Filed: Jun. 16, 2005
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: the mayor of Cranston, Rhode Island. The Board cross-appeals from the district court's, refusal to dismiss the action on abstention grounds.) (collecting cases).state law questions in the state court system., and such review may well be available.questions to the Rhode Island Supreme Court.
Not for Publication in West's Federal Reporter
Citation Limited Pursuant to 1st Cir. Loc. R. 32.3
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 05-1750
STEPHEN P. LAFFEY,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
ROGER BEGIN, ETC., ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees.
No. 05-1790
STEPHEN P. LAFFEY,
Plaintiff, Appellee,
v.
ROGER BEGIN, ETC., ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellants.
___________________
APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
[Hon. Mary M. Lisi, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Selya, Lynch and Howard,
Circuit Judges.
Tom Marcelle, with whom Lepizzera & Laprocina and Michael J.
Lepizzera, Jr. were on brief, for plaintiff.
Carolyn A. Mannis on brief for Rhode Island Affiliate,
American Civil Liberties Union, amicus curiae.
Raymond A. Marcaccio, with whom Christine M. Curley and
Oliverio & Marcaccio were on brief, for defendants.
June 16, 2005
SELYA, Circuit Judge. These interlocutory appeals follow
the district court's denial of preliminary injunctive relief. We
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).
The facts are straightforward (although the legal
implications are complex). The plaintiff, Stephen P. Laffey, is
the mayor of Cranston, Rhode Island. A local radio station,
corporately owned, offered Mayor Laffey the opportunity to host a
weekly talk show. The mayor declined any remuneration but accepted
the free air time and began a string of weekly appearances.
The president of the Cranston City Council — a political
rival of the mayor — filed a complaint with the Rhode Island State
Board of Elections (the Board). The complaint alleged that Mayor
Laffey, who has not yet announced his plans for the 2006
elections,1 was receiving an in-kind corporate contribution from
the radio station in violation of the Rhode Island Campaign
Contributions and Expenditures Reporting Act, R.I. Gen. Laws § 17-
25-10.1. The Board held a hearing, found the complaint
meritorious, and ordered the mayor to cease and desist from hosting
the talk show.
The mayor complied, but brought suit against the members
of the Board (in their official capacities) in the federal district
1
The mayor is widely rumored to be a candidate for either
federal or state-wide office. Although he has not discouraged that
speculation, he has yet to announce or declare his candidacy for
any particular office.
-3-
court. He claimed, inter alia, that the Board's order abridged
rights secured to him by the First Amendment. The district court,
ruling from the bench on May 17, 2005, refused to enjoin the
operation of the Board's order. These appeals followed.2 We
consolidated them and granted expedited review.
The briefing revealed that the Board's decision, and to
some extent the embedded constitutional issues, rested on uncertain
questions of state law — a matter to which we shall return. At
oral argument on June 9, 2005, we suggested that the parties might
wish to cooperate in obtaining answers to these state law questions
from the Rhode Island Supreme Court and that, in the interim, the
Board might wish to suspend the operation of its cease and desist
order. Mayor Laffey's counsel readily agreed to this proposal and
the Board's counsel quite reasonably asked for time to allow the
Board to consider it. We are now advised that the Board met on
June 13, 2005, and accepted the proposal. It has stayed the
operation of the cease and desist order pending resolution of the
pertinent state law questions. We applaud the commitment to fair
play and the orderly administration of justice that this decision
evinces.
The parties' agreement renders these appeals moot, but
does not dissipate the underlying controversy. See 13A Charles
2
There are two appeals. Mayor Laffey appeals from the denial
of relief. The Board cross-appeals from the district court's
refusal to dismiss the action on abstention grounds.
-4-
Alan Wright, et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 3533.2 (2d
ed. 1984) ("A partial settlement moots the issues involved in the
settlement, but not those that the parties did not intend to
settle.") (collecting cases).
The principal issue in this case — whether the state
campaign finance law, as applied to these facts, violates the First
Amendment — remains unresolved. That issue, in turn, depends to
some degree on significant and unsettled state law questions
related to the extent of the Board's enforcement authority and the
scope and meaning of Rhode Island's campaign finance statute
(including, but not limited to, the meaning of terms such as
"candidate" and "in-kind contribution"). The parties have agreed,
and we concur, that these questions should be answered as
expeditiously as possible by the state supreme court. See Noviello
v. City of Boston, 398 F.3d 76, 91 (1st Cir. 2005) (explaining that
"the highest court of a state is . . . the final arbiter of state-
law questions"). Only then can a federal court rule intelligently
on the constitutional claims.3
To implement the parties' agreement, we remand this case
to the district court. We note that several abstention doctrines
appear to have potential relevance to the proceedings. See, e.g.,
Colo. River Water Conserv. Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800
3
Indeed, such clarification may, depending on what the Rhode
Island Supreme Court decides, render some or all of the
constitutional issues moot.
-5-
(1976); R.R. Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941); see also
Maymó-Meléndez v. Alvarez-Ramírez,
364 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 2004)
(applying abstention principles of Younger v. Harris,
401 U.S. 37
(1971), to coercive administrative proceedings). If the district
court determines that one or more of these doctrines apply, it may
abstain from an immediate exercise of jurisdiction, stay the
federal proceeding, and allow the parties to resolve the pertinent
state law questions in the state court system.
Of course, the district court's abstention decision may
be influenced by the availability vel non of state court review.
See Pullman, 312 U.S. at 501 (suggesting that abstention is not
appropriate upon a "showing that . . . obvious methods for securing
a definitive ruling in the state courts cannot be pursued"). The
Board has suggested that state court review can be achieved should
the mayor file a petition for writ of certiorari to the Rhode
Island Supreme Court, asking that tribunal to pass upon the
validity of the Board's cease and desist order. See Van Daam v.
DiPrete,
560 A.2d 953, 954 (R.I. 1989) (per curiam). The state law
questions embedded in this case are, in the Van Daam court's
phrase, "substantial,"
id., and such review may well be available.
In the spirit of the parties' agreement, the district court may
direct the mayor to file such a petition.
If such review is not available and other conventional
routes to the state supreme court appear for any reason to be
-6-
precluded, the district court may certify the appropriate state law
questions to the Rhode Island Supreme Court. See R.I. Sup. Ct. R.
App. P. 6. Upon its receipt of the state supreme court's response,
the district court may proceed to adjudicate the constitutional
issues unless the state supreme court's resolution of the state law
questions or a change in circumstances renders such an adjudication
unnecessary.
Let us be perfectly clear. These are merely suggestions.
We have complete confidence in the district court and, in the final
analysis, it is for the district court to determine how best to
proceed. Nothing contained in this opinion is intended to cabin
the district court's discretion.
We need go no further. The parties' agreement disposes
of any live controversy related to these appeals. Consequently, we
dismiss the appeals as moot and remand the case for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion and with the parties'
agreement (which we deem binding upon them). Each side shall bear
its own costs.
It is so ordered.
-7-
