Filed: Oct. 21, 2005
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: , Brian P. Mansfield, Counsel, Department of Correction, and, Nancy Ankers White, Special Assistant Attorney General, on brief, for Defendants, Appellees.complaint, inter alia, for failure to state a claim.denied, 540 U.S. 985 (2003).1915(e)(2), as plaintiffs suggest, but rather under Fed.
Not For Publication in West's Federal Reporter
Citation Limited Pursuant to 1st Cir. Loc. R. 32.3
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 04-2538
MICHAEL COTE, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
ROBERT MURPHY AND MICHAEL T. MALONEY,
Defendants, Appellees.
ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT OF
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
[Hon. Douglas P. Woodlock, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Boudin, Chief Judge,
Lynch and Lipez, Circuit Judges.
Michael Cote, et. al., pro se, on memorandum.
Brian P. Mansfield, Counsel, Department of Correction, and
Nancy Ankers White, Special Assistant Attorney General, on brief
for Defendants, Appellees.
October 21, 2005
Per Curiam. Plaintiffs/appellants are four individuals
who have been adjudicated to be “sexually dangerous persons” and
civilly committed to the Massachusetts Treatment Center under Mass.
G.L. ch. 123A, §§ 1-16. In this pro se action brought pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983, they challenge the Center’s policy of “double-
bunking” its residents, claiming that such a practice violates the
Fourteenth Amendment and the Center’s management plan. Upon motion
from defendants, the district court dismissed the amended
complaint, inter alia, for failure to state a claim. Plaintiffs
have timely appealed but have chosen not to file a brief,
preferring instead to rely on their submissions below. We affirm
essentially for the reasons enumerated by the district court,
adding only the following.
It is undisputed that due process provides the governing
standards in this context. See, e.g., Seling v. Young, 531 U.S.
250, 265 (2001). The “dispositive inquiry” is whether the
challenged restrictions constitute “punishment.” Block v.
Rutherford,
468 U.S. 576, 583 (1984). To pass muster, “the
conditions and duration of confinement [must]. . .bear some
reasonable relation to the purpose[s] for which persons are
committed,”
Seling, 531 U.S. at 265–-which here include not only
treatment and rehabilitation but public safety, see, e.g., Kansas
v. Hendricks,
521 U.S. 346, 363 (1997). Among the other
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protections afforded by due process is the right to “reasonable
safety.” Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982).
Double-bunking is not a per se violation of due process,
see Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 541-43 (1979), but in rare cases
might amount to an unlawful practice when combined with other
adverse conditions, see, e.g.,
id. at 542; Inmates of Suffolk
County Jail v. Rufo,
12 F.3d 286, 293-94 (1st Cir. 1993); cf. Nami
v. Fauver,
82 F.3d 63, 65-68 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding that such a
challenge stated Eighth Amendment claim). Yet this is not such a
case. The district court properly found an absence of “any factual
allegation that demonstrates that double-bunking has [caused] or
will cause these plaintiffs any sort of constitutionally-cognizable
injury.” Based on the amended complaint alone, that conclusion is
inescapably true; plaintiffs there simply asserted that they were
being put “in harm[‘]s way.” And it remains true even if (in
recognition of plaintiffs’ pro se status) one considers the factual
allegations contained in all of their filings below. We explain
briefly.
In charging that double-bunking amounts to punishment,
plaintiffs mainly argue that the practice increases the risk of
sexual assaults and other violence. They maintain that “room
visits” among residents were restricted in 1996 and then prohibited
in 2003 largely for this reason. They also allege that defendants
have failed to evaluate potential roommates for compatibility, as
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required by the Center’s management plan. What is missing,
however, is any suggestion that plaintiffs themselves are in danger
of being harmed. Indeed, they offer brief descriptions of their
own residential arrangements which are entirely devoid of such
concerns. “While a pro se complaint is held to less stringent
standards than one drafted by an attorney. . ., courts need not
conjure up unpleaded facts to support. . .conclusory
[allegations].” Hurney v. Carver, 602 F.2d 993, 995 (1st Cir. 1979)
(internal quotation marks omitted; brackets in original).
On this record, plaintiffs’ due process claim thus
effectively reduces to a charge that double-bunking of sex
offenders is a per se constitutional violation. That proposition
is without merit. See, e.g., Allison v. Snyder, 332 F.3d 1076,
1079 (7th Cir.) (holding that, in light of Wolfish, “[d]etails such
as double celling add nothing” to due process claim brought by
civilly-committed sexually dangerous persons in Illinois), cert.
denied,
540 U.S. 985 (2003).
Plaintiffs also object that as pro se litigants they
should have been notified of any pleading deficiencies and given a
chance to amend their complaint accordingly. Yet defendants’
memorandum provided ample notice, asserting that “plaintiffs have
failed to allege that they have suffered any injury as a result of
being double bunked.” And at no time since–-either in opposition
to that memorandum, in response to the district court’s decision,
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or on appeal-–have plaintiffs proffered any new factual allegations
in an attempt to address this shortcoming. We also note that the
complaint was not dismissed sua sponte pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2), as plaintiffs suggest, but rather under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6).
Affirmed.
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