restitution and fine
payments through the Inmate Financial Responsibility Program
("IFRP") without submitting any such plan to the sentencing court
for its approval. While district courts may not delegate to
probation or the Bureau of Prisons designation of the timing and
amount of court-ordered payments, see United States v. Merric, 166
F.3d 406, 409 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding that district court could
not delegate to probation the obligation of scheduling defendant's
installment payments), this case is distinguishable. Contrary to
Bramson's argument, the Maryland and New Jersey courts here did not
delegate the setting of payment schedules to probation or the
Bureau of Prisons. Rather, both courts held that payment was due
immediately. Thus, there was no improper delegation by the courts
of their exclusive authority to determine a payment schedule. The
Bureau of Prisons was merely using the IFRP to collect Bramson's
court-ordered payments. See, e.g., Matheny v. Morrison,
307 F.3d
709, 712 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding that Bureau of Prisons may
administer collection of payments through IFRP where sentencing
court orders immediate payment); McGhee v. Clark,
166 F.3d 884, 886
-2-
(7th Cir. 1999) (same). Moreover, as the lower court correctly
noted, Bramson's argument regarding the collection of his
restitution payments is moot in light of the Maryland court's
amended judgment which limits the source of restitution funds to
the money already seized from Bramson at the time of his arrest.1
Next, Bramson argues that the Bureau of Prisons may not
collect fine payments when restitution remains outstanding. He
cites to 18 U.S.C. § 3612(c) which states that money received from
a defendant should be disbursed to pay restitution in full prior to
paying other fines. We deem this argument waived, as it was raised
for the first time in Bramson's objections to the magistrate's
report and recommendation. Maine Green Party v. Maine, Sec'y of
State, 173 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1999). The claim lacks merit in any
event. While Bramson argues that the restitution order "remains
legally undischarged," he essentially concedes that the collection
of restitution from him is no longer an issue. Indeed, the
Maryland court's amended judgment makes clear that the only source
1
To the extent Bramson challenges his "refusal status" under
the IFRP, particularly its effect on his prison housing assignment,
we note that every court to consider the issue has upheld the IFRP
against general, and due process, challenges, see Montano-Figueroa
v. Crabtree, 162 F.3d 548, 548 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing cases);
Johnpoll v. Thornburgh,
898 F.2d 849, 851 (2d Cir. 1990) (noting
that IFRP "serves valid penological interests and is fully
consistent with the Bureau of Prisons' authorization . . . to
provide for rehabilitation and reformation"), and find Bramson's
claim to be without merit, see Williams v. Faulkner,
837 F.2d 304,
309 (7th Cir. 1988), aff'd sub nom. Neitzke v. Williams,
490 U.S.
319 (1989) (stating that prisoners have no protected interest in
particular housing assignment).
-3-
of funds to be applied to Bramson's restitution obligation is the
money already seized from Bramson at the time of his arrest and
that "restitution is not to be paid pursuant to the Inmate
Financial Responsibility Program." Thus, there is no money due and
owing from Bramson as restitution. Accordingly, the Bureau of
Prisons may properly collect money to satisfy Bramson's outstanding
fine.
Finally, Bramson argues that the lower court erred in
allowing the government an additional two months to respond to his
petition. This claim lacks merit. While Bramson states that "[n]o
explanation was offered for the reason for the delay," the
government explained in its motion that it was "in the process of
gathering information necessary to file an answer or other response
and need[ed] additional time to complete these assessments." There
is no indication that these proffered reasons were not legitimate.
Indeed, the government's response, in the form of a motion to
dismiss/motion for summary judgment based on failure to exhaust
administrative remedies, included 22 exhibits regarding Bramson's
Maryland and New Jersey sentences, his participation in the IFRP,
and his requests for administrative remedies.2 Also, while Bramson
states that the government's delay resulted in the lack of a "level
2
The lower court did not address the government's exhaustion
argument, ruling instead "that the petitioner has been afforded the
relief sought, and that to the extent that the petition seeks more,
it is without merit."
-4-
judicial playing field," Bramson does not explain how he was
prejudiced by the delay or denied due process. Further, while
Bramson argues that 28 U.S.C. § 2243 forbids an extension of time
beyond twenty days in § 2241 cases and that the rules governing §
2254 cases are inapplicable, the § 2254 rules specifically state
that they may be applied by the district court to other habeas
petitions. See Rule 1(b) of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases.
Rule 4 provides that the "the judge shall order the respondent to
file an answer or other pleading within the period of time fixed by
the court . . . ." Thus, the district court had the discretion to
set a deadline beyond twenty days for a response. See Bleitner v.
Welborn, 15 F.3d 652, 653-54 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting that Rule 4,
which has force of superseding statute, loosened up deadline for
responses); Clutchette v. Rushen,
770 F.2d 1469, 1474 (9th Cir.
1985) (noting that Rule 4 contains no fixed time requirement and
gives district court discretion to grant appropriate deadline in
habeas cases).
The judgment of the district court is affirmed. See 1st
Cir. R. 27(c).
-5-
