Filed: Jan. 30, 2006
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: sentencing range). United States v. Duarte, 246 F.3d 56, 60 (1st Cir. When handing down, the sentence, he stated trenchantly that his perception of, intellectual honesty concerning the availability of departures, constrained him to stay within the guideline sentencing range.resentencing proceeding.
Not for Publication in West's Federal Reporter
Citation Limited Pursuant to 1st Cir. Loc. R. 32.3
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 03-1868
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
MAYRA DIAZ, ETC.,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Douglas P. Woodlock, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Selya, Lipez and Howard, Circuit Judges.
Tamara A. Barney, by appointment of the court, on brief for
appellant.
Michael J. Sullivan, United States Attorney, and Susan M.
Poswistilo, Assistant United States Attorney, on brief for
appellee.
January 30, 2006
SELYA, Circuit Judge. A federal grand jury in the
District of Massachusetts indicted defendant-appellant Mayra Diaz
on various charges. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846; 18 U.S.C. §
2. Five other persons were accused in the original indictment,
including Diaz's live-in boyfriend, Santiago Pache. After a four-
day jury trial, Diaz was found guilty on two drug-trafficking
counts. On May 20, 2003, the district court sentenced her to a
151-month incarcerative term (the bottom of the guideline
sentencing range). This appeal ensued.
We need not tarry. This is a single-issue appeal in
which Diaz asserts that because she was sentenced prior to the
decision in United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005), and
under the mandatory guidelines system then in effect, resentencing
is required. Diaz concedes that this claim of error is
unpreserved. It is, therefore, relegated to plain error review.
See United States v. Guzmán,
419 F.3d 27, 30 (1st Cir. 2005);
United States v. Antonakopoulos,
399 F.3d 68, 75 (1st Cir. 2005).
In order to establish an entitlement to relief under the
plain error standard, an appellant must show "(1) that an error
occurred (2) which was clear or obvious and which not only (3)
affected [her] substantial rights, but also (4) seriously impaired
the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings." United States v. Duarte, 246 F.3d 56, 60 (1st Cir.
2001). The first two prongs of the plain error test are satisfied
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where, as here, the sentencing court treated the guidelines as
mandatory rather than advisory. See Antonakopoulos, 399 F.3d at
75. Consequently, we proceed directly to the third and fourth
prongs of the test.
With respect to these prongs, the appellant must show at
a bare minimum that, had the error not occurred, there is a
"reasonable probability" that she would have received a lesser
sentence. Id. We have held that in many cases this third-prong
showing will be "sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome
of the proceeding,"
id. at 78 (quoting United States v. Dominguez
Benitez,
542 U.S. 74, 83 (2004)), and, thus, will satisfy the
fourth prong as well.
In light of the foregoing, the pivotal issue is whether,
but for the then-mandatory nature of the sentencing guidelines, "it
is reasonably likely that the district court would have imposed a
more lenient sentence." Guzmán, 419 F.3d at 30. In answering this
question, our reading of the record will neither be pettifogging
nor overly strict. See United States v. Heldeman,
402 F.3d 220,
224 (1st Cir. 2005).
In this case, we believe that Diaz has satisfied the
requirements for showing plain error. The district judge not only
sentenced her to the shortest possible prison term available under
the applicable guideline sentencing range but also characterized
that sentence as "very severe." In virtually the same breath, the
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judge noted pointedly that "the limits of [judicial] authority
[were] provided by the Sentencing Guidelines." He went on to
explain that he was bound to follow the dictates of the Sentencing
Commission and, indirectly, of Congress. These allusions, taken in
context, tend to show a belief that the then-mandatory guidelines
tied the judge's hands.1
To cinch matters, the record reveals three special
circumstances that suggest a reasonable likelihood of a lower
sentence under an advisory guidelines regime. First, the
sentencing judge appeared to be sensitive to the abusive
relationship that existed between Diaz and her codefendant,
Santiago Pache. While the judge found that this relationship did
not justify a departure based on coercion, see supra note 1, he
nonetheless concluded that the "dysfunctional relationship" placed
Diaz "under a degree of duress." Second, Diaz's family
circumstances, especially in relation to the care of her young
child, were immaterial under the mandatory guidelines regime; now,
however, the judge could very well find them compelling. Finally,
the judge was sufficiently concerned about Diaz's cognitive ability
and mental health that he ordered the Bureau of Prisons to conduct
a psychiatric evaluation. Although the evaluation revealed that
1
The judge's statements regarding his denial of Diaz's request
for a downward departure reinforce this view. When handing down
the sentence, he stated trenchantly that his "perception of
intellectual honesty concerning the availability of departures"
constrained him to stay within the guideline sentencing range.
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Diaz was able to proceed to sentencing and to serve a sentence of
incarceration, it confirmed that she suffered from an adjustment
disorder.
We need go no further. Because the record, taken as a
whole, indicates that the district court, if acting under an
advisory guidelines system, might well have imposed a more lenient
sentence, we vacate Diaz's sentence and remand for resentencing.
If we have misread the district judge's inclination, it will be
easy enough for him simply to reimpose the same sentence. At any
rate, that is for the able district judge; for our part, we
intimate no view as to what sentence should be imposed in the
resentencing proceeding.
The appellant's sentence is vacated and the case is
remanded for resentencing.
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