Filed: Aug. 07, 2007
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: Robert A. Vigeant on brief pro se.1, The complaint asserted two additional claims that were, dismissed early in the litigation: the first alleged that the, search was unlawful, and the second was a claim brought by, Vigeant's now deceased grandmother for damages to her business.proceeds, .
Not for Publication in West's Federal Reporter
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 06-2577
ROBERT A. VIGEANT,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES,
Defendant, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
[Hon. William E. Smith, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lynch, Circuit Judge,
Campbell and Selya, Senior Circuit Judges.
Robert A. Vigeant on brief pro se.
Steve Frank and Robert S. Greenspan, Appellate Staff, Civil
Division, Department of Justice, Peter D. Keisler, Assistant
Attorney General, and Robert Clark Corrente, United States
Attorney, on brief for appellee.
August 7, 2007
Per Curiam. Robert A. Vigeant appeals the district
court's entry of summary judgment in favor of the government in
this action brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§
2671-80, asserting claims of false arrest, false imprisonment,
malicious prosecution and abuse of process based on the events
leading to Vigeant's arrest and conviction for a firearms offense
which was subsequently vacated by this court.1 See United States v.
Vigeant, 176 F.3d 565 (1st Cir. 1999). We review the grant of
summary judgment de novo, drawing all reasonable inferences in
favor of the nonmoving party. United States v. Union Bank for Sav.
& Inv.,
487 F.3d 8, 16-17 (1st Cir. 2007). Summary judgment is
properly granted if the movant can demonstrate that "there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
However, "where [the nonmoving] party bears the burden of proof, it
'must present definite, competent evidence' from which a reasonable
jury could find in its favor." Union Bank for Sav. & Inv., 487
1
The complaint asserted two additional claims that were
dismissed early in the litigation: the first alleged that the
search was unlawful, and the second was a claim brought by
Vigeant's now deceased grandmother for damages to her business.
While Vigeant does not appear to challenge the dismissal of the
first claim, he requests "reinstatement" of his grandmother's
claim. However, since Vigeant failed to raise a timely objection
to the magistrate judge's recommendation to dismiss that claim,
which was subsequently adopted by the district court, we will not
review it now. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Negron v. Celebrity
Cruises, Inc., 316 F.3d 60, 61 (1st Cir. 2003). The remaining
issues raised on appeal relate to the summary judgment
determination.
-2-
F.3d at 16-17 (quoting United States v. One Parcel of Real Prop.,
960 F.2d 200, 204 (1st Cir. 1992)). To establish a claim for false
arrest, false imprisonment or malicious prosecution under Rhode
Island law, Vigeant was required to demonstrate, among other
things, a lack of probable cause for the criminal proceedings.
Beaudoin v. Levesque,
697 A.2d 1065, 1067 (R.I. 1997). While this
court determined in the context of the direct criminal appeal that
the search warrant application was not supported by probable cause
and that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule
therefore did not apply, we did not consider whether federal agents
executing the search of Vigeant's home had probable cause to arrest
him when they discovered firearms. See
Vigeant, 176 F.3d at 569
(expressly limiting inquiry to "whether there was probable cause to
believe that Vigeant had committed the crime of laundering drug
proceeds, . . . as alleged in the affidavit [for the search warrant
application]").
Vigeant argues that the determination that the agents did
not act in "good faith" in obtaining the search warrant also
vitiates any probable cause that may have existed for his arrest
for the firearms offense; in other words, Vigeant contends that the
application of the exclusionary rule in the criminal proceedings
warrants application of the rule in this civil proceeding. The
district court properly rejected this argument. See Pennsylvania
Bd. of Probation & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 365 & n.4 (1998)
-3-
(noting that the exclusionary rule generally has been held to apply
only in criminal proceedings); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S.
338, 347-48 (1974) (stating that the exclusionary rule is a
remedial device intended to deter future unlawful police conduct
rather than a personal constitutional right, and that "standing to
invoke the rule has been confined to situations where the
government seeks to incriminate the victim of the unlawful
search"). See also Townes v. City of New York,
176 F.3d 138, 149
(2d Cir. 1999) (holding, in a civil rights action, that the absence
of probable cause for a stop and search did not vitiate the
probable cause to arrest plaintiff upon discovery of handguns in
the car in which he was riding). For the reasons set forth by the
district court, we agree that the undisputed facts demonstrate that
the agents had probable cause to believe Vigeant was a felon in
possession of firearms, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). The
government was therefore entitled to summary judgment on the claims
for false arrest, false imprisonment and malicious prosecution.
We also agree with the district court's determination
that Vigeant failed to produce evidence of any ulterior motive or
wrongful purpose for his arrest beyond spite or malevolence, as is
required to prove a claim for abuse of process. See Butera v.
Boucher, 798 A.2d 340, 354 (R.I. 2002) ("The gist of an abuse-of-
process claim is the misuse of legal process to obtain an advantage
'not properly involved in the proceeding itself . . . .
-4-
[However], even a pure spite motive is not sufficient where process
is used only to accomplish the result for which it was created.'"
(quoting W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of
Torts § 121, at 897 (5th ed. 1984)) (emphasis in original).
Defendant was therefore also entitled to summary judgment on the
abuse of process claim.
Accordingly, essentially for the reasons set forth in the
district court's October 19, 2006, Decision and Order, we affirm.
See 1st Cir. R. 27.0(c).
-5-
