Filed: Sep. 16, 2005
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: CRI moved for summary judgment in October 2003.1, In all events, Dávila conceded at oral argument that she was, not prejudiced by the district courts decision to strike her, Second Opposition.ADA claims.life activity of working.As a result, Dávilas ADA claim fails. See Carroll, 294 F.3d at 238.
Not For Publication in West's Federal Reporter
Citation Limited Pursuant to 1st Cir. Loc. R. 32.3
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 04-2575
ESTHER DÁVILA-RIVERA, RAFAEL VELEZ-RIVERA,
and CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP VELEZ-DAVILA,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
CARIBBEAN REFRESCOS, INC. and ABC INSURANCE CO.,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Daniel R. Dominguez, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Boudin, Chief Judge,
Selya, Circuit Judge,
and Siler,* Senior Circuit Judge.
Roberto Ariel Fernández with whom Juan M. Frontera-Suau was on
brief for appellants.
Oreste R. Ramos with whom Jorge I. Peirats was on brief for
appellees.
September 16, 2005
*
Of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting by
designation.
SILER, Senior Circuit Judge. Plaintiffs Esther Dávila-Rivera,
Rafael Velez-Rivera, and the Conjugal Partnership Velez-Davila
(collectively, “Dávila”) appeal the district court’s grant of
summary judgment to Defendants Caribbean Refrescos, Inc. (“CRI”),
and ABC Insurance Company on her claim under the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12182 et seq. In
addition, Dávila appeals the district court’s decisions to strike
her response to CRI’s motion for summary judgment and to dismiss
without prejudice her Commonwealth law claims. For the reasons
discussed hereafter, the district court’s grant of summary judgment
is AFFIRMED.
I. BACKGROUND
Dávila was employed by CRI from 1974 until 2002, most recently
as an Administrative Assistant II in the Finance Department. In
2000, she underwent corrective therapies for carpal tunnel syndrome
(“CTS”). In June of that year, Dávila told her immediate
supervisor, José Martínez, that she needed to have corrective
surgery for her CTS. At that time, Martinez did not express any
objection to the forthcoming surgery; however, he instructed her to
inform him of the date in advance. This surgery was ultimately set
for December 14, 2000, and Dávila informed Martínez of the date
through a vacation request made in December. This request was
approved, although she alleges that he balked at granting the
request and initially ordered her to change the date of her
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surgery.
Dávila completed the rehabilitation treatment on January 18,
2001, and her doctor, Dr. Angel Pérez Toro, stated that she could
return to work on January 22, 2001. Dr. Pérez Toro completed a
medical questionnaire on functional capacity for CRI, asserting
that Dávila could perform both fine and heavy hand manipulation and
that she could lift, push, or haul up to five pounds. When Dávila
returned to work, she also was evaluated by a CRI physician, Dr.
Carlos A. Canales Quintero, who concluded that Dávila could lift up
to ten pounds. The weight restriction therefore was relaxed from
five pounds to ten pounds.
Upon her return, Martínez assigned Dávila to digitally scan
documents. Although she asserts that she told him that the work
was repetitive and would affect her CTS, she was not reassigned.
Two days later, Daisy Meléndez, a CRI company nurse, noted that
Dávila’s right hand was swollen. Dr. Canales recommended a hand
brace, and, in a follow-up visit, noted the swelling had gone away.
Dávila contends that working conditions at CRI caused her to
suffer from depression. On February 27, 2001, CRI referred her to
the State Insurance Fund to receive medical treatment for her
depression and other emotional conditions. She was placed on
short-term disability leave with a one-year reserve period. Dávila
also requested long-term disability leave benefits from NATLSCO,
the company managing CRI’s disability plan. This request was
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denied in November 2001. On February 27, 2002, CRI notified Dávila
that her reserve period had ended and, therefore, that her
employment had been terminated.
In October 2002, Dávila filed a complaint in the United States
District Court for Puerto Rico alleging, inter alia, that CRI
terminated her employment and failed to reasonably accommodate her
CTS and emotional depression conditions in violation of the ADA.
CRI moved for summary judgment in October 2003. In December 2003,
Dávila filed her opposition to this motion (“First Opposition”).
The First Opposition was accompanied by a 43-page brief that
exceeded the 25-page limit established by Local Rule 7.1(e) and the
district court’s order. When CRI moved to strike, the court
granted Dávila “the opportunity to re-file [the Opposition], after
pruning it into a twenty five page document.” Dávila subsequently
filed a revised opposition (“Second Opposition”), which was
slightly less than 25 full pages. CRI again moved to strike on the
ground that this Second Opposition violated Local Rule 7.1(e). The
magistrate judge compared the First and Second Oppositions and
recommended that the Second Opposition be stricken and CRI’s motion
for summary judgment be treated as unopposed. This recommendation
was adopted by the district court. The magistrate judge noted that
the two documents were textually virtually identical, with the only
changes being the removal of footnotes and several paragraphs. She
determined, in part from this textual analysis, that Dávila’s
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Second Opposition was printed in a font smaller than allowed by
Rule 7.1(e).
In August 2004, the district court granted CRI’s motion for
summary judgment, dismissing with prejudice Dávila’s ADA claim and
her other federal claims. In addition, the court dismissed without
prejudice her Commonwealth law claims. Dávila appeals the district
court’s decision to strike the Second Opposition, its grant of
summary judgment to CRI on her ADA claim, and its dismissal of the
Commonwealth law claims.
II. DISCUSSION
Local Rule Violation
While this court reviews deferentially a district court’s
refusal to forgive a local rule violation, see Crowley v. L.L.
Bean, Inc., 361 F.3d 22, 25 (1st Cir. 2004) (internal citation
omitted), we need not rule on this matter because even taking into
account the evidentiary materials highlighted in the Second
Opposition, Dávila’s claims fail.1
Summary Judgment
We review de novo a district court’s entry of summary
judgment, viewing the entire record in the light most favorable to
the party opposing summary judgment. See Dávila-Pérez v. Lockheed
Martin Corp., 202 F.3d 464, 466 (1st Cir. 2000). All reasonable
1
In all events, Dávila conceded at oral argument that she was
not prejudiced by the district court’s decision to strike her
Second Opposition.
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inferences are made in favor of the non-moving party. Id. Summary
judgment is appropriate only if “there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact” and “the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
Dávila appeals the grant of summary judgment only as to her
ADA claims. Because the district court ordered the Second
Opposition stricken from the record, CRI’s motion for summary
judgment was unopposed. However, the district court is “still
obliged to consider the motion on its merits, in light of the
record as constituted, in order to determine whether judgment would
be legally appropriate.” Kelly v. United States, 924 F.2d 355, 358
(1st Cir. 1991).
“The ADA prohibits discrimination in employment against
qualified persons with a disability.” Carroll v. Xerox Corp., 294
F.3d 231, 237 (1st Cir. 2002) (citing 42 U.S.C. §12112(a)). Three
alternative definitions of “disability” are provided: an individual
is considered to be disabled if (1) she has “a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more of [her] major
life activities,” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A); (2) she has “a record of
such an impairment,”
id. § 12102(2)(B); or (3) she is “regarded as
having such an impairment,”
id. § 12102(2)(C).
“Major life activities” are “activities that are ‘of central
importance to daily life.’” Carroll, 294 F.3d at 238 (quoting
Toyota Motor Mfg. v. Williams,
534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002)). The
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courts have recognized various “major life activities,” including
the performance of manual tasks, Toyota Motor Mfg., 534 U.S. at
198; lifting, Gillen v. Fallon Ambulance Serv., Inc.,
283 F.3d 11,
21 (1st Cir. 2002); and sleeping, Calero-Cerezo v. DOJ,
355 F.3d 6,
21 (1st Cir. 2004) (citing Criado v. IBM Corp.,
145 F.3d 437, 442-
43 (1st Cir. 1998)). In addition, the Supreme Court and this court
have assumed, without deciding, that working may be considered a
major life activity. See
id. (citing Sutton v. United Airlines,
Inc.,
527 U.S. 471, 492 (1999)). We also have noted that
concentrating “may be reasonably subsumed within the broader
context of working and learning.” Whitney v. Greenberg,
Rosenblatt, Kull & Bitsoli,
258 F.3d 30, 33 (1st Cir. 2001).
Dávila must show that her impairment substantially limits a
major life activity. Therefore, she must demonstrate either that
she is unable to perform a major life activity that an average
person in the general population can perform or that she is
significantly restricted in the performance of a particular major
life activity as compared to an average person in the general
population. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1). “To be substantially
limiting, ‘[t]he impairment’s impact must . . . be permanent or
long-term.’” Carroll, 294 F.3d at 238 (quoting Toyota Motor
Mfg.,
534 U.S. at 198).
Dávila bears the burden of showing that she has a qualified
disability. See Calero-Cerezo, 355 F.3d at 20. She claims two
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impairments, CTS and severe depression. CTS has been recognized as
a physical impairment. See, e.g., Toyota Motor Mfg., 534 U.S. 199.
In addition, “[t]his circuit has recognized depression as a mental
impairment that may constitute, at least in some circumstances, a
disability under federal law.”
Calero-Cerezo, 355 F.3d at 20.
In her Amended Complaint, Dávila asserted that her CTS
“limited her writing and computer activities.” She asserts on
appeal that her CTS impaired her major life activities of
performing manual tasks and lifting. Although she points to the
January 2001 lifting restriction imposed by Dr. Pérez Toro and
modified by Dr. Canales, this restriction is insufficient to
demonstrate a substantial limitation, as it was in effect only from
January 22, 2001 to February 12, 2001, for three weeks.
Furthermore, the same form indicated that, at that time, she was
able to engage in fine and thick hand manipulation. Thus, Dávila
has failed to demonstrate that she was substantially limited in the
performance of manual tasks or lifting.
In her Amended Complaint, Dávila asserted that her depression
prevented her from working. She asserts on appeal that her
depression additionally impaired her major life activities of
sleeping and concentrating. First, we note that she has failed to
demonstrate that her depression substantially limited the major
life activity of working. The Supreme Court has observed that
“[w]hen the major life activity under consideration is that of
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working, the statutory phrase ‘substantially limits’ requires . .
. that plaintiffs allege they are unable to work in a broad class
of jobs.” Toyota Motor Mfg., 534 U.S. at 200 (quoting
Sutton, 527
U.S. at 491). Dávila has failed to make such an offering. In
addition, she alleges, but has failed to demonstrate, that her
depression substantially limited her ability to sleep or
concentrate. No evidence was introduced that would demonstrate she
was substantially restricted or that the limitations were permanent
or long-term.
As a result, Dávila’s ADA claim fails. She has not produced
sufficient evidence to demonstrate that she had a qualified
disability. Consequently, we need not address the remaining
grounds upon which the district court’s grant of summary judgment
was based. See Carroll, 294 F.3d at 238.
Supplemental Jurisdiction
This court reviews a district court’s refusal to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction for abuse of discretion. Pejepscot
Indus. Park, Inc. v. Maine Cent. R. Co., 215 F.3d 195, 200 (1st
Cir. 2000). Jurisdiction in this case is based upon Dávila’s
federal claims; she therefore requested that the district court
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the non-federal claims.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Supplemental jurisdiction exists when
“the relationship between [the federal] claim and the state claim
permits the conclusion that the entire action before the court
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comprises but one constitutional ‘case.’” Rodriguez v. Doral
Mortg. Corp., 57 F.3d 1168, 1175 (1st Cir. 1995) (quoting United
Mine Workers v. Gibbs,
383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966)).
When the foundational federal question claims are dismissed,
the district court may reassess its jurisdiction over the
supplemental claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); see also Roche
v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 81 F.3d 249, 256-57 (1st
Cir.1996). Ordinarily this assessment will “weigh strongly in
favor of declining jurisdiction over state law claims where the
foundational federal claims have been dismissed at an early stage
in the litigation.” Camelio v. American Fed’n,
137 F.3d 666, 672
(1st Cir. 1998). Original jurisdiction in this case rested upon
the ADA and other federal claims. Thus, because the district court
properly granted summary judgment on the ADA claim and the
dismissal of the other federal claims has not been appealed, we
find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
declining supplemental jurisdiction over the Commonwealth law
claims.
AFFIRMED.
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