Filed: Mar. 25, 2008
Latest Update: Feb. 22, 2020
Summary: and Lipez, Circuit Judge., ____________________, Charles Christophe and Christophe & Associates, P.C., on brief, for Petitioner., Wallace, Senior Circuit Judge.sex trafficking and not because of her political opinion.she is not entitled to asylum relief.Hincapié, 494 F.3d at 220.It is so ordered.
Not for Publication in West's Federal Reporter
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
________________
No. 07-2019
SENADA NDREKA,
Petitioner,
v.
MICHAEL B. MUKASEY,
United States Attorney General,
Respondent.
_________________
ON PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER
OF THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS
_____________________
Before
Torruella, Circuit Judge,
Wallace,* Senior Circuit Judge,
and Lipez, Circuit Judge.
____________________
Charles Christophe and Christophe & Associates, P.C., on brief
for Petitioner.
Briena L. Strippoli, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration
Litigation, Jeffrey S. Bucholtz, Acting Assistant Attorney General,
and Mary Jane Candaux, Assistant Director, on brief for respondent.
March 14, 2008
*
Of the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation.
Wallace, Senior Circuit Judge. Petitioner Senada Ndreka seeks
review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (Board) denial of her
appeal. Substantial evidence supports the Board’s decision, and we
affirm. See López de Hincapié v. Gonzales, 494 F.3d 213, 218-220
(1st Cir. 2007).
Ndreka cannot qualify as a refugee unless she was persecuted
based on a protected ground. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,
428 (1987); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). Although Ndreka
argues she was subject to persecution based on her political
opinion, substantial evidence supports the Board’s determination
that Ndreka was targeted by criminals interested in using her for
sex trafficking and not because of her political opinion. Thus,
she is not entitled to asylum relief. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1).
Because Ndreka failed to show that she was persecuted based on a
protected ground for asylum eligibility purposes, she likewise
fails in her application for withholding of removal. See López de
Hincapié, 494 F.3d at 220.
Substantial evidence supports the Board’s determination that
Ndreka has not shown it is more likely than not that she would be
tortured by or at the acquiescence of a government official upon
her return to Albania, and the denial of relief under the
Convention Against Torture was therefore appropriate. See Xue Deng
Jiang v. Gonzales, 474 F.3d 25, 32 (1st Cir. 2007).
Therefore, Ndreka’s petition for review is denied.
It is so ordered.
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