Filed: Sep. 22, 2006
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: and Howard, Circuit Judge., F. Mark Terison, Senior Litigation Counsel, with whom Paula D., Silsby, United States Attorney, was on brief, for appellee. United States v. Leland, 370 F. Supp. This appeal followed. Lawton v. State Mut.F.3d 480, 485 (1st Cir.withdrawal of the appellant's guilty pleas.
Not for Publication in West's Federal Reporter
Citation Limited Pursuant to 1st Cir. Loc. R. 32.3
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 05-2670
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
WILLIAM LELAND,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE
[Hon. John A. Woodcock, Jr., U.S. District Judge]
Before
Selya, Circuit Judge,
Siler,** Senior Circuit Judge,
and Howard, Circuit Judge.
Robert M. Napolitano for appellant.
F. Mark Terison, Senior Litigation Counsel, with whom Paula D.
Silsby, United States Attorney, was on brief, for appellee.
September 22, 2006
*
Of the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.
Per Curiam. In a second superseding indictment, a
federal grand jury in the District of Maine charged defendant-
appellant William Leland with commission of an array of federal
controlled substance and firearms offenses. See 21 U.S.C. §§
841(a)(1), 846; 18 U.S. C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2). On January 27,
2004, pursuant to the terms of a plea agreement that called for the
government to move to dismiss one count of the indictment, the
appellant entered guilty pleas to the remaining counts.
Almost a year later, in a motion filed on January 19,
2005, the appellant sought to withdraw his guilty pleas. Following
a hearing, the district court, in a well-reasoned rescript, denied
the motion. United States v. Leland, 370 F. Supp. 2d 337, 339-47
(D. Me. 2005) (concluding, inter alia, that the movant lacked a
fair and just reason for his plea-withdrawal request). On October
27, 2005, the court sentenced the appellant to serve a 252-month
incarcerative term. This appeal followed.
We have long adhered to the view that when a trial court
accurately sizes up a case, applies the proper legal rules, and
articulates a persuasive rationale, "an appellate court should
refrain from writing at length to no other end than to hear its own
words resonate." Lawton v. State Mut. Life Assur. Co., 101 F.3d
218, 220 (1st Cir. 1996); accord, e.g., Cruz-Ramos v. P.R. Sun Oil
Co.,
202 F.3d 381, 383 (1st Cir. 2000); Ayala v. Union de
Tronquistas, Local 901,
74 F.3d 344, 345 (1st Cir. 1996); Holders
-2-
Capital Corp. v. Cal. Union Ins. Co. (In re San Juan Dupont Plaza
Hotel Fire Litig.), 989 F.2d 36, 38 (1st Cir. 1993). This case
fits snugly within the confines of that principle. Accordingly, we
affirm the judgment below for essentially the reasons elucidated in
the district court's meticulous analysis of the plea-withdrawal
request.
There is one loose end. On appeal — unlike in the lower
court — the appellant claims that his former attorney provided
ineffective assistance of counsel. A threshold problem stands in
the way of this Sixth Amendment challenge: no such claim was
advanced below. This court has ruled "with a regularity bordering
on the monotonous [that] claims of ineffective assistance cannot
make their debut on direct review." United States v. Mala, 7 F.3d
1058, 1063 (1st Cir. 1993). While the Mala rule admits of a narrow
band of exceptions applicable to cases in which "the critical facts
are not genuinely in dispute and the record is sufficiently
developed to allow reasoned consideration" of a freshly minted
ineffective assistance claim, United States v. Soldevila-Lopez,
17
F.3d 480, 485 (1st Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v. Natenel,
938 F.2d 302, 309 (1st Cir. 1991)), this appeal plainly falls
outside the compass of that band of exceptions. We therefore
reject the appellant's ineffective assistance claim as premature,
without prejudice, however, to his right to raise that claim,
-3-
should he so desire, in a petition for post-conviction relief under
28 U.S.C. § 2255.
We need go no further. Having perused the briefs with
care, entertained oral argument, and canvassed the record in its
entirety, we find fully supportable the district court's conclusion
that no fair and just reason exists sufficient to justify
withdrawal of the appellant's guilty pleas. Consequently, we
affirm the judgment below, without prejudice, however, to the
appellant's right to press his ineffective assistance of counsel
claim in a collateral proceeding, as described above.
Affirmed.
-4-
