Filed: Jan. 09, 2008
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: 1, Maramis's wife, Sellyna Ombuh, also a native and citizen of, Indonesia, is a derivative applicant for asylum, withholding of, removal, and protection under the CAT, based on Maramis's, application.fear of persecution.201 F. App'x at 794.2005) (citing Morales v. INS, 208 F.3d 323, 328 (1st Cir.
Not for Publication in West's Federal Reporter
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 07-1552
RAYMOND MARAMIS,
Petitioner,
v.
MICHAEL B. MUKASEY,*
ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
ON PETITION FOR REVIEW OF ORDER
OF THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS
Before
Lynch, Circuit Judge,
Stahl, Senior Circuit Judge,
and Howard, Circuit Judge.
Wei Jia on brief for petitioner.
Joan E. Smiley, Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation,
Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General, and Richard M. Evans
on brief for respondent.
January 9, 2008
*
Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2), Attorney General
Michael B. Mukasey has been substituted for former Attorney General
Alberto R. Gonzales as the respondent herein.
STAHL, Senior Circuit Judge. The Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA) affirmed, without opinion, an Immigration Judge's
(IJ's) denial of Raymond Maramis's claims for asylum, withholding
of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture
(CAT). Maramis,1 a native and citizen of Indonesia, now petitions
this court for a review of the BIA's denial of his claims for
asylum and withholding of removal. Maramis does not argue error in
the BIA's affirmation of the IJ's denial of relief under the CAT,
thus waiving that issue. See Wijaya v. Gonzales, 201 F. App'x 791,
792 (1st Cir. 2006) (unpublished opinion). Because a reasonable
fact-finder would not be compelled to conclude that Maramis has met
his burden of proof to establish eligibility for asylum or
withholding of removal, we deny the petition for review.
I. BACKGROUND
Maramis entered the United States via Los Angeles,
California, on or about May 1, 2002, as a nonimmigrant visitor with
authorization to remain in the United States until October 31,
2002. In a Notice to Appear dated May 23, 2003, the former
Immigration and Naturalization Service instituted removal
proceedings. At a hearing before the IJ, Maramis admitted the
factual allegations within the Notice to Appear and conceded
1
Maramis's wife, Sellyna Ombuh, also a native and citizen of
Indonesia, is a derivative applicant for asylum, withholding of
removal, and protection under the CAT, based on Maramis's
application.
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removability as charged, but argued entitlement to asylum,
withholding of removal, and protection under the CAT.
The IJ denied Maramis's asylum application and other
attendant claims, finding that, while credible, Maramis did not
adequately corroborate his status as a lifelong Christian, that the
events described by him did not amount to past persecution, and
that he failed to present a sufficient basis to substantiate a
well-founded fear of future persecution. The IJ also perfunctorily
denied Maramis's claims for withholding of removal and protection
under the CAT. A detailed discussion of the underlying facts is
unnecessary, because Maramis bases his appeal entirely on a pattern
or practice theory in his attempt at establishing a well-founded
fear of persecution. As evidence, Maramis relies exclusively upon
the State Department's 2005 International Religious Freedom Report
on Indonesia.2
II. DISCUSSION
We review the BIA's denial of asylum for substantial
evidence and accept the BIA's findings of fact if they are
"supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on
2
Although Maramis presented additional evidence concerning
conditions in Indonesia to the IJ, including the State Department's
2004 Country Report on Indonesia as well as letters from a
Christian pastor located in Indonesia and Maramis's sister in
Indonesia, his brief on appeal focuses solely on the 2005
International Religious Freedom Report for purposes of establishing
the existence of a pattern or practice of religious persecution in
Indonesia. We note, however, that the result would not change were
the court to consider the additional information.
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the record considered as a whole." Njenga v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d
335, 338 (1st Cir. 2004) (quoting INS v. Elias-Zacarias,
502 U.S.
478, 481 (1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted). With respect
to factual conclusions, we will reverse the decision below only if
"any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the
contrary." 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). Where, as here, "the BIA
adopts an IJ's decision, we review the relevant portion of the IJ's
opinion as though it were the decision of the BIA." Guillaume v.
Gonzales,
504 F.3d 68, 72 (1st Cir. 2007).
The petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish
eligibility for asylum. Bocova v. Gonzales, 412 F.3d 257, 262 (1st
Cir. 2005). This burden can be met by proving past persecution on
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion, which then gives rise to an
inference of future persecution, or by establishing a well-founded
fear of persecution on the same grounds.
Id. "A well-founded fear
of future persecution can be shown in either of two ways."
Wijaya,
201 F. App'x at 794. "First, the petitioner may show a genuine
subjective fear of persecution, along with 'credible, direct, and
specific evidence' that would objectively support a reasonable fear
of future individualized persecution."
Id. (quoting Guzman v. INS,
327 F.3d 11, 16 (1st Cir. 2003)). "Second, a petitioner need not
provide evidence that he would be singled out for persecution if he
establishes that there is a 'pattern or practice in his or her
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country of nationality . . . of persecution of a group of persons
similarly situated to the applicant on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.'" Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 8 C.F.R.
§ 1208.13(b)(2)(iii)(A)).
Thus, our review of the decision below regarding whether
Maramis has a well-founded fear of persecution is highly
circumscribed. We can only reverse if the evidence compels the
opposite conclusion. In this case, Maramis has waived his
arguments related to past persecution and his fear of future
persecution based on his own, specific circumstances. See Berrio-
Barrera v. Gonzales, 460 F.3d 163, 168 & n.2 (1st Cir. 2006)
(holding that issues not presented on appeal or adverted to in a
perfunctory manner are deemed waived). In this appeal, Maramis
maintains only that the IJ erred by holding that he had failed to
present sufficient corroboratory evidence that he had been a
Christian since birth and by failing to address Maramis's evidence
supporting the existence of a pattern or practice of persecution
against Christians in Indonesia. Because we rule against Maramis
on the latter ground, we need not consider the question of whether
the IJ erred by requiring Maramis to present corroboratory evidence
regarding his alleged Christian faith.
The record evidence does not compel the conclusion that
Maramis has established a well-founded fear of future persecution
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on the basis of his professed religious identity. In support of
this aspect of his claim on appeal, Maramis points to the 2005
International Religious Freedom Report issued by the State
Department. Maramis contends that the IJ neglected to consider
whether this evidence proved the existence of a pattern or practice
of persecution of Christians in Indonesia. This argument is
largely semantic, based on the IJ's failure to use the precise
phrase "pattern or practice," which is a term of art. "We do not
require an IJ to intone any magic words before we will review [his]
determination." Sulaiman v. Gonzales, 429 F.3d 347, 351 (1st Cir.
2005) (citing Morales v. INS,
208 F.3d 323, 328 (1st Cir. 2000)).
As a substantive matter, the IJ described the general
conditions in Indonesia as presented in the State Department report
in his summary of facts, specifically noting that despite the
presence of some ongoing conflict, "the [Indonesian] government
made significant efforts to reduce interreligious violence . . . ."
Again, in his findings and analysis, the IJ acknowledged the
existence of some degree of religious turmoil in Indonesia.
Moreover, we note that counsel for Maramis likewise did not use the
phrase "pattern or practice" during oral argument before the IJ,
opting for less precise diction. Even if Maramis did adequately
make a pattern or practice claim to the IJ, the IJ's conclusion is
supported by the record.
-6-
Although the IJ recognized that Indonesia is not devoid
of religious conflict, he nonetheless determined that Maramis
failed to adduce sufficient evidence to form an objectively
reasonable basis for fearing harm in Indonesia because of his
purported Christian faith. This conclusion is amply supported by
the record. Indeed, in recent cases, we have repeatedly and
uniformly rejected nearly identical appeals from petitioners based
on the supposed existence of an ongoing pattern or practice of
persecution against Christians in Indonesia. See, e.g., Kho v.
Keisler, 505 F.3d 50, 54-55 (1st Cir. 2007) (citing Sipayung v.
Gonzales,
491 F.3d 18, 21 (1st Cir. 2007);
Wijaya, 201 F. App'x at
795; Teja v. Gonzales,
196 F. App'x 4, 7 (1st Cir. 2006) (per
curiam) (unpublished opinion); Jaya v. Gonzales,
169 F. App'x 596,
598 (1st Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (unpublished opinion)).
Maramis did not supply either the IJ or the BIA with any
new information substantiating worsening conditions in Indonesia
that would warrant a different result. A perusal of the 2005
International Religious Freedom Report reinforces, rather than
refutes, the IJ's rejection of Maramis's pattern or practice
argument. Besides praising the Indonesian government's efforts to
curb religious violence, the report reveals only sporadic and
isolated incidents of religious turmoil in a country of
approximately 240 million inhabitants. The overall tenor of the
report reflects measured progress rather than increasing conflict.
-7-
Thus, Maramis has failed to prove that he has a well-founded fear
of future persecution and, consequently, his claim for asylum is
without merit.
Maramis, "having failed to establish [his] eligibility
for asylum, necessarily fails in [his] claim for withholding of
removal," which is subject to a more stringent burden of proof.
See Wang v. Mukasey, 508 F.3d 80, 85 (1st Cir. 2007) (citing
Berrio-Barrera 460 F.3d at 168; Rodriguez-Ramirez v. Ashcroft,
398
F.3d 120, 123 (1st Cir. 2005)). Thus, we reject Maramis's claim
for withholding of removal as well.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we deny Maramis's petition for
review.
Affirmed.
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